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Abstract 
This research aims to study the effects of legal liability rules on auditing quality in 
order to devise and implement a guideline for the optimal liability rules that can be 
applied to the auditing profession within society, and thus encourage investment.  
In an emerging market like Kuwait state, there is a weakness in the legal system, which 
may cause users to place less reliance on financial reports and auditing services. This 
environment does not encourage investment. The position in Kuwait state will be 
studied as an example of how emerging economies can add to the understanding of the 
role of the auditor, for the purposes of improving audit quality and encouraging a 
greater amount of investment. Where this position can be understood, this study gives a 
strong impression of how the legal liability of external auditors can impact on the 
auditing quality and, importantly, the chances of obtaining investment. For this reason 
the study is applied in Kuwait state.  
This research differs from the other literature in several important ways. First, the study 
has been performed in an environment of weak governance. Second, it studies the 
effects of the civil legal liability system from two views at the same time, so the 
research is carried out in relation to two different sides: first, the demand side of the 
auditing services represented by the users of financial information; and second, the 
supply side of the auditing services represented by the auditors. This has been done 
through two questionnaires, one distributed for each side.  
The results of users' questionnaire revealed that the existence of civil legal liability 
will increase the demand for auditing service. Also, consideration is directed towards 
the main determinant of auditing quality, which is the legal liability system, more so 
than other factors. As well as, through increasing auditor liability, trust in financial 
information will be enhanced, subsequently prompting investment within society. 
Moreover, the users, besides their needs for auditing services, require auditors to 
provide collateral for their investment process in order to increase their investment 
level. On other side, the results of auditors' questionnaire detected that the auditors 
hold the view that the demand for auditing services by companies will not be affected 
by the existence or non-existence of the liability rules. However, auditors believe that 
the existence of legal liability rules will make financial statement users more trustful in 
financial information, thereby increasing the number of users of audited financial 
reports. Also, the auditors do not agree that their liability should be increased since  this 
will make auditing services more costly through the need to collect more evidence, 
increase  the time of auditing, increase the sample size, etc. The increase in liability 
will also limit their acceptance of risky clients, make them increase their efforts, and 
due care. Furthermore, the introduction of legal liability may cause them to reduce their 
supply of audit services.  
Finally, a statistical test is carried out to compare the answers of the two groups. It is 
found that there are differences in views concerning the effects of the existence of legal 
liability on the demand for auditing. As well as, there are differences regarding their 
preferences about the alternative civil legal rules. The results of this study will help 
legislators by comparing the effects of available legal rules on audit quality and 
investment level. Accordingly, legislators can select the appropriate legal structure for 
auditors’ liability that achieves benefits to the business environment. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1  Preface 
The legal responsibility of external auditors is considered integral to the underpinning 
of auditing profession within any society. Legal responsibility affects auditing quality 
(Palmrose, 1988; Melumad & Thoman, 1990; Dye, 1995; Kinney & Nelson,1996; 
Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz, 1998; Radhakrishnan,1999; Zhang & Thoman, 1999; King 
& Schwartz, 2000; Defond et al., 2002). Increasing audit quality means less uncertainty 
concerning financial information, which improves the overall decision-making process 
when allocating resources in performing auditing tasks. In this regard, reporting results 
honestly reflects the financial status of the customer’s firm subjected to auditing. As a 
result, the entire process reflects on decisions made by financial statements users. 
The legal accountability of external auditors rests on a number of rules governing the 
dimensions forming responsibility, e.g. the incident constituting the auditors’ 
responsibility, parties claiming the auditors’ fault and the subsequent measurement of 
the damage incurred and necessitating compensation, and the party held accountable 
for paying the damage estimated by the court having jurisdiction in interest of the 
plaintiff.  
It should be noted that there are various rules available, each of which affects auditing 
quality in different manner. Such alternative rules vary in terms of the level of 
responsibility imposed upon the auditor. Therefore, such rules produce different levels 
of quality provided, thus compelling the auditor to exercise due care during the auditing 
process and also affecting decisions made by financial statement users regarding their 
investments. 
There is a great deal of controversy concerning the rules of legal responsibility that 
should achieve ideal levels for the society in terms of auditing quality and the 
investment volume in business firms. With this in mind, previous studies (Palmrose, 
1988; Melumad & Thoman, 1990; Elitzur & Falk, 1996) indicate that there is, in 
general, a positive correlation between the levels of compensation expected by the 
plaintiff as a result of auditors’ liability towards them and auditing quality; this 
Chapter One: Introduction 
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subsequently affects users’ decision and the level of investment and trade. Some studies 
(Ball et al., 2003; Christensen et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2009) argue that the 
benefits of IFRS mandatory adoption are appear to be stronger in countries where legal 
systems effectively protect outside investors’ claims. A common finding is that IFRS 
has an effect only in countries with strong enforcement regimes. However, other 
studies (Narayanan, 1994; Patterson & Wright, 2003) indicate another trend, which 
emphasises that heightening the legal responsibility of external auditors may not 
strengthen auditing profession. This is owing to the fact that certain legal rules may 
reduce or even completely demise the auditing process, as a whole; however, there 
might be other alternative rules which could be far harsher. 
 
 From another perspective, i.e. that indicated by Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz 
(2000), the possibility of the legal system to attain auditing quality is not necessarily 
the most efficient for society, as legal responsibility enforces more accurate auditing in 
addition to protecting users of financial statements against potential losses. As a result, 
greater levels of legal accountability for auditors may prompt investors (amongst users 
of financial statements) to exaggerate investment compared with ideal levels for 
society.  
Moreover, unjustified legal suits may be filed in regard to external auditors, once the 
auditor’s responsibility is unfairly heightened. Some (Schibano, 2000, in Yu, 2000) 
argue that greater levels of legal responsibility may force the auditor to show discretion 
when issuing reports—a development that would result in the potential rejection of 
financial statements issued by the auditor, thereby causing business firms to experience 
difficulties in obtaining the funds necessary for conducting investment activities, 
although they may be beneficial to society.  
Accordingly, there is a call for exercising care by legislators by comparing available 
legal rules to select the legal structure appropriate to the business environment, when 
considering the benefits achieved by society. Such a process would ultimately ensure 
the overall effective allocation of resources under the assumption that every legal rule 
has a different effect on decisions relating to auditing quality and those made by users 
of financial statements.  
Chapter One: Introduction 
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In a weak legal environment, such as the state of Kuwait, there is a trend to expand the 
proprietary base along with other measures aiming at economic reform, resulting in the 
development of the Kuwaiti securities market. Moreover, there is the dire need to 
improve the business climate and enhance both local and foreign investors’ trust in the 
financial information disclosed to reveal the financial status of firms operating in 
Kuwait. With this in mind, it has become imperative that financial reporting and the 
overall credibility of financial statements be enhanced. The outcome should be the 
restoration of public trust in the financial statements issued, with information attached 
to them, upon making investment decisions.  
To this end, the legal liability of external auditors operating in a weak legal 
environment, such as that of Kuwait state, should be scrutinised so as to ensure the high 
quality of the auditing profession potentially achieved by well-defined standards for 
auditing liability. Notably, this can facilitate investment decisions in the financial 
markets in Kuwait. 
Such scrutiny would markedly determine the extent to which statutory amendments are 
needed for existing provisions and the issuance of new laws, thus implementing 
controls on enforced legislature and bringing benefits to society. 
 
1.2  Study Problem 
The problem can be summarised, as follows: 
1. What are the liability rules improving overall auditing quality within society? 
2. What are the factors affecting auditor activity and auditing quality? 
3. Is there a relationship between investment level and the liability rules applied 
and audit quality? 
In light of the aforementioned, many have questioned the overall credibility of the 
auditor’s job role, the quality of auditing outcomes and the legal responsibility of 
auditors, the latter of which urges a professional review to improving performance 
quality and eventually rationalising the decisions made by financial statement users.  
Chapter One: Introduction 
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The aim of auditors’ legal liability is the guarantee of achieving a reasonable quality for 
the auditing profession and the overall creditability of financial reports; hence the 
support of investment process within society. The investment level should be at an 
optimal level and not at the utmost level. Thus considered a full guarantee for 
investment through the imposition of legal rules to compensate investors for any loss 
potentially exacerbating investment levels, without any study of the risk and cause of 
collapse in the investment process. Therefore, our problem is concerned with achieving 
a framework for the relation between auditors’ legal liabilities, auditing quality, and 
investment level. It is considered that this will help to structure emerging economies. 
When striving to achieve auditor liability, there is the call for a well-defined liability 
rule and damage measure. Moreover, there are a number of legal rules adopted to 
govern auditor liability; these vary from compensation to deterrence, and which can 
ultimately enhance auditing quality. In this regard, a compensation rule offers a greater 
guarantee for investors regarding investments, although this may ultimately cause 
auditors additional apprehensions regarding financial reports and thus a lesser desire to 
accept customers with risky business. Moreover, a deterrence rule, through professional 
sanction, may offer higher auditing quality, but a lesser guarantee for investors. 
Auditing quality—a multi-faceted concept—is concerned with all participants in the 
auditing process and beneficiaries. However, both parties view the auditing process 
from different perspectives: shareholders, on the one hand, evaluate quality in a 
different way from creditors, who consider quality differently from investors.  
Importantly, auditing quality needs to be at a level where the probability of audit failure 
is at its lowest rate in society. Importantly, auditing quality could not be at its highest 
level owing to the high costs of the auditing process or at its lowest level owing to legal 
liabilities. Essentially, auditing quality depends on auditor activity, which is a function 
of auditing costs and expected liabilities in the case of auditing failure. With additional 
costs meaning a lesser supply of auditing process, which subsequently increases 
uncertainty for financial statements users. Accordingly, imposing a strict liability 
regime means a high cost for the auditing profession. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 12 
Uncertainty affects the level of investment: a higher risk will lead to reduced 
investment levels, whilst reducing risk depends on auditors’ liabilities, which may lead 
to poor investments decisions and the transfer of risk from investors to auditors. 
Trust in regard to the financial statements released by companies is one of the 
fundamentals helping to support and assist the financial markets. In this context, it is 
true to state that the role played by external auditors from the aspect of validating and 
authenticating the issued financial statements is of great importance as the basis for 
decision making.  
Various studies have examined this issue; however, thus far, there has not been any 
development in terms of establishing a definite and comprehensive framework 
addressing the different dimensions constituting the relationship of legal liability to the 
auditing process, thus helping users to measure the overall quality level of auditing. 
Therefore, there is a dire need for researchers and practitioners to develop existing 
approaches to quality control, thus suggesting new approaches that would protect 
equity and enhance performance quality, so that decisions made by investors are 
rationalised. 
 
1.3  Study Importance 
The importance of this study can be seen from two different perspectives. 
  
1.3.1  A Theoretical Perspective 
A number of emerging economies seek to expand the proprietary base, thus leading to 
the expansion of the role adopted by the capital market and an increase in the listed 
joint stock in the securities market. As a result, there is a critical need to incorporate 
greater trust into the quality of information circulated through improving the quality of 
the auditor’s report. For this reason, the position in Kuwait will be focussed on as a 
generic suggestion for how the emerging economies can add to the understanding of the 
role of the auditor, when it comes to improving audit quality and encouraging a greater 
amount of investment. Where the position in Kuwait can be understood, this will then 
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give the researcher a strong impression of how the civil legal liability of external 
auditor can impact on the quality of the audit and, importantly, the chances of obtaining 
investment.  
In regard to the financial violations experienced by major corporations in developed 
economies, the collapse of some of these entities is attributed, in some cases, to faulty 
accounting practices, which points the finger of accusation at auditing service quality. 
Harsh criticism has been directed towards the auditing profession, in Kuwait, for failing 
to keep up with developments in light of recent changes, thus causing deficient 
professional performance and poor levels of quality.  
With this in mind, few studies have thus far sought to tackle the issue of legal 
responsibility for external auditors, from the various dimensions relevant to auditing 
quality, as viewed by the different parties making up the auditing environment and the 
users of financial statements. 
With the discussion thus far taken into account, the present study will seek to 
incorporate legal and accounting knowledge in order to gain an understanding of the 
way in which legal rules impact the liability of external auditors and decisions by 
auditors, as well as the users of financial statements. Importantly, there have been no 
studies carried out, previously, in a weak legal environment, such as the Kuwaiti 
business environment, and which have tested the relationship between the 
administrative alternatives of the legal responsibility, and decisions relating to auditing 
quality.  
The present study aims to consider and discuss the impacts of alternative rules, and 
further directs attention to the third party, who has the right to sue the auditor in respect 
of auditing quality, as well as the users of financial statements—an issue rarely 
examined by previous studies. 
 
1.3.2  A Practical Perspective 
The present study will provide empirical evidence to develop understanding of the 
major factors obstructing legal liability of the auditor in emerged economies, such as 
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that of Kuwait, as a guarantor of auditing quality. The study will also determine various 
ramifications associated with alternative legal rules, thus enabling the legislator, in any 
countries, to control such ramifications, while formulating the rules governing legal 
liability of the auditor. 
Satisfying the needs of the business environment in emerged economies can be 
achieved through the provision of guidelines on the appropriate system, with such 
concerned with regulating the legal liability of external auditors. It is recognised that 
this would enable a balance to be struck between the utilities of the main parties 
affected by the auditing process, while also dealing with the rapidly changing economic 
factors on the local and international levels, e.g. free market economics, integration into 
globalism, and movement toward trade liberation, within the framework of 
international trade agreement. This will certainly impact on the accounting and auditing 
profession, and the investment climate in Kuwait, as a whole. Therefore, the investment 
atmosphere within Kuwait is required in order to adapt to such changes, since the 
existing rules governing the legal liability of external auditors in Kuwait may not help 
enhance trust amongst the users of financial statements.  
In relation to the above-mentioned, this study is performed in the State of Kuwait for 
many reasons: 
 The weaknesses in its legal system make the users less concerned with the 
financial reports and the auditing services. 
 Kuwait is an emerging economy, where its government seeks to encourage 
investment. 
 There is a critical need for a legal system to support audit quality and 
investment level in such an emerging economy. 
 The field of the study is adequate to study the conflict between financial 
information users and auditors, concerning the auditors’ responsibility. 
 There are no previous studies concerning this field performed in Kuwait. 
 This study can help in understanding the audit quality and investment level in a 
weak legal environment, and the users’ expectations from the auditors. 
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1.4  Study Objectives 
The present study will seek to attain the following objectives: 
1. To identify the factors preventing the implementation of auditors’ liability 
within the current business environment. 
2. To study the ways in which different levels of auditor liability affect decisions 
relating to overall auditing quality and subsequent investment. 
3. To identify the major factors defining the auditing process, through analytical 
examination of a literature review, so as to delineate a relationship between 
these factors and the overall legal liability of external auditors.  
4. To establish a conceptual framework able to facilitate the interpretation of a 
relationship between the legal liability of external auditors and professional 
performance quality.  
5. To measure and thereby analyse the main variables influencing professional 
performance quality, illustrating the impacts on decisions taken by the users of 
financial statements concerning their investments.  
 
 
1.5  Study Hypotheses 
In order to meet the study objectives, this research will seek to test four hypotheses, 
considering the users of financial statements (the demand side of the auditing services) 
at the first stage of the study. In the second stage of the study, the first and third 
hypotheses are tested considering the auditors (the supply side of the auditing services). 
The four hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1: The degree of the civil legal liability system within society has no effect on the 
auditing profession. 
H2: The civil legal liability rule is not the main factor affecting auditing quality. 
H3: Increasing the civil legal liability of auditors will not increase audit quality. 
H4: Investment level within society is not dependent on the civil legal rules applied. 
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1.6  Study Methodology 
In order to test the hypotheses of the research and achieve the objectives, a 
comprehensive framework (theoretical and practical) will be relied upon. With this in 
mind, the research includes two styles: 
First, a theoretic study: this aspect seeks to build a scientific framework for the study 
problems and the objectives through depending on text books, essays, researches, 
conferences and periodicals, in order to: 
 study and cite the relationship between the legal responsibility of external 
auditors, and the professional performance quality in auditing; and 
 describe the relationship between auditing professional performance quality and 
the decisions made by investors.  
Second, field study: this aspect includes the design of two questionnaires and its 
distribution through interviews and via mail to a sample of both users and external 
auditors working in the private offices in the state of Kuwait. This aspect has the 
objective to realise opinions and experiences in solving the research problem through 
analysing the results of the questionnaire by using the relevant statistics methods and 
depending on ready statistics programmes; this helps to ensure the overall correctness 
or inaccuracy of the research hypotheses. 
The questionnaires help the researcher to establish the exact information from the 
people concerned, which helps in terms of reaching suitable and precise results for the 
research.  
 
1.7  Study Plan 
This study will be organised into seven chapters, as follows.  
 Chapter One provides an introduction to the study.  
 Chapter Two is dedicated to performing a literature review concerning the 
development of the most important legal liability rule for auditors. 
 The Literature Review of auditing quality and auditor responsibility will be 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
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 The testing of the hypotheses will be performed in Chapter Four for users.  
 Chapter Five will test the hypotheses for auditors.  
 Chapter Six will include a comparison between the results of users’ and 
auditors’ tests.  
 Finally, Chapter Seven will provide the conclusion, recommendations, 
limitations and future research suggestions associated with this study. 
 
 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
The field of this study is considered new owing to the fact that there have been no 
previous studies carried out in the context of the weak business environment examining 
the legal responsibility for external auditors from various dimensions relevant to 
auditing quality, as viewed by the different parties making up the auditing environment, 
as well as users of financial statements. 
This research enriches the literature by working to incorporate legal and accounting 
knowledge, in order to understand the way in which the legal rules impact the overall 
liability of external auditors, and the decisions by auditors as well as users of financial 
statements. 
Moreover, the research will provide empirical evidence to support understanding of the 
major factors obstructing the legal liability of the auditor in emerged economies, such 
as Kuwait state as a guarantor of auditing quality. The study will also determine various 
ramifications associated with alternative legal rules, thus enabling the legislator in any 
countries to control such ramifications whilst formulating the rules governing legal 
liability of auditor. Moreover, this study aims to satisfy the needs of the business 
environment both across the world generally and in Kuwait, in particular; this will be 
achieved through the provision of guidelines on the appropriate systems to regulate the 
legal liability of external auditors. So the contributions of this research are: 
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 This research will enrich the literature by working to incorporate legal and 
accounting knowledge, in order to understand how the legal rules impact 
liability of external auditors and decisions of users of financial statements 
related to their investments level.  
 The study also will determine various effects of alternative legal rules, thus 
enabling the legislator to control any of these effects, while formulating the 
rules governing legal liability of the auditor; it is then possible to suggest an 
appropriate system for auditor legal responsibility (ALR).             
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Chapter Two: Literature Review of the Development of Legal 
Liability Rules for Auditors 
 
2.1  Introduction 
According to the legal rules organising the civil responsibility of external auditors, we 
can conclude that, if the civil court working in any country states that, if there is 
anything misleading in audited financial statements resulting in damage incurred by 
one or more parties, this means that the firm management (the client) has responsibility. 
On the other hand, the auditors’ responsibility is based on auditing efforts and liability 
rules (strict liability rules, negligence rules, etc.) to which external auditor is subjected 
in these countries towards the party, who has the right to litigate civilly. If auditor 
responsibility is proven, this responsibility would then be divided between the auditor 
and the firm’s management (the client) by the Court in light of its estimation for the 
share of every party from fault. Importantly, damage caused necessitates compensation, 
which is decided by the Court by referring to measures used in estimating the 
compensation (out of pocket measures [OOP] and independent of investment measure 
[IOI]). As auditing failures are commonly associated with client bankruptcy, the matter 
requires determining responsibility, in terms of paying compensation, which is 
determined for the plaintiff in the case of insolvency of one or more defendants, 
according to applied legislative base (pure proportional rule, hybrid proportional 
liability rule, and joint and several liability rules). 
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Figure (1): Rules of legal organisation of civil liability for the external auditors: 
 
 
                         
                        Alternatives rules organisation civil liability for auditor 
Dividing liability for 
paying compensation 
damage 
measure 
occurrence of 
liability 
Determination of the 
scope of parties who 
can litigate auditor 
1. Joint and several 
liability rule 
2. Pure proportional 
rule. 
3. Hybrid proportional 
liability rule 
1. Out of 
Pocket 
(OOP). 
2. Independent 
of 
Investment 
(IOI). 
1. Strict liability rule. 
2. Negligent 
liability rule 
1. Contract rule. 
2. Primary 
beneficiary rule 
3. The foreseen user 
rule. 
4. Reasonable foresee 
ability rule. 
 
Many studies in the field of auditor legal responsibility provide evidence regarding the 
ability of the responsibility system, in terms of encouraging the desirable behaviours of 
the auditor by increasing auditing quality and thereby introducing the appropriate 
apportionment of resources so as to achieve the highest economic efficiency within 
society. 
The problem of legal responsibility worsens concerning the third parties’ benefit from 
auditing services. Generally, we can define the third party who has the right to litigate 
the auditor legally (Boynton & Kell 1999) as a category of users, their names not given 
in advance to the auditor, but which depends on his professional opinion when making 
their decisions relating to audited firms. Examples of this category include 
stockholders, prospective investors, creditors, and others who use financial statements. 
Damage 
apportionment rule 
Damage 
measures 
Liability rules Liability scope rules 
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However, it is clear that the third party—who has the right to litigate auditors owing to 
injuries incurred resulting from dependence on misleading financial statements 
accredited by the auditor—belongs to different categories with branched and 
conflicting interests. No one calls an auditor to reconcile between the interests of these 
categories or to care for their interests to the same degree. Also, by opening the door to 
legal responsibility for the third party to litigate the auditor exposes the auditor to 
arbitrary requirements, thus causing the greatest injury to the auditing profession. 
In this context, we review the most important rules governing the responsibility of the 
auditor toward the third party, which have been drawn from the judicial practices and 
legislative systems in the USA, the UK, and the specific situation of Kuwait. Finally, 
the nature of the decisions made by users is discussed. 
 
2.2  The Situation in the USA 
Pacini & Sinason (1998) declare that, to make the auditor responsible about damages 
caused to non-clients (the third party) due to negligence, the following conditions must 
be met: 
a. The existence of auditor negligence towards the third party who is obliged 
before him to give due care, thus resulting in misleading and untrue financial 
statements used by this other party. 
b. The auditor has the belief that the other party depends on these financial 
statements in making certain decisions. 
c. The auditor must be informed that the other party may depend on these financial 
statements in making this decision; consequently, the auditor knows that, if a 
mistake were to be made, this could cause damages for the party. 
d. The dependence of the third party on audited financial statements is logical and 
justified. 
e. The occurrence of real damages for the third party (plaintiff). 
f. The existence of a causal relationship between the auditor’s behaviour and the 
causing of damages for the plaintiff. 
The American jurisdiction pursued several legal suit cases dealing with the auditors’ 
responsibility towards the third party in different situations, and was involved in 
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establishing rules and principles regulating such responsibility and determining the 
third party who has the right of civil litigation on the auditor under common law. 
American legislators had a pioneering role in the codification of legislative texts, in this 
regard. 
 
2.2.1 The Responsibility towards the Third Party under Common Law 
American courts developed four main legal rules or criteria in regard to determining the 
third party who debits the auditor with a care task, whereby the other has the right to 
litigate the auditor owing to the inaccuracy of financial statements resulting from the 
auditor's negligence. These rules were developed by supreme courts in both New York 
and New Jersey states in addition to the American Bar Association. 
The rules must not be considered as representing an independent and separated point 
per se, as these rules do, in fact, fall within a continuum. These rules are: 
a. The privacy rule. 
b. The primary beneficiaries rule (near privacy rule). 
c. The foreseen user rule. 
d. The reasonably foresee ability rule. 
The case of Landell vs. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919) considered the first case 
litigated against auditors in the USA with regard to the auditor’s overall responsibility 
towards the third party, whereas the supreme court in Pennsylvania state judged that the 
auditor had no responsibility toward a buyer of some normal stocks of the employer’s 
indemnifying company, who bought these stocks in direct consideration to the report 
issued by the auditor concerning the financial situation of the company; this report was 
later demonstrated as not accurate and/or honest. In its rejection, the court depended on 
the non-existence of a contractual relation between the plaintiff and defendant (auditor). 
In addition, the plaintiff could not provide evidence that the auditor had issued this 
report and had the intention to cause damages for the plaintiff (Pacini & Sinason, 
1998). 
Upon this judgment, the only party with the right to litigate an auditor owing to 
negligence was the client according to the rule established by the court of 
Chapter Two 
 23 
Pennsylvania—that of privacy of contract. This rule requires the existence of a 
contractual relation or direct connection between the auditor and any other party, and 
so this party litigates the auditor owing to his negligence and his overall responsibility 
of damages incurred by this party. The privacy of the contract rule is considered to be 
the strictest rule regulating auditors’ responsibility from the point of view of the third 
party. This rule is referred to only in the Virginia and Pennsylvania states in the USA 
(Gormley, 1988; Pacini & Sinason, 1998). 
In 1931, the Supreme Court in New York judged the case of Ultramares vs. Touche, 
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) which is currently considered one of the most important 
judgments. The case is believed to represent an essential development in the field of 
establishing the other party and the pioneering application of primary beneficiaries, 
leading to the expanding zone of the auditor's responsibility of negligence to include 
parties other than the client. Occurrences of this case were summed up with the 
statement that the plaintiff (the Ultramares company) provided financial loans to the 
Fred Stern company as a direct result of the auditor's report (Touche and Niven Com), 
who presented an unqualified opinion on the financial statements of the company. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff incurred large financial damages when it was found that the 
financial statements of the company were misleading, failing to reveal its actual 
financial situation. When the financial statements revealed that the net assets of the 
company were US$1070000, the liabilities of the company were more than its assets of 
US$200000. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the assets, as mentioned in the balance 
sheet, implied fallacious debts, the value of which were US$950000. Furthermore, this 
balance sheet did not reveal some of its obligations, itemising its value as US$30000. 
The auditor presented 32 copies of this report to the client, the implied balance sheet of 
the company on which he approved, knowing that such reports would be reviewed by 
various different creditors and stock holders. When the company declared its 
bankruptcy, the plaintiff litigated the auditor owing to his negligence, thus resulting in 
approving the misleading balance sheet statement and causing damages to the plaintiff, 
who depended on the balance sheet statement when providing loans for the company 
(Pacini & Sinason, 1998). 
The court judged that, in spite of the auditor's negligence, he was not responsible for 
compensating the damages incurred by the plaintiff, as he did not know that the 
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financial statement of the company would be presented exactly to the plaintiff; thus, it 
was necessary for the Ultramares Company to litigate auditors for his normal 
negligence. At this stage, the client was required to inform the auditor, upon 
appointment, that they identified another party particularly as a user of the financial 
statements; thus, he was considered a primary beneficiary of the audit (Pacini & 
Sinason, 1998). Importantly, in this regard, the court established the identity of the 
primary beneficiary as any person considered to be the main receiver of the auditor 
report, with auditors needing to know the name of this beneficiary prior to auditing 
(Tucker & Zurich, 1993).  
From the evidence presented to the court in regard to the aforementioned case, it was 
demonstrated that performing auditing was originally for the sake of the client; the 
plaintiff was not identified as the user of the auditor's report, and the auditor was not 
informed of any name of a third party considered to be the beneficiary of the auditing 
process. Consequently, the plaintiff must prove serious negligence by the auditor when 
auditing; the plaintiff did not do this and so his case was rejected (Pany & Whittington, 
1997). 
The previous judgment established the rule of the primary beneficiary of the auditor's 
work. This rule implies that the auditor is responsible for normal negligence towards 
the third party other than the client if he knows, in advance, that these parties depend 
on his work in terms of making certain decisions. Consequently, such parties would 
benefit directly from the auditor's work, and so they must benefit equally to the clients 
in spite of the non-existence of a direct contractual relation linking them with the 
auditor. This rule has been used till now in several American courts when identifying 
the third party with the right to litigate the auditor for negligence. 
During consideration of the case, it was evidenced that, if the auditing procedures were 
tarnished with serious negligence to a degree, calling the court to believe that the 
auditor himself was not persuaded by the sufficiency of these procedures, or if he was 
otherwise considered to be careless or intended to turn a blind eye to the essential 
occurrences, or did not investigate the situations that must raise his doubts, negligence 
in these cases is considered to be serious negligence raised from the perspective of the 
court to fraud. This makes the auditor responsible to the other party in this case—even 
if the other party was not identified. The judge indicates, in the same case, that the 
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auditor's responsibility towards his client was represented by the law in terms of 
compiling his report without fraud, and so he was therefore obliged in virtue of the 
auditing contract to prepare the report with a degree of care required from a person in 
such a situation, but also with regard to the creditors and investors to whom the client 
presented the auditing report. In this regard, the auditor's obligation toward them was to 
compile the report without any fraud as the auditor knew from the surrounding 
conditions that the client did not have the intention to keep the report for himself. From 
this, it was demonstrated that the court tends to restrict the auditor's responsibility in 
regard to the other party concerning fraud or serious professional negligence committed 
by him (Pacini & Sinason, 1998). 
Approximately 50 years following the Ultramares case, the Court of New York 
emphasised the primary beneficiary rule through considering the case of Credit 
Alliance vs. Arthur Anderson and Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). This case implied 
that, for several years, the financial services company Credit Alliance provided 
financing for a company called Smith. In 1978, the creditor company asked the Smith 
company to provide its financial statements, after subjecting it to auditing by an 
external auditor as a condition to accept the obtaining of any additional financial credit 
in the future. In actual fact, the Smith company provided its financial statements to the 
creditor company accompanied with the auditor's report, which implied an unqualified 
opinion with regard to these financial statements for the years 1976–1979. In 1980, the 
Smith company declared its bankruptcy, and the creditor company litigated the auditor 
owing to negligence. 
In this case, the court emphasised the privacy concept as a base for the auditor's 
responsibility for normal negligence towards the third party, and accordingly identified 
the three criteria or conditions that must be made available so that the third party has 
the right to litigate the auditor as a primary beneficiary according to this rule (Pacini et 
al., 2000): 
a. The auditor must be acquainted with the fact that financial statements subjected 
to auditing would be used for the purpose identified. 
b. There must be one party or more identified and known to the auditor; this party 
will essentially depend directly on such financial statements when making 
decisions. 
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c. It must be proven that the auditor was informed of the intention of this party to 
depend on the financial statements in his work, and must accordingly take 
actions from the auditor to connect with this party, thus indicating the 
awareness of the party’s dependence on the auditing process. 
The New York court emphasised that it must check the availability of all previous 
conditions to prove the auditor's knowledge of dependence of the other party on his 
work, as this third party is considered a primary beneficiary of the auditing. Many 
American courts agree with this statement, whereas other courts in the same states are 
content with adopting the first two components. 
However, the court did not identify what actions are sufficient in terms of proving the 
auditor's awareness and understanding of the dependence of the other party on his 
work. Accordingly, in the case of European American Bank vs. Strauhs and Kay, 65 
NY2d 536(1984), the court was obliged to determine three forms of acts, all 
demonstrating the existence of a connection between the third party and auditor, 
thereby proving that the auditor knew the intention of the third party to depend on the 
auditor's work. Such acts are represented in Pacini & Sinason (1998): 
a. The existence of direct oral communication between the auditor and the third 
party (plaintiff). 
b. The existence of direct correspondence between the auditor and the third party. 
c. Conducting a series of personal meetings between the auditor and the third 
party. 
In 1968, the rule of foreseen or known user, known as the restatement rule, was applied 
for the first time in the case of Rusch Factors Inc. vs. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, (D.R.I. 
1968). The occurrence of this case represented that the defendant (auditor) audited 
financial statements of a company to support its obtaining finance from the other. In 
actual fact, this company obtained a loan from the Rusch Factors Company, which was 
dependent on the audited financial statements, and which demonstrated the ability of 
this company to repay; however, the debtor could not pay back the funds, and so the 
creditor company litigated the auditor owing to negligence. The auditor, in his defence, 
stated that there is no object for responsibility towards the plaintiff company depending 
on the lack of availability of conditions required for applying the privacy rule in this 
case—or what is referred to as a lack of privacy—as the Rusch Factors company was 
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not identified with the name during the agreement on auditing. In spite of this, 
however, the court of Rhode Island state considered the auditor responsible to the third 
party, as the court considered it the foreseen beneficiary of the auditor's work (Tucker 
& Zurich, 1993). 
In 1977, the American Bar Association supported and encouraged the use of the 
foreseen or intended beneficiaries rule by American courts, with the association 
indicating the rule in restatement 2
nd
 of Torts, used by judges as a guide when 
establishing rules forming the common law. This law stated in Section 552 that a 
person charged with a public task to make available certain information is considered 
responsible for a damage incurred by any person that belongs to the exact category of 
persons for the beneficiary and guiding them. This task is stated as a general principle; 
every person making available misleading information with the purpose of using it to 
affect the other's financial processes, which is considered responsible for financial 
damages incurred by those receiving this information and depending on it logically. 
In the application of this text, the auditor responsible for auditing a client's financial 
information is considered to be obliged to show care not only towards the client but 
also towards any other person belonging to any exact group of persons; the auditor 
aims to use this information and is guided by it for their benefit. It is enough to 
consider the auditor responsible in the sense that the person depends logically on this 
information in one process or a similar process for which the auditor or the client 
acknowledges the financial information affects making a decision. As such, the auditor 
may be responsible towards one of the client’s creditors if the client informs the auditor 
that the auditing process will be used for obtaining a certain loan—even if the client 
does not exact the name of the creditor and even if the name of the creditor is extracted 
with funds subsequently borrowed from another one (Tucker & Zurich, 1993). 
A court decision built upon this rule does not require that the third party that incurred 
the damages be known by name, although it is conditioned that this third party belongs 
to a class of persons known to the auditor before beginning the auditing process 
(Allegeart & Tinkelman, 2000). Furthermore, it is also conditioned that the dependence 
of this third party on the auditor's work is logical and intentional by the auditor, and 
thus there must exist a direct relation between errors implied in the financial statements 
on the one hand and financial damage incurred by the plaintiff on the other hand. The 
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court evaluates this relation in the light of the plaintiff's culture and experience. 
Consequently, if the plaintiff himself is considered negligent, his dependence on the 
auditor's work is then considered illogical, and the auditor is considered as not 
responsible for the damage incurred by the plaintiff in this case (Pacini & Sinason, 
1998). 
In regard to the above-mentioned, under this rule, the auditor is not responsible towards 
other parties when the auditor do not have sufficient reason to believe that they will use 
audited financial statements. Accordingly, this rule will not be applied if it is proven 
that there was no communication between the auditor and the client, with such 
communications considered valid evidence of the auditor's knowledge and his intention 
to influence the third party’s behaviour through the use of financial information 
prepared by the auditor (Pacini et al., 2000). In addition, the auditor is appointed to the 
task of performing annual auditing only and, according to this rule, therefore has no 
responsibility in regard to normal negligence towards the third party. Thus, the 
responsibility of negligence is restricted compared with the responsibility of fraud 
(Tucker & Zurich, 1993). 
Although the application of the foreseen user rule was accepted on a wide scale, as it 
was applied in many negligence cases against auditors from non-clients and is still used 
nowadays in many courts in American states, the direction towards increasing the zone 
of the auditor's legal responsibility was not ceased to this extent but rather increased to 
a remarkable degree under the following factors: 
a. Development of the legal responsibility concept in general to include the 
protection of consumers from producers and professionals’ errors. 
b. Increase the size of the publicly held corporations, accounting and auditing 
firms, which enable these firms to afford the consequences of their legal 
responsibility. 
c. Increase the number of individuals and groups depending on financial 
statements audited by auditors to verdict its validity. 
In conformity with the direction towards expanding the zone of the third party who 
indebts the auditor with care, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 1983, established a 
new concept considered as the most wide explanation for users’ rights than the third 
parties. This is the foreseen ability concept revealed by the court after investigating the 
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case Rosenblum Inc. vs. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). According to this concept, 
the auditor is responsible for normal professional negligence and not toward primary 
beneficiaries and foreseen users only, but towards all persons the auditor predicts, to a 
reasonable degree, will use and depend on financial statements. Importantly, the 
auditor's report should consider unforeseen user concepts, including all creditors and 
stock holders, which makes the auditor exposed to legal responsibility towards an 
unlimited class of persons (Tucker & Zurich, 1993). 
The occurrences of this case are represented in issuing the auditor an unqualified report 
on financial statements of the Giant stores company, which revealed the profitability of 
the company. Depending on these statements, Rosenblum sold its’ project to the Giant 
Company in exchange for obtaining a share of its stocks. After a short time, the Giant 
Company declared its bankruptcy, at which point the stocks became valueless. 
Rosenblum litigated the auditor, claiming his normal negligence, whereas it was 
demonstrated that the client’s management manipulated the records to reveal that the 
assets were not possessed by it or otherwise omitted the creditor's accounts from these 
records (Pacini & Sinason, 1998). 
The court of the first instance refused to condemn the auditor, depending on the auditor 
having no responsibility for normal negligence towards the non-identified third party; 
however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey rescinded the judgment and refused to 
apply the rules of primary beneficiaries and foreseen user, judging that the auditor was 
responsible for normal negligence towards any third party as the auditor can reasonably 
foresee its receiving and dependence on financial statements audited by him (Pany & 
Whittington, 1997). Nevertheless, the court identifies the zone of applying this rule to 
include only the users of the financial statements who have received such statements 
from the auditing firm directly so as to achieve a specific goal related with its works. 
Consequently, the auditor has no responsibility towards persons receiving these 
financial statements from annual reports existing in libraries and specialised 
governmental bodies (Pacini et al., 2000). 
Many courts have adopted the application of the reasonably foreseen ability rule; of 
these courts, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has expanded the zone of the auditor's 
legal responsibility to include all parties who predicted that they would depend on the 
auditor's work, and who add that there were reasons for applying such rules as 
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compensation for the injured party, risk-spreading and deterrence, which are essential 
goals for any civil legal responsibility system. 
In 1987, the Court of Mississippi applied the rule of reasonably foreseen ability in the 
case of Touch Ross vs. Commercial Union Insurance Co, 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987). 
After the judgment of the Mississippi court, this rule was not applied again; however, 
some courts indicated that applying this rule would harm the auditing profession, and 
so the courts refused its application. 
From the beginning of the 1980s, there appeared to be a strong direction in the USA 
calling for restricting the zone of the auditor's legal responsibility owing to negative 
effects exposed by the auditing profession and business environment as a result of an 
increased number of parties having the right to litigate auditors, and so exposure to 
litigation risk increased as costs incurred by large auditing firms in the USA—called 
the Big Six (now only four)—in 1993 were approximately US$1.1 billion for litigation 
and defence costs. This matter called for restricting auditors’ legal responsibility 
towards the third party. In response to this call, American courts reviewed the rule of 
identifying the third party where the auditor is responsible toward them, and identifies 
any one of them representing the zone of legal responsibility appropriate for both the 
auditors and users of financial statements. Moreover, the court put forward a different 
explanation for these rules to identify that the third party has the right to litigate an 
auditor for normal negligence. 
In this regard, this period witnessed the refusal of many courts in terms of expanding 
the zone of the third party. More specifically, the rule of reasonably foreseen ability 
was applied in most of the American states, whereas these three other rules were 
depended on with different explanations; however, the primary beneficiaries rule was 
applied in many states, with the Court of Arkansas judging that the auditor has no 
responsibility for compensating the third party—who notably has no contractual 
relation—unless the client informs the auditor that the identity of the person will 
depend on the auditing services, and include a written note. The court also conditioned 
that the auditor must send a copy of any correspondences to the identified persons to 
prove the knowledge of the auditor and client of the dependence of those persons on the 
auditing process. This explanation of the primary beneficiaries rule is considered as the 
most restricted in the USA, although the Court of Illinois presents a less restrictive 
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explanation than the previous one for the primary beneficiaries rule: it contends that, if 
there is no correspondence from the auditor to the third party proving the intention of 
the client of the dependence of this party on the auditing process and knowledge of the 
auditor with this intention, the third party can prove this intention with all methods 
(Pacini et al., 2000). 
Courts of Nebraska and Idaho embraced the primary beneficiaries rule through 
adopting criteria identified by the Court of New York in the case of Credit Alliance, in 
which the same court emphasised and explained, in the case of Security Pacific vs. Peat 
Marwick Main, 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992). Other states, such as Montana and Utah, 
adopted the same rule but with different explanations (Pacini & Sinason, 1998; Pacini 
et al., 2000). 
In 1995, the Court of New Jersey retreated from the rule established in 1983. This rule 
considers reasonably foreseen ability since it adopts a similar explanation for the 
concept applied in the case of Credit Alliance, which outlines three conditions but 
which does not require the necessity of informing the auditor through written note of 
the intention of the third party to depend on the auditor's work—except if the third 
party (plaintiff) is a bank. In 1999, the Court of Louisiana almost agreed with this 
explanation, except for in one case where the auditor had no need for written 
knowledge of the intention of the third parties’ dependence on his work—even if it is a 
bank (Pacini et al., 2000). 
Moreover, the Court of Kansas ratifies a legal principle that judges that the auditor has 
no responsibility towards non-clients if the following occurrences are not realised 
(Pacini et al., 2000): 
a. The auditor must know when contracting the intention of the client towards 
using his work for the sake of the third party planning to make a certain 
decision. 
b. The auditor must be informed by the client that the auditor's work will be 
available for the third party. 
c. The auditor must be informed of the identity of the third party by a written note. 
d. The dependence of the third party on the auditor's work must be connected with 
specific transactions specified in correspondences sent to the auditor. 
Chapter Two 
 32 
Similarly, in 1996, the Court of Michigan put forward limits for applying the auditor's 
responsibility towards the third party as it considers the auditor as not responsible for 
normal negligence towards non-clients if not informed by the client, with a written 
note, of the main intention of the client from auditing to realize the interest of the third 
party or to otherwise influence it. The Court also allowed for the client to identity, in 
writing, not only the identified persons, but also a class of persons for which the client 
intends to use the auditors’ work, to pursue interest or to influence them (Pacini et al., 
2000). 
From the above-mentioned, it was demonstrated that the rule of foreseen user has 
gained great acceptance before many courts in the USA after studying and analysing 
different rules establishing the identity of the third party for which the auditor is 
indebted with the required care (Pacini et al., 2000). 
In 1992, in the case of Bily vs. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) which 
was raised owing to the failure of the Osborne firm (for computers), the Court of 
California turned from applying the reasonably foreseen ability to adopting the foreseen 
user rule. This judgment is considered as more important as it is viewed as an essential 
turn from protecting the rights and expectations of investors, creditors and the public 
for the sake of auditors to alienating them from exposure to the legal responsibility 
towards the unlimited class of non-clients (Pacini et al., 2000). The Court further 
mentioned reasons for its refusal for the continuity in terms of applying the reasonably 
foreseen ability rule. These reasons were represented in the generality of the class, 
which can litigate an auditor owing to negligence and the responsibility for its damages 
under this rule. 
At the beginning of 1997, an appellate court of Arizona stated that the rule of the 
foreseen user was the appropriate rule to determine whether or not the third party had 
the right to litigate the auditor for negligence in the case of Standard Chartered Bank 
vs. Price Waterhouse, LEXIS 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). Occurrences of this case are 
represented in the claim of a plaintiff—a British bank—of possessing another bank—
Arizona Bank—through its branch in the USA. The Arizona Bank presented all 
financial statements audited by an auditor. Upon the financial statements being 
acquired by the plaintiff, in 1988, the bank was exposed to great damage, which 
induced the plaintiff to litigate the auditor for negligence. The auditor stated that was 
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no contractual relation linking him with the plaintiff, but the Court adopted the foreseen 
user and emphasised the responsibility of the auditor for damages incurred by the 
plaintiff. Moreover, the Court considered him a member in a limited class of foreseen 
users of the auditor’s work. In spite of this, however, the Court refused to expand the 
auditor’s responsibility to include all damaged parties that could be predicted (Pacini & 
Sinason, 1998). 
Finally, at the beginning of 1998, the Court of Massachusetts adopted the rule of 
foreseen user in the case of Nycal Corp. vs. KPMG Peat Marwick, 688 N.E.2d 1368 
(Mass. 1998). The occurrences of this case are summed up as the plaintiff (Nycal 
Corporation) entering into an agreement in 1991 to buy stocks from a Gulf resources 
and chemical corporation. The auditor audited the financial statements of the company 
for 1990, and accordingly presented an unqualified opinion. Subsequently, the 
company declared its bankruptcy in 1993, with the Nycal establishment prosecuting the 
auditor for negligence as he did not take into consideration the costs of environmental 
protection that must be incurred by a Gulf company, as well as failure to consider credit 
obligations related to workers’ pensions. It was proven that the auditor had ceased 
auditing in February 1991, despite purchasing deliberations having begun in March 
1991. Nevertheless, the auditor was not aware of this matter until the beginning of July 
1991. As such, in this case, the Court adopted the foreseen user rule and emphasised 
that the auditor was responsible for non-clients who met the condition that the auditor 
had actual knowledge that the client belonged to a limited class of users who would 
depend on the auditor’s report in making decisions specific to a certain process, and 
that the auditor intended to influence them through his work. For this reason, the Court 
judged that the auditor had no responsibility (Pacini et al., 2000; Pacini & Sinason, 
1998). 
On the other hand, the case of Boykin vs. Arthur Andersen & Co., 46 ALA. L. REV. 
703 (1995) was the only case since 1988 in the USA; in this case, a rule nearer to the 
concept of reasonably foreseen ability was applied where the number of financial 
statement users with the right to litigate the auditor civilly than was reported was 
increased under the concept of the foreseen user, as the Alabama Court stated that the 
auditor’s responsibility, when recognising that his opinion would be depended on by a 
limited class of persons, could be predicted to a reasonable degree. This conflicted with 
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the foreseen user rule, which frankly refuses the principle of the foresee ability (Pacini 
et al., 2000).  
To conclude from the above-mentioned, the direction prevailing in the USA at the end 
of the 1960s till the end of the 1980s increased the zone of the auditor’s legal 
responsibility to a great degree to include parties other than the client, beginning with 
the third party (thus representing the primary beneficiary of the auditor’s work) and 
then the foreseen user of the auditor’s work. Ultimately, the third party is considered as 
every person for whom the auditor can predict the possibility of depending on the 
auditor’s services (the reasonably foreseen ability rule). 
Owing to several passive effects relating to the auditing profession resulting from 
expanding the zone of the auditor’s legal responsibility, the final decade of the last 
century witnessed a change in direction towards restricting the zone of non-clients who 
have the right to litigate the auditor for normal negligence. This was demonstrated in 
judgments and explanations, as presented by American courts in the different states, 
with regard to cases prosecuted against auditors. Emphasising this direction, most of 
the American states at the current time applied the primary beneficiary rule and the 
foreseen user as a base for the identification of the third party’s identity, who credits 
the auditor with required care with its reasonable and absolute refusal of the reasonably 
foreseen ability rule. Markedly, only two states emphasised the rule of participation in a 
contract as only the base for stating the auditor’s responsibility for normal negligence. 
The reason for this direction adopted by civil American courts towards restricting the 
zone of the third party who has the right to litigate auditor civilly lies in the wide range 
of consideration concerning the potential of misleading financial information to affect 
the user through audited financial statements. Accordingly, it is impossible for the 
auditor to control the scope of the use of such financial statements by maintaining 
client control on the financial report as well as the control in terms of distributing the 
auditor’s report, whereas the auditor has no knowledge. In consideration of this, the 
various parties of different classes may be exposed to tremendous damage owing to 
their dependence on such information. Accordingly, an auditor may find himself 
responsible to an unlimited number of persons, and therefore required to pay 
compensation that they may not be able to afford, thus causing great injury to the 
auditing profession. 
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2.2.2 The Responsibility towards the Third Party under Legislative Laws 
Legislative bodies in the USA have issued several laws addressing the legal 
responsibility of the auditor towards the third party (non-clients); these laws consider 
the auditor as responsible civilly towards a wide section of parties other than non-
clients, as American legislators come from this narrow cycle drawn by the 
jurisprudence for the zone of the auditor’s responsibility. The most important of these 
laws is the Securities Act 1933 and Securities Exchange Act 1934. The purpose of the 
codification of such acts was to protect investors from exposure to similar conditions 
prevailing after the collapse of the stock market in 1929 in the USA.  
 
2.2.2.1 Auditors’ Responsibility under the Securities Act of 1933: 
The Securities Act of 1933 aims to provide investors with appropriate information to 
evaluate the extent of the quality of new securities. Consequently, this law did not 
control trading securities after selling them for the first time. Accordingly, through this 
law, companies will issue new securities for the public and are obliged to register these 
securities in the American Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) before putting them 
forward to the public. The registration statement must include financial statements 
accredited by an external auditor, as well as all essential facts related with the securities 
that will be put forward for selling for the first time (Thomas et al., 1991). 
By the Act of 1933, the auditor and company issuing these securities are responsible for 
any falsification of or alterations to the contents of a registration statement, or of a copy 
of a registration publication that will be distributed to foreseen investors containing the 
same information included in the registration statement. Consequently, the auditor is 
responsible, before any buyer of these issued securities, if the registration publication 
contains any altered data or has disregarded any essential information in virtue of the 
first clause of Section n.11 of this Act, which indicates that, if a registration publication 
contains an incorrect statement related with an essential fact or has otherwise 
disregarded an important fact that must be mentioned in order to make the financial 
statements not misleading, any person who obtained these securities can litigate the 
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auditor associated with preparing or reporting any party of the registration statement if 
it was not proven that the owner of these securities knew about the incorrectness of the 
data contained in the registration statement (Pany & Whittington, 1997). 
The Act of 1933 provides these guarantees for a limited class of investors represented 
by buyers of securities put forward for selling for the first time in the light of the 
registration publication. This Act did not require this class to prove the auditor's 
negligence to be responsible civilly before them, but it is enough to hold the auditor 
responsible to put forward evidence for the following: 
 There are damages incurred by the plaintiff. 
 The registration publication contained an essential alteration or disregard for 
important facts, where the information contained in this publication is 
misleading and it is not necessary that the plaintiff put forward evidence for his 
dependence on this information when making purchase decisions on these 
securities to litigate the auditor. 
In spite of the new jurisprudence, there is no consideration to the auditor as being 
responsible for incorrect information, generally, except for work characterised by fraud 
and deception, or a lack of considering the facts known to him. Upon this, the auditor 
must put forward the proof for his non-negligence in exerting the professional care 
required for doing his job. In this regard, he is accredited with the information 
contained within the registration statement and publication in the light of his reasonable 
investigation of such data, with the need to prove the exertion of the required care to 
put forward evidence that damages incurred by the plaintiff were due to other factors 
and had no relation with the financial statement enclosed with the registration statement 
and publication (Thomas et al., 1991).  
From the above-mentioned, if the auditor did not want to carry the liability for damages 
incurred by plaintiff; the buyer of the new securities, auditor should put forward the 
evidence for the following: 
 he was committed by exercising due care when writing his report that enclosed 
with the registration publication; or 
 there is no relation between damages incurred by the plaintiff and the altered 
financial statement; or 
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 the plaintiff knew that the financial statements were misleading, when he 
bought these securities. 
The case of Escott vs. Barchris Construction Corporation, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) is considered one of the most important cases related with the auditor's 
responsibility, which relied on Article n: 11 of the Act of 1933. This case was 
prosecuted by the buyers for securities issued by the Barchris company against both the 
managers of the company and the auditor, where the company declared its bankruptcy 
after issuing these securities. Subsequently, the buyers claimed that the registration 
publication specific to the securities implied an altered financial statement, and 
disregarded the disclosure of essential facts. It was proven by the court that untrue data 
were included in the registration publication, thus concluding that the financial 
statements were considered misleading for whoever depended on the statements in 
making purchasing decisions for issued securities. As a result, the Court judged with 
the responsibility of the auditor and managers of the company, although the Court 
criticised the auditor as his non-obligation with acknowledged auditing standards and 
his negligence in examining and investigating various subsequent occurrences to the 
auditing process but prior to the effective date of registration publication that registered 
in (SEC). However, the Court indicated that the auditor must investigate any evidence 
that can be concluded from the occurrences following the date of auditing, which may 
subsequently refute the data implied in the registration publication registered in SEC, 
preparing for acquainting with it by the public (Pany & Whittington, 1997). 
 
2.2.2.2 Auditors’ Responsibility under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the public markets in terms of 
circulating securities in the USA. This act requires, from every company, that its 
securities be circulated in these markets and subjected to the authority of SEC in terms 
of presenting an annual report, including financial statements subjected to auditing, 
thus representing the main source of the auditor's responsibility. 
According to the Act of 1934, everyone who bought or sold securities issued by the 
company can litigate the company issuing such securities, as well as its auditors, if it is 
Chapter Two 
 38 
demonstrated that the annual report presented to SEC contained altered and misleading 
financial statements greatly. 
The auditor's responsibility towards non-clients is under the Act of 1934 sections n. 10 
and n. 18, where clause (b) of Section n.10 indicates that it is not legally permitted for 
any person to use—directly or indirectly—any one of various communication methods 
with the intent to: 
 Employ it as a tool to fraud the other. 
 Mention untrue statements related with an important fact or disregard an 
important fact to make these financial statements not misleading. 
 Participate in any work considered as fraud for any person with regard to 
buying and selling securities. 
In Section n.18, Clause (a), on the other hand, it is stipulated that holding the legal 
responsibility towards any person—ignoring financial statements that are altered and 
misleading—who depends on these statements by buying or selling securities at a price 
affected by these misleading statements and incurs damages due to his dependence on 
these statements, unless the defendant can prove that his behaviour was bona fide and 
the individual had no knowledge that the statement was misleading and altered (Pany & 
Whittington, 1997). 
Markedly, it is clear that the Act of 1933 limited the auditor’s responsibility to a limited 
class of investors who possessed these new securities put forward to the public for the 
first time; however, under the law of 1934, the zone of the auditor’s responsibility 
increased, where everyone who bought or sold—at any time—some circulated 
securities in the stock market was able to litigate the auditor depending on the existence 
of fraudulent financial statements or otherwise omitted important and essential facts, 
thus making such statements misleading. 
According to Article No. 10 and No. 18 of the Act of 1934, holding the responsibility 
towards a buyer or seller of securities, it is required that the plaintiff put forward 
evidence for: 
 Financial damages incurred by the plaintiff. 
 Financial statements those were misleading. 
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 The dependence of the plaintiff on these misleading financial statements when 
making buying or selling decisions for these securities. 
Article n. 10 of the Act emphasises putting forward evidence that the auditor has the 
intention to commit fraud against the plaintiff, whereas Article n. 18 holds the auditor 
responsible towards the other, if he has failed to prove that his professional acts were in 
the frame of being bona fide. 
With regard to the auditor's defence aspects represented in terms of refuting accusations 
that he had the intention to commit fraud against the plaintiff through auditing, which 
he carried out according to Article No. 18 of the law—mainly according to Article No. 
10 of that law—the auditor can avoid the responsibility, if he proves he was bona fide 
in performing the auditing and he did not know that there was an important financial 
statement that had been altered and that the financial statement was misleading if the 
auditor is not accused of serious negligence or fraud. Finally, the auditor can refute 
such accusations by putting forward evidence that the damages incurred by the plaintiff 
resulted from other reasons. 
As the zone of the auditor's responsibility in virtue of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 is, to a great extent, that the plaintiff (buyer or seller) can litigate the auditor 
depending on any altered or fraud statement, under this law, the auditor is then not 
responsible for ordinary negligence but rather responsible only for gross negligence or 
fraud. 
The case of Hochfelder vs. Ernst 425 U.S. 185 (1976) is one of the most important 
guiding cases in the field of determining the auditor’s overall responsibility according 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This case is related with an accountability and 
auditing firm, which audited the accounts of a company working in the field of 
securities brokerage in the period from 1964–1967. In 1968, the Board Director—who 
possessed 92% of the stocks of the company—stated in a note after he had committed 
suicide. that the company bankrupted owing to his manipulation of the accounts of 
various investors, as the director had persuaded those investors to send him their money 
directly through cheques deposited in a special bank account in his name or sent by 
post using his personal name, where he latter invested this money in escrow accounts, 
producing high revenues for the investors. The director gave instructions that the letters 
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with his name on them were not to be opened, but were to be delivered to him 
personally. In fact, there were no escrow accounts amongst the company accounts, and 
the director used the investors' money for his personal interests, as soon as he received 
the cheques. 
Upon this, the company accounting records did not disclose these escrow accounts, and 
so they did not appear in the financial statements deposited in SEC. Accordingly, the 
investor, whose money was embezzled by the director, litigated the auditor civilly in 
virtue of Article No. 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, accusing him of 
ordinary negligence, claiming his responsibility for the damages they incurred. 
However, the plaintiff did not accuse the auditor of fraud or intentional mis-
performance (Pany & Whittington, 1997). 
In this case, the plaintiff depended on the auditor's negligence, due to his failure in 
detecting the shortcoming aspects in the inner control structure of the company, thus 
enabling the director to embezzle; if the auditor had performed his duty, he would have 
detected the fact that rule put by the director related, i.e. not opening post received with 
his name on it, as being an unsound measure as it was acknowledged, in financial 
establishments, that letters received to a company are opened in the mail room so as to 
secure the company against fraud that may be committed by its employers, thus making 
use of their position in the company. 
The American Supreme Court refused the case and indicated non-recognition to litigate 
the auditor for compensation in virtue of Article No. 10 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and related the rule issued by SEC, in the case of the auditor having no 
intention to commit fraud or deceive. Accordingly, the Court judged that the auditor 
had no responsibility as he did not have the intention to commit fraud or disclose untrue 
data. Also, the court judged that he had no responsibility for ordinary negligence under 
the acts of the Securities Exchange in 1934 with regard to regulating securities 
circulation (Pany & Whittington, 1997). 
Generally, the pronouncement of this judgment reduced the zone of the auditor's 
responsibility towards non-clients as, under the Act of 1934, this responsibility became 
nearer to his responsibility under common law in the USA, as mentioned previously in 
this chapter. 
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2.3  The Situation in the UK 
It may be stated that the auditor's civil legal responsibility was limited to the privacy 
doctrine. Napier (1998) indicates that, until the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, the third 
party had no right to litigate the auditor for negligence—even if the financial statements 
on which they depended were the direct reason for the damages incurred. 
Upon this, there was a difficulty in litigating the auditor outside the frame of 
contractual relations where the contract lagged and the contracted relation was non-
existent. Essentially, the auditor had no responsibility, unless he committed fraud on 
the basis of the judgment whereby the auditor would not be responsible toward the 
other party for the damages it incurred, owing to its dependence on the auditing—even 
if the auditor was negligent. This was confirmed by the judgment pronounced in the 
case of Candler vs. Crane Christmas & Co., 2 KB 164 (1951) where such judgment 
emphasised the necessity to prove the existence of a contractual relation between the 
auditor and plaintiff to prove the responsibility of the auditor for negligence toward the 
plaintiff. Moreover, the third party had no right to litigate the auditor for negligence 
where a responsibility case is not recognised for a mere mistake statement (Pacini et 
al., 2000). 
In 1964, there began an interest in the nature of the auditor's responsibility toward the 
other resulted from mentioning untrue data after pronouncing the judgment in the case 
of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. vs. Heller & Partners Ltd, 465 AC (1964).  In this case, it 
was judged that responsibility may arise from damages occurring as a result of 
mentioning untrue data. Occurrences of this case are summarised in that the defendant's 
firm (Heller & Partners Ltd), a commercial bank, presented financial data concerned 
with the credit ability of Easipower Ltd. in response to the demand of another bank 
(National Provincial Bank) charged with this task for the sake of one of its clients. 
Markedly, the defendant knew that these financial data would be transferred to another 
unknown party (Hedley Byrne), which depended on these data so as to expand granting 
credit for Easipower. However, Easipower bankrupted shortly after that, and it was 
subsequently demonstrated that the data on which it was dependent for granting credit 
were untrue and misleading (Pacini et al., 2000). 
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The House of Lords, as is the supreme juridical authority in the UK, ratified a new 
legal principle stating that a person who has special skills, gives advice and information 
and knows that the information will be depended on must exert due diligence towards 
the person who will depend on such, and so he would be responsible for any negligence 
or breach for this task but would be responsible for compensating the damage incurred 
by this person due to his negligence. From this, the importance of this case arises, as it 
advocates the responsibility for negligence owing to failing to mention facts by a 
specialised advisor in any field. This means that the auditor will be held responsible for 
negligence towards any person other than the client (Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. vs. 
Heller & Partners Ltd.) (Wikipedia website). 
Depending on the case of Hedley Byrne, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales issued its bulletin concerning the auditor's responsibility towards 
the other (third party), demonstrating that the third party—who notably has the right to 
litigate for compensation—is limited to who incurred the damage due to the auditor's 
negligence in preparing his report (Wikipedia website). 
The bulletin of the Institute of Chartered Accountants included various practical 
applications in the light of the previous judgment, where it indicated to Hedley Byrne 
& Co. Ltd. vs. Heller & Partners Ltd. (Wikipedia website).  
 
2.3.1 For the Creditors of the Auditors’ Clients 
Clients generally present a financial statement ratified by an auditor for creditors in 
support of requests that are presented to get loans. Those creditors are considered from 
the other for the auditor. It was conditioned that, if they incurred financial injury by 
virtue of their dependence on the financial statements that checked by the auditor, 
evidence must be put forward to prove that the auditor committed negligence, and that 
he was aware when performing the audit that such financial statements were required 
by the client to be presented to the bank or other to facilitate obtaining credit or to 
continue obtaining credit facilities presented to the client. 
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2.3.2 Stockholders 
The purpose of presenting these annual financial statements accredited by the auditor is 
to help stockholders to control the affairs of the company and to judge the efficiency of 
its management. The stockholders, as a whole, can litigate the auditor civilly if he has 
committed negligence or defaulted in his work, causing financial damage to the 
company owing to their dependence on the auditor's work. However, an individual 
stockholder has no right to litigate an auditor, if a related investment decision has been 
made, depending on the misleading accounts of the company supported by the auditor's 
report. Accordingly, it is demonstrated that the report was prepared negligently by the 
auditor or otherwise included misleading data as the purpose of preparing final 
accounts is as a service for all stockholders in total—not to enable one of the 
stockholders to make investment decisions. 
However, the matter is different in the context of the auditor's report concerning the 
data recorded in the subscription bulletin. Markedly, if it appears that the auditor knows 
or must know that such data will be used for this purpose, in this case, he would be 
responsible toward the other for financial damages incurred owing to dependence on 
the report prepared by the auditor in spite of the non-existence of a contractual relation 
that may be used as a foundation for accountability. 
Furthermore, the bulletin issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants included an 
example of occasions wherein the auditor would be responsible for damages incurred 
by the third party according to a legal principle stated in the case of Hedley Byrne. The 
most important of these occasions (Abo Zeid, 2000): 
 preparing reports or financial statements, when the auditor knows or is 
expected to know that the client intended to make the third party depend on 
financial statements (even if the exact identity of the third party was not 
disclosed to the auditor at the appropriate time); 
 giving an auditor data related to the creditability of the client or giving 
guarantees related to its ability to carry out the conditions of contracts or giving 
any other kind of confirmations on behalf of the client. 
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The institute indicates that, when an auditor restricts the field of his report specifically 
or otherwise expresses appropriate reservations in his report or in a note enclosed with 
the financial statements, this may represent a repudiation of the responsibility to be 
effective in any negligence case prosecuted against him by any other third party. 
However, it must be kept in mind that reservation must be disclosed by the auditor 
only, if the situation requires this, as using this reservations randomly may deteriorate 
public confidence in the work done by the auditing profession. 
In the next Hedley Byrne case, there appeared a direction towards expanding the zone 
of parties having the right to litigate the auditor for negligence; this was ascertained by 
the judgment pronounced in the case of JEB Fasteners Ltd. vs. Marks, Bloom & Co., 3 
All ER 289 QBD (1981). In this case, the concept of the foresee ability was applied. 
Occurrences of this case are summarised as the plaintiff buying all stocks of a company 
depending on the auditor’s report, which implies an unqualified opinion concerning the 
validity of the financial statements. Subsequently, it was demonstrated that such 
financial statements contained a huge amount of errors resulting from stocks possessed 
by the plaintiff where they were evaluated as being worth more than their real value. 
Although the auditor did not know when contracting with the client about auditing that 
there was a third party who wanted to possess stocks of the company, the auditor later 
became aware of such a purchasing process, and there were communications between 
the buyer (plaintiff) and the auditor throughout the purchasing process (Pacini et al., 
2000).  
The buyer litigated the auditor, claiming his negligence and his responsibility for the 
damages he incurred owing to his dependence on the audit when purchasing these 
stocks. This was supported by the court, which pronounced the responsibility of the 
auditor, emphasising his awareness of the fact that a third party may depend on these 
financial statements ratified by the auditor, when making certain decisions. 
Moreover, the previous principle was applied in the case of Twomax Ltd. vs. Dickson, 
McFarlane and Robinson, SLT 98, 103(1983), wherein the Court investigated three 
separate cases prosecuted by some investors who purchased stocks of a company. After 
a short period, the company declared its bankruptcy. The Court judged that the auditor 
was indebted with due diligence towards the investors, and so the court pronounced the 
responsibility of the auditor for damages they had incurred on the foundation that the 
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auditor had knowledge with the dependence of foreseen investors on the financial 
statements subjected to auditing. Importantly, this was found to be enough to apply the 
proximity condition, on which the Court depended in terms of ratifying the auditor’s 
responsibility towards the third party (Pacini et al., 2000).  
Accordingly, it appeared that there was the need for controlling the zone of the 
auditor’s responsibility towards the third party in the UK during the 1980s, when the 
judgment was pronounced in the case of Caparo Industries PLC vs. Dickman, 2 AC 
605(1990). Occurrences of this case are summarised as the entering of the plaintiff into 
negotiations to obtain the majority of the stocks in a company in which he had 
previously possessed some stocks. In 1984, the plaintiff received a copy of financial 
statements subjected to auditing; these statements showed a profit of about GBP1.3 
million, and depended on these statements when purchasing stocks. Later, the plaintiff 
discovered that the company that possessed the majority of its stocks had incurred 
losses of approximately GBP 460,000, and that the financial statements on which he 
depended when making decisions to control the company were misleading, and so he 
litigated against the auditor, claiming the auditor’s negligence and responsibility for the 
damages he incurred. 
The House of Lords made its decision unanimously for refusing the case prosecuted 
against the auditor. The House of Lords acknowledged the absence of identified 
conditions, stating that the auditors in public shareholding companies were not 
responsible for negligence towards foreseen investors or current investors buying new 
stocks of the company depending on the obligatory auditing process (Pacini et al., 
2000).  
In the same case, the court established conditions for applying the auditor’s 
responsibility towards the third party. Such conditions are represented by the auditor, 
predicting the dependence of this party on the auditor's work, and a proximity state 
must exist in the relationship between the auditor and plaintiff. The court identified the 
following conditions that must be proven to apply this state, and accordingly highlight 
its realisation conditions: 
 The auditor must know and understand that the results of the auditing process 
would be conducted to a third party known to him or belonging to a limited and 
identified class of persons. 
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 The third party must experience financial damages due to its dependence on the 
auditor’s work. 
 The dependence of the third party on the auditor’s work must be the identified 
purpose of the auditing process. 
The Appellate English Court adopted the same principle in its judgment in the case of 
James vs. Hicks Anderson & Co., 2 QB 113 (1991); in this judgment, the court ratified 
the necessity of not expanding the zone of the auditor’s responsibility towards the third 
party, when it mentioned that courts in England must adopt a restricted concept towards 
identifying the third party, and the zone of the auditor’s responsibility must be limited 
to a person or a class to which he belongs, and the auditor is intended to make him 
depend on the results of the auditing, and in the purpose for which the auditing was 
carried out. (Pacini et al., 2000). 
From the above-mentioned, we can conclude that the legal principle issued in the next 
Caparo case resulted in restricting the zone of the auditor’s responsibility towards the 
third party, as the auditor was not—under the absence of certain conditions—obliged to 
exert due diligence towards foreseen external investors or any one of the current 
stockholders who bought stocks of the company depending on financial statements 
certified by the auditor. To hold the auditor responsible for negligence towards the third 
party, they must put forward evidence that the auditor knew that the results of his work 
would be communicated to this party separately or otherwise to a member of a limited 
class of persons, and that this party would be dependent on the auditor’s work with 
regard to a limited process or transaction. 
 
2.4 The Situation in the State of Kuwait 
The researcher reviews in this section the regulations in Kuwait state; from the reality 
of legislative texts contained in various Kuwaiti laws, that exposed to professional 
liability in general and the responsibility of the external auditor in particular. The aim 
of the review is to help understand the narrower issue of auditor liability in Kuwait 
state in order to determine the need for new legislation. Alternatively, an amendment to 
the existing legal texts to be more specific and appropriate to contemporary economic 
changes in the business environment of Kuwait. 
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The Kuwaiti legal environment depends on the code law; thus, Kuwaiti courts did not 
discuss much litigation regarding a dispute between users and auditors. Kuwaiti laws 
that dealt with financial regulation and came under the responsibility of external 
auditors in particular and professionals in general are as follows: 
 Kuwaiti business Companies Law No. 15 of 1960. 
 Kuwaiti Civil law. 
 The regulation of securities and the establishment of investment funds No. 31 of 
1990. 
 Practicing the profession comptrollers Law No. 5 of 1981.  
 
These laws are considered the foundation for the plaintiffs when they litigate the 
external auditor, who causes them damage as a result of their reliance on his report. 
Also, Kuwaiti Civil courts rely on them to issue the judgments when considering the 
raised cases against the external auditor.  
According to these laws, auditor's responsibility is divided to civil liability and 
disciplinary responsibility:  
 
Here the researcher reviews briefly what stated in this regard: 
 
2.4.1 The civil liability for the external auditor:     
Companies Law No. 15 issued in 1960, Article No. 165, is the only law concerning the 
auditing profession. It states that the auditor is responsible for the accuracy of the data 
in his report, as he represents all shareholders of the company (Fatwa and Legislation 
Dep., 2005). This article has been written, ambiguously. 
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Article no. 148 in the same law states that the chairman and members of the board of 
directors are responsible towards the company, shareholders, and third parties for all 
acts of fraud, abuse of power, and every violation of the law or the company's system 
and error in the administration. 
On the other hand, the Kuwaiti civil law continues some articles (Fatwa and Legislation 
Dep., 2004) which are not concerned directly with the relationship between the auditors 
and the users, such as: 
 
 Article No.705 for the relation between the agent and the client states that the 
agent should exert the due care of the ordinary person. 
 
 Article No. 227 for the damage caused by another party, directly or indirectly, 
states that the party caused the damage should compensate the damage caused by 
him. 
 
 
 Article No. 230 states that the compensation of a damage caused by other party 
should equal to the value of loss plus the gains lost from this damage. Moreover, 
article No. 247 states that the judge determines the value of the damage. 
 
 Article No. 228, states that, if the damage is caused by more than one party, each 
party has the liability to compensate the complete damage (joint and several 
liability rules); and the compensation is divided between them according to the 
wrong doing of each party. 
The researcher notes that the Kuwaiti legislations do not include legal texts specific 
only to the external auditors. But, there are general rules may be apply when the 
responsibility of the external auditor is held as he is considered a professional. 
Exceptionally, the Companies Law; which explained the responsibility of the external 
auditor in just one article which is inaccurate and came in general. 
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As can be seen that these laws did not give a clear and specific definition of third party 
who has the right to litigate the external auditor in the case of audit failure. It is also 
noticeable the lack of existence of adequate and organized legislative texts that 
mentioned the limits of responsibility of the external auditor toward the third parties 
clearly and comprehensively.  
With regards to the Law of the regulation of securities and the establishment of 
investment funds No.  31 for the year 1990, it indicates some articles referred to 
external auditors and their criminal responsibility for any failure, negligence, and fraud 
committed while performing their work. Moreover, it states, in part, that the auditor is 
responsible for any negligence or imposture occurring while he is performing his 
auditing duties. This law did not include any articles regarding the damage potentially 
occurring for the investors from a wrongdoing of the auditor. These articles devoid 
from any provisions relating to civil liability of the company or its auditors for the 
benefit of the buyer of securities that issued by the company. Especially, when he may 
inflict damage due to his dependence on the attached financial statements in 
subscription bulletin and the auditor's report. This law did not decide any civil rights for 
buyer of securities against auditors; whom their negligence is proved during the 
auditing. Furthermore, it did not include any provisions relating to the rights of investor 
who deal with securities in the stock market. It was supposed that this law includes 
clear texts expose to the limits of external auditors' liability for normal negligence, 
huge negligence, and fraud toward the third parties. It should determine the definition 
of third parties and the measure on which the court depends to estimate the damage that 
required compensation to the plaintiff.  
 
2.4.2 The disciplinary responsibility for the external auditor: 
Article 9 of Law No. 5 for the year 1981 in the matter of practicing the profession 
comptrollers, states that the auditor; who is applying to register in the record of 
auditors; should swear before starting audit that he will lead his work honestly, taking 
into his account the rules of the profession. Moreover, swear that he will not hide the 
truth to the stakeholders and will not reveal the secrets of his customers or any 
information that entrusted to him during the work. Besides, abiding the charter of honor 
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which organizes the profession. Under article 283 of the same law: the disciplinary 
sanctions that may apply on auditor are as follow:  
 Alarm. 
 Suspension from practicing the profession for a period of not more than 3 
months. 
 Erase his name from the record of auditors. 
The auditor can appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Committee; which 
issued a disciplinary punishment, at the Kuwaiti courts. 
Practically, it is noted that the professional organization in Kuwait are not interested in 
monitoring the audit profession to activate the disciplinary responsibility contained in 
the Kuwaiti constitution for profession. As a result, the performance quality of the audit 
profession has not being controlled by the professional organisation. Accordingly, there 
are many calls for placing legal liability on auditors in order to affect the audit quality 
positively. 
The researcher believes that to activate legal system for the responsibility of the 
external auditor, it requests the attention in the role of professional organizations. 
Importantly, seek to organize the role of these professional organizations in the scope 
of control on the external auditors’ professional performance. This includes that 
organisations should participate in the development of technical controls for audit 
profession. As well as, participation in the preparation of accounting and auditing 
standards and raise awareness about them. Also, includes creating local professional 
practices in order to correspond with international auditing standards, requirements of 
globalization, and the required qualifications to face the international competition in 
services. It also requires the sustained rehabilitation and continuing education for 
practitioners of audit profession in order to keep up with the rapid developments in this 
area and to increase the confidence of the audit profession.  
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Accordingly, there is a weakness in the Kuwaiti legal environment regarding auditor 
liability, as the rules applied are general and do not mention the auditor’s overall 
responsibility towards third parties. This is owing to: 
 
 less comprehension for the auditor liability from the users of financial statements 
and investors particularly; 
 non-existence of a legal system governing the securities trading in the Kuwaiti 
capital markets, and the dissemination of financial reports; 
 the slowness of litigations in the Kuwaiti courts and the shortage of 
compensation for the injured. 
Furthermore, the rank of Kuwait in the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) of the 
World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2008), which covers six dimensions of governance, have 
not improved since the inception of the WGI, in 1996. The rank of the State of Kuwait 
in the WGI (the rank from 1 for low rank to 100 for high rank) is summarised in the 
following table: 
 
Table (2.1): Rank of Kuwait in the 
worldwide governance indicators 
Governance dimension 1996 2010 
Voice and accountability 45 32 
Political stability 50 60 
Government effectiveness 60 58 
Regulatory quality 56 55 
Rule of Law 69 66 
Control of corruption 78 67 
 
This indicates a weak environment for investment and auditing professions, thus 
reflecting the needs of information users for a liability system to prompt investment 
process for the general economic wellbeing of developing regions. 
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The researcher believes that it is necessary for the litigation climate in Kuwait to be 
characterized as follows:  
 Easy litigation proceedings  
 The expected compensation for the benefit of plaintiffs should fit with the size 
of damage caused to them due to their dependence on the external auditors’ 
report; whom negligence or fraud is proved. 
 Educating users of financial statements to know their legal rights. 
 The availability of adequate insurance for the external auditors against litigation 
risk. 
 
2.5 The Decision Made by Financial Statement Users 
 
 
The main use of the audited financial statements is for decision-making. A major 
consideration when making decision is the legal environment; hereafter, the researcher 
considers the decisions by users. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 
defines users of accounting information as (FASB, 1978): 
‘members and potential members of some group-such as owners, creditors, and 
employees- have or contemplate having direct economic interests in particular 
business enterprises…Members of other group- such as financial analysis and 
advisors, regulatory authorities, and labour unions-have derived or indirect 
interests’ (Braiotta et al., 2010). 
From this, we can categorise the external users of accounting information as follows: 
investors, creditors, and financial and government organisations. The needs of each 
user category may differ according to the use they wish to make of the accounting 
information. Investors (i.e. potential investors and stock holders), for example, depend 
on reports and financial statements when making purchasing, selling or holding 
decisions, using them to obtain the information necessary for the evaluation of various 
issues, such as investment risk and return, management’s ability to use available 
economic resources effectively to achieve a positive cash return for investors, and the 
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firm’s ability to continue its operations. In this regard, Titman & Trueman (1986) 
created a model to examine the potential benefits of audit quality for investors when 
evaluating stocks and shares, as auditing processes can prove valuable to investors 
should they reduce any uncertainty in regard to financial reports prepared by 
management. 
Franz et al. (1998), however, suggest another value for audit services. Aside from the 
likelihood of uncovering any management fault or fraud, users may also regard auditing 
as insurance; in other words, they may consider the auditor to be a partial guarantor for 
the value of an investment in a firm’s securities, as any losses in value owing to 
deficiencies in the financial statements will be covered by the management through 
legal action against the auditor. 
Creditors (i.e. banks, financial credit firms and lenders) use accounting information to 
help them calculate credit risk by evaluating the ability of a firm to generate positive 
cash flows in the future. This determines the firm’s ability to repay borrowings and 
interest over time, which in turn affects the creditors’ ceiling and investment costs, 
rather than considering simply the firm’s asset value. 
With consideration to the requirements of financial authorities (e.g. the Stock 
Exchange) and government agencies (e.g. the tax service), accounting information 
enables them to determine whether or not a firm is in compliance with its obligations as 
per the relevant rules and regulations. 
This study is particularly interested in the effects of an alternative legal liability system 
concerning the decisions of financial statement users in relation to investment in a firm. 
The researcher believes that there are several reasons for this: 
1. Investors usually represent the largest category of users of accounting 
information. 
2. Investors’ decisions are considered one of the most important determinants 
of a society’s resource allocation and thus future economic growth. 
3. Investors' decisions may be used as a basis for creditors’ decisions because 
their goals, and their intended use of accounting information, are similar. 
Both investment and credit activities serve to make available financing for a 
firm to pursue its own investment projects, and it is this similarity of 
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purpose, and the possibility of economic damage resulting from reliance on 
a misleading audit report, which may encourage either party to decide to sue 
the auditor. 
2.6  Conclusion 
The liability rules governing the auditor’s liability will vary across different societies 
based on whether or not it depends on common law or a code law system, or whether 
the economy is a developed or an emerged economy. There is no agreement regarding 
the liability rules applied or the level of the liability of the auditor towards third parties. 
In the USA, for example, there is restricting auditor legal responsibility towards the 
third party, with normal negligence applied in the case of auditing failure if the auditor 
does not know the third party. On the other hand, serious negligence is applied if the 
auditor knows the third party. In the UK, the Institute of Charted Accountants indicates 
in its bulletins that creditors and investors are primary users of the audited financial 
reports, and can therefore litigate the auditor for any damage caused by negligence if 
proved. In an emerged market like Kuwait, however, there remain weaknesses in the 
legal system, which may cause users to be less concerned with the financial reports and 
the auditing services. This environment cannot support investment, and thus is a dire 
need for a legal system to improve audit quality and thereby increase investment level 
in such emerging markets. 
The next chapter is literature review of audit quality and auditors’ responsibility.
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Chapter Three: Literature Review of Audit Quality and Auditors’ 
Responsibility 
 
3.1  Overview 
In any business organisation, the company's progression is considered as a basis for, 
amongst other things, decision-making and as an indicator for evaluating the firm’s 
overall performance. A financial analysis or evaluation is a tool documenting current 
and future financial situations in order to determine a financial strategy to assist achieve 
organisational objectives. In actual fact, economic growth and the separation of capital 
possessions from its management have the greatest role in terms of increasing auditing 
importance, and so auditors have a great role within society. This requires them to 
maintain their distinguished professional position through resuming providing 
professional services of the highest levels to gain the confidence of the public. 
Auditing in any business is the inspection and verification of the precession of financial 
statements based on accounting records and procedures. It is well known that a firm 
that does business with stock on a registered stock exchange or otherwise arranges to 
issue new shares of stock must agree to an external audit. Moreover, an external audit is 
used to give the financial users a true and fair statement of a company’s financial 
position. With this, auditors make sure that the business has fully followed the 
procedures and steps in preparing financial statements and report. As part of this 
preparation and investigation, auditors compare the current financial statements with 
the past years’ in order to identify inconsistencies. If they establish lapses, they will 
create a picture or report the financial position to the Board of Directors. Moreover, the 
job of external auditors also involves the inspection of assets to determine whether their 
value is overstated. Moreover, liabilities and debts are also checked to ensure that they 
have not been understated. 
Importantly, the emerging crises gripping many of the multinational corporations lately 
(Enron, for instance) have raised questions concerning the role adopted by the auditor 
in preparing opinions concerning financial statements and doubts surrounding the 
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performance of auditors, thus heightening legal responsibility and potential prosecution 
in the face of negligence.  
In light of the above, many have questioned the credibility of the auditor’s job and the 
quality of the auditing outcome, the legal responsibility of the auditors is scrutinised, 
urging a professional review to improve performance quality and eventually rationalise 
the decisions made by financial statement users. However, despite professional and 
academic efforts in this area, a deficient reaction is cited, thus necessitating a 
reconsideration of the quality issue from a comprehensive perspective with greater 
controls to devise new approaches to the improvement in auditing quality.  
Auditing quality—a multi-faceted concept—is concerned with all participants in the 
auditing process and beneficiaries; however, both parties view the auditing process 
differently. Shareholders, on the one hand, are known to evaluate quality in a different 
way to that of creditors, who view quality differently to investors. Undoubtedly, other 
parties using financial information will also perceive quality differently from the 
auditing team owing to a number of reasons relating to auditing standards, economic 
considerations, professional accountability, and cultural backgrounds. Essentially, 
although quality traits or factors influencing them have not been defined clearly, they 
need to be appropriately stated to identify their relevance to the legal accountability of 
external auditors. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the professional organisation of auditing does not 
guarantee the attainment of a desired level in terms of professional performance, with 
the quality control standard in place, professional development should be able to reduce 
chances of failure; thus, the consistent pursuit of improving quality of professional 
performance is one major characteristic to enable the auditor to confront the fallout 
brought about by the legal liability arising from the auditing process.  
Since the external auditor’s performance is considered the mainstay when making 
decisions, the financial statements which have been audited are considered the basis on 
which decision makers rely; this necessitates that auditors deliver the highest 
professional performance in terms of quality. 
Trust in financial statements, as released by companies, is one of the fundamentals 
helping to support and activate financial markets, and so the role adopted by an external 
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auditor from the aspect of validating and authenticating the issued financial statements 
is of great importance as the basis for decision-making. Legislature in terms of 
accounting and auditing seeks to forge controls, criteria and guidelines, all of which 
would generate better trust in the external auditor’s performance.  
Importantly, the users of financial statements assume that auditors are supposed to 
perform the following tasks:  
1. conduct auditing efficiently, honestly, independently and objectively;  
2. improve auditing effectiveness from the quality perspective;  
3. provide more useful information to financial statement users about the          
nature and results of the auditing process including early warnings about the 
survival of firms; and 
4. ensure clearer communications with the auditing committees, or other 
concerned parties charged with the preparation of financial reports, used to 
rationalise the decisions by such users.  
Various studies have examined this issue; however, they have not been able to 
determine a definite and comprehensive framework addressing the different dimensions 
making up the relationship of legal responsibility to the auditing process so as to 
provide a measure for quality level of auditing. Therefore, there is a crucial need for 
researchers and practitioners to develop existing approaches to quality control, 
suggesting new ones that would protect equity and enhance performance quality so that 
decisions made by financial statements users are rationalized. 
This research contributes the accounting literature through finding answers to the 
following questions:  
1. What are the liability rules that improving audit quality within society? 
2. What are the factors affecting auditor activity and audit quality? 
3. Is there a relationship between investment level and liability rules applied and 
audit quality? 
The problem in this regard is thus summarised in regard to the lack of a crystal clear 
framework addressing different dimensions governing the legal liability of external 
auditors, as viewed by the different parties involved in the auditing process, so that the 
quality of the auditor’s performance is scrutinised besides the absence of an approach 
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that would control the auditing quality through the careful review of various 
dimensions, eventually serving the rationalisation of decisions made by users of 
financial statements. 
To limit the zone of the study and to thereby achieve its goals, the study will be limited 
in terms of reviewing the accounting literature for auditing quality and studying the 
auditor’s civil legal responsibility towards clients and third parties so as to analyse the 
relationship between the alternative legal rule regulating this responsibility on the one 
hand, and the auditing quality and decisions of financial statements’ users related to the 
determination of their investment volume in their business establishments on the other. 
Moreover, the study will also enable us to establish the way in which the legal system 
of external auditors impacts the responsibility of the auditor and the decisions of 
auditors, as well as the users of financial statements. 
Based on the above-mentioned, the researcher will study and analyse the issues 
concerned with auditing quality, and accordingly analyse the auditor’s civil legal 
responsibility towards the different parties so as to determine the conceptual frame for 
this responsibility through dealing with the following points: 
 
3.2  Auditors’ Responsibility towards the Client and the Third Party 
The aim of the audit of financial statements is to enable the auditor to give his opinion 
on whether or not the financial statements of the company under audit accurately 
reflect—in all significant respects—the financial position of the company and its 
income results and cash flows. 
Importantly, the auditor plays a significant role in the development of a certain business 
and is responsible for the analysis of the financial statements of a certain business 
(Craswell, Francis & Taylor 1995). Noted below are various factors influencing the 
auditor’s responsibility: 
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Figure (2): Factors influencing the auditor’s responsibility 
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3.2.1  Due Professional Care 
Due professional care, as one of the general principles governing the auditing process, 
indicates the care level, diligence, personal judgment, skills and professional 
competencies familiar to other auditors working in the same conditions in which the 
auditor works or in similar conditions. This means that the auditing process and the 
compiling of reports is carried out with the same degree of care, competence, learning 
and experience available to other members in the auditing and accounting profession, 
as required by professional standards (Guy, Alderman & Winters 1999). 
As auditors are required to exercise personal judgment, care, regular skills and 
expected skills from other auditors, this means that evaluating auditors when 
investigating negligence cases requires comparisons to be drawn between the auditing 
procedures carried out by auditors with the care criterion; this includes procedures that 
other auditors would follow in the same conditions, i.e. if it is confirmed that an auditor 
was remiss in carrying out these procedures, thus he became negligent (Kadous 2000). 
Thus, in practice, due professional care is determined, or the performance level is 
compared with auditor performance (defendant) in order to explore the extent of 
negligence when carrying out professional duties, which is carried out by the experts 
appointed by the courts before which the case against this auditor is raised. This means 
establishing the level of due professional care for a particular situation completed after 
the auditor has completed the auditing process. As a result of this, researchers agree 
that the due care criterion is vague as the auditor does not know in advance before 
beginning auditing. Furthermore, experts appointed by the court may have more 
information than what the auditor had relied upon when giving his opinion; this may 
lead to a hindsight of due care, or well-known hindsight, resulting from late awareness 
(Anderson et al., 1997; Kadous 2000). 
In the same context, the study of Kadous (2000) indicates that determining the due care 
criterion after completing the auditing process may lead to auditing failure 
consequences on the care level of the required auditing. This study concludes that there 
is a forward relationship between the intensity of results based on auditing failure on 
the one hand and the due care level of the auditor on the other hand—an increased 
intensity of results or losses (e.g. workers lose their jobs, expose to several parties to 
Chapter Three 
 61 
loss, firm failure), increase of due care level determined by the court. Some authors 
(Bonner et al., 1998) suggest that the nature of the fraud committed in financial 
statements has an influence on the understanding of the jury and judges of the auditor’s 
responsibility. 
Some authors (Schwartz 1997; Radahakrishnan 1999) argue that the inability of 
auditors to predicate the due care criterion shall be used in evaluating their 
performance, which may be an incentive for them to increase their auditing effort or 
present more conservative opinions in terms of auditing reports so as to reduce the 
possibility of their exposure to litigation risk or to negligence (Kinney & Nelson 1996). 
 
3.2.2  The Third Party 
Generally, we can define the third party, i.e. those with the right to litigate the auditor 
legally (Boynton & Kell 1999) as: 
 Primary beneficiary: indicates a known person, his name given in advance to the 
auditor, as he will be the main user or primary beneficiary of the auditing results 
and auditing reports. For example, a client informs an auditor before beginning the 
auditing. Then this auditing report will be used in obtaining a loan from a particular 
bank. In this case, the bank is considered as the primary beneficiary of the auditing. 
 Other beneficiaries: a category of users, their names are not given in advance to the 
auditor, but they depend on his opinion when making their decisions related to 
audited firms. Examples of this category are stockholders, prospective investors, 
creditors and others who use financial statements. 
From the above-mentioned, it is clear that the third party who has the right to litigate 
auditors, due to injuries incurred resulting from his depending on misleading financial 
statements accredited by the auditor, belongs to different categories with branched and 
conflicting interests. Nobody calls an auditor to reconcile between the interests of these 
categories or to care for their interests to the same degree. Moreover, opening the door 
to legal responsibility for the third party to litigate the auditor ultimately exposes the 
auditor to arbitrary requirements, causing the greatest injury to the auditing profession.  
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3.3  Impact of Litigation Risk on the Auditing Profession 
Markedly, litigation risk is viewed as being an element of risk associated with final 
auditing, which means losses or physical or moral injury to which an auditor may be 
exposed if the auditor is presented with an inappropriate technical opinion concerning 
financial statements. More specifically, auditing risk is achieved when an auditor 
makes a mistake. This mistake takes two forms. The first is represented in a mistaken 
conclusion by the auditor, with him being convinced that there are fundamental 
mistakes which caused him to present an adverse report; an appropriate report, on the 
other hand, must be unqualified. Accordingly, an auditor’s report causes serious injury 
to audited firms, thus resulting in the client litigating the auditor and potentially 
defaming his professional reputation and causing the loss of several current and 
prospective clients. The second form is represented in the inability of the auditor to 
discover the fundamental errors included in financial statements, and so the auditor 
issues an unqualified report when the appropriate one is an adverse report. This causes 
injuries to the parties depending on the auditor’s report when making their decisions 
related to audited firms, thus resulting in litigating the auditor and claiming him 
responsible for losses incurred by such parties owing to their dependence on the 
auditor’s report. 
During the last decade, the auditing profession has witnessed several crises resulting 
from an increase in litigation risk to which auditors were exposed and who may 
subsequently suffer from heavy economic losses owing to the litigation raised against 
them by third parties. Litigation and compensation required to be paid increased 
remarkably in the last decade of the past century, thus raising disputes in auditing and 
the legal settings in several countries, such as the USA, where costs incurred by large 
audit firms for defence and litigation fees increased from over 7% of its annual revenue 
from accounting and auditing services in 1990 to 9%, in 1991, equating to almost 
US$477 million. This percentage increased suddenly to 19%, in 1993 owing to legal 
allegations, therefore estimated at almost US$30 billion; this is owing to widening the 
scope of legal responsibility of auditors and increasing the possibility of the third party 
to litigate an auditor due to negligence (Dennis, Engle & Stephens 1996; Tucker & 
Zurich, 1993).  
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The study of Palmrose (1988) supposes a reverse relationship between the quality of 
professional performance and audit cases, and concluded—depending on a sample 
including 472 cases with alleged auditing failure against the largest 16 audit firms 
working in the USA—that auditors belonging to eight large audit firms (now only four) 
were exposed to a lower rate of litigation compared with smaller firms depending on 
the fact that large audit firms present auditing reports with high quality, thus reducing 
the possibility of litigation. 
Moreover, the study of Khurana & Raman (2004)—which is related to the litigation 
risks and financial reporting credibility of big4 firms and non-big4 firms in Anglo-
American countries—shows that the exposure to litigation risk is the driver for 
perceived audit quality more so than brand name protection. In this regard, their study 
revealed that there is a relationship between auditing quality and litigation risk and the 
level of damage facing the auditor, and that decreases in auditor litigation risk could 
have unintended results for the perceived audit quality in the USA. This study has 
further established the degree of responsibility of an auditor in accordance with their 
profession, as stated in the papers of Simunic & Stein (1996) and Venkataraman, 
Weber & Willenborg (2008). 
In contrast, large auditing firms dispute the fact that they are exposed to litigations not 
relying on law, but that such litigations result from plaintiffs who are convinced that 
firms have the financial ability to pay juridical requirements (Anderson et al., 1992). 
This is indicated by the study of Dunbar & Juneja (1993), which concludes after 
investigating fraud cases related to securities that: 
a. The predicted value of payments is higher when the auditor is the defendant in 
the litigation. 
b. The payment’s size is determined by the ability of the defendants to pay. 
Thus, plaintiffs have greater incentives to litigate auditors when the latter belong to 
large audit firms (Raghunandan & Rama 1999). In spite of this, Lys & Watts (1994) did 
not find a correlation between the size of auditing firms and the number of auditing 
cases. The authors justified this result by stating that there was no sufficient variety for 
the variable of size in the study sample as the most important items were belonging to 
large auditing firms. 
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The auditing response to increased litigation risks is crystallised on two main axes. The 
first is an attempt to reduce the possibility of auditing failure through setting quality 
control standards, introducing an auditing concept by peer review as a way of self-
regulating auditing and adopting recommendations issued by the Threadway 
Commission (Krishnan & Krishnan 1997). Moreover, the study of Pratt & Stice (1994) 
provides various arguments for auditors, seeking to reduce the possibility of auditing 
failure through supporting auditing planning procedures. This study concludes that 
auditors seek to classify client characteristics related with litigation (as financial states 
and assets structures) when determining the auditing argument appropriated for this 
contract. From this, we can conclude that an auditor designs appropriate auditing 
procedures that are sufficient to balancing them with litigation risks. This is reflected in 
the possibility of detecting errors contained in financial statements. 
The second axis is represented by a group of other acts reducing litigation risks, which 
can be resorted to in cases where auditing failure is not the main determinate for 
litigation risks. One example of such an act is caution in auditing contracts for clients 
with a high degree of risks: for instance, directing towards expanding issuing restrained 
opinions (Krishnan & Krishnan 1997). 
 
3.4  Results and Reasons for Audit Failure 
An auditor may be exposed to litigation, regardless of auditing failure. Sullivan (1992) 
indicates that a number of litigations against six large auditing firms in the USA (now 
only four) resulted from an examination of the accounts of public shareholding firms 
equal to three times the real number of auditing failure cases (Krishnan & Krishnan 
1997). Also, Stice (1991) indicates that litigation against auditors may not result 
directly from auditing failure as the auditor may be a target for litigation owing to 
financial ability or otherwise due to the low cost of defendants’ characterisation. In 
actual fact, plaintiffs have a strong incentive to litigate the auditor—even if there are no 
predicated benefits for this procedure (Raghunandan & Rama 1999).  
Below, some of the reasons for audit failure are noted along with the responsibility of 
the auditor and its sources: 
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Figure (3): Reasons for audit failure 
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the previous years. This means that a qualified auditor’s opinion increases the 
possibility of litigation. In the same context, Carcello & Palmrose (1994) conclude that 
presenting the auditor with a qualified opinion reduces the possibility of exposure to 
litigation, whereas a small percentage of 10% of qualified reports in auditing cases 
were observed in the sample of the study. Observance of this percentage, regardless of 
its reduction, supports the statement that issuing qualified auditing reports prior to 
exposing the client to bankruptcy may not protect the auditor from the consequences of 
legal responsibility. 
In the above-mentioned, the auditing profession must induce caring of audit quality to 
reduce the possibility of auditing failure and thus secure an appropriate minimum of 
auditor professional performance. In this regard, the activation of even a legal system 
for the auditor’s civil responsibility is viewed as being one of the effective guarantees 
for auditing quality. 
 
3.5  Auditing Quality 
The definition of ‘auditing quality’ is provided by De Angelo (1981a), who is 
considered to be the most accepted of authors, in the field of auditing. He defines the 
term as detecting breaches in clients’ accounting systems and reporting such 
(DeAngelo, 1981a). Consequently, according to this definition, auditing quality means 
the increased ability of the auditor to detect accounting faults and to accordingly 
increase independence. Others define auditing quality as the degree of confidence 
provided by the auditor in regard to financial statements’ users (Arrunada, 2000), as it 
is recognised that the purpose of auditing is to induce confidence in financial 
statements. Accordingly, the researcher can therefore state that auditing quality relates 
to free financial statements from essential faults and contraventions. 
In addition, other researchers suggest a variety of other definitions of auditing quality. 
For instance, there is that of who defines auditing quality as a measure of the auditing 
ability in relation to reducing bias of accounting information and improving its overall 
accuracy (Carey & Simnett 2006). On the other hand, another researcher defines 
auditing quality as the accuracy of information provided by auditors to investors (Deis, 
1992). A third researcher defines auditing quality as a counterpart of information 
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accuracy of the auditor’s report, and the overall capacity of the auditor to detect and 
exclude essential faults and contraventions in net income disclosed by financial 
statements (Butler et al., 2003), and to further consider the possibility that auditors may 
issue non-clean reports concerning financial statements, which may contain essential 
faults (Becker et al., 1998). Finally, a fourth researcher suggests that auditing quality, 
from the perspective of many professional organisations, is determined to mean the 
degree of auditor compliance with professional standard issued by such organisations 
(Francis, 2004). 
Based on the above-mentioned, we can state that auditing quality suggests the degree to 
which auditing ability is able to detect essential faults and contraventions in financial 
statements, and accordingly announces such in addition to asymmetry between 
management and stockholders, thus protecting the interests of investors under 
separation property from management. 
In actual fact, an auditor must run the auditing process with its different phases 
according to accepted auditing standards, containing principles, the main measures and 
related guidelines. Furthermore, an auditor must also conduct the auditing process 
considered necessary under the surrounding conditions in order to ascertain whether or 
not all financial statements are free from any significant errors. In this regard, he can 
plan and do auditing depending on reasonable professional doubt, recognise that there 
are conditions resulting from significant mistakes, impacting financial statements, and 
accordingly collect an enough and suitable degree of confirming arguments to conclude 
appropriate results, upon which he can build his opinions; in this regard, arguments in 
auditing are persuasive rather than definitive arguments. In addition to the above-
mentioned, auditors (the auditing firm) must apply policies and quality control 
procedures designed to ascertain that auditing processes are supported according to 
recognised auditing standards. Moreover, auditors may also ask for assistance from 
individuals with professional skills and efficiencies, thus enabling them to carry out 
their tasks satisfactorily, as auditing processes assigned to individuals have a degree of 
practical training and have necessary professional qualifications. 
Many researchers have found evidence to support that large auditing firms carry out an 
auditing process of high quality and accordingly impart more accreditation to the 
client’s financial statements compared with small auditing firms. This opinion depends 
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on large auditing firms carrying out an auditing process of higher quality, as such 
organisations enjoy human and physical resources, thus enabling them to attract more 
skilful professional competencies and the availability of physical resources required to 
train auditors and conduct examinations.  
In this regard, DeAngelo (1981b) argues that eight large auditing firms (now four) have 
more incentives for discovering errors in financial reports prepared by management, 
and subsequently issuing accurate audit reports to maintain the brand name reputation 
formed by these firms, not risking losing this reputation and their clients, and accepting 
lower fees (Lennox, 1999a). From the evidence supporting this opinion, the firm Arthur 
and Andersen—which provided accounting and auditing services—lost many of its 
clients months following the collapse of the firm, where this situation gave a 
justification to the clients of the audit firm to get rid of auditors belonging to this firm, 
especially under abnormal interest directed at them owing to the litigations of 
stockholders against them, as well as avoiding exposure to the strict control of 
organisational bodies in the case of continuing employing the auditors for serving 
Arthur and Andersen (Weber, Henry & Lavelle 2001).  
Similarly, DeFond & Jiambalvo (1991) indicate that the clients of large audit firms 
have reduced the possibility of committing errors or irregularities that cause the 
manipulation of profitability. Such authors emphasise, in the following study, the 
increased possibility of conflict between the auditor and the management of the 
auditing client concerning the incentives for the client to manipulate profitability when 
such firms employ auditors belonging to large audit firms (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1993). In the same context, the study of Becker et al. (1998) concludes that the auditors 
of client accounts belonging to large audit firms reduce the possibility of the 
management inflating income through abnormal accruals and thus restricting the firm’s 
exercises relating to accounting estimates. The study also indicates that the Big Six 
auditing firms at the time (now four only) offered auditing of higher quality than other 
small audit firms. 
Lennox (1999a) concludes that large audit firms give accurate observations with regard 
to financial distress when giving audit opinions and increasing the possibility of issuing 
the appropriate opinion concerning the ability of the firm to continue; this is because 
large auditing firms have the technical ability to investigate opportunities of continuity 
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or to otherwise have a large number of clients suffering from problems relating to the 
continuity of their firms, and so have greater experience with such situations (Wooten, 
2003).  
Some researchers (Nichols & Smith, 1983; Eichenseher, Hagigi & Shields, 1989; 
Lennox, 1999a) indicate a positive reflection within the stock market when auditing 
firms turned to large audit firms compared with small audit firms. Furthermore, firms 
produce new issues in terms of the pricing problems of pricing their securities less than 
the fair price when utilising large auditing firms (Balvers et al., 1988). 
3.5.1 The Need for Auditing Quality 
 
The determination of auditing quality is viewed as being one of the most difficult 
matters owing to the difference in terms of its nature and the variety of beneficiaries of 
such. Auditing quality is viewed as being a main demand for all beneficiaries of 
auditing owing to the following reasons (Clarkson & Simunic, 1994; DeFond, 1992): 
1. auditors must carry out auditing with the highest possible quality to 
ensure credibility on their report; 
2. the management of the auditing establishment should want to impart 
confidence in its financial statements, thus requiring the performing of 
auditing with the highest possible quality; 
3. professional organisations should consider achieving quality when 
carrying out auditing tasks, and guarantee fulfilment of auditing with its 
responsibilities towards all concerned parts; and 
4. due to severe competition amongst auditing firms, both auditors and 
clients pay attention to auditing quality as a predominance factor when 
distinguishing between auditing firms. 
As a result of the urgent need to improve auditing quality, various researches and 
studies in this field have focused on the fact that auditing quality is one of the most 
important questions at both academic and applied levels, as the Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in 1998, indicates that, in order to 
decrease the number of cases where auditors fail to perform their work with the 
required level of quality, there is the need to develop professional standard and 
legislations, organising auditing to guarantee improvement in terms of auditors’ overall 
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quality performance. This ensures adequately serving users of published financial 
statements, and accordingly helps them to make rational investment decisions 
(Heninger, 2001).  
 
3.5.2 Measuring Auditing Quality 
 
Various studies have made use of direct measures for measuring auditing quality. For 
example, some studies have analysed control measurements on applied quality in real 
auditing tasks, with such being used in order to distinguish between different levels of 
auditing quality (Schaner, 2001). Furthermore, other studies have utilised the results of 
counterpart auditing for measuring auditing quality (Krishnan & Schauer 2000). On the 
other hand, auditing quality measures adopted in one study depend on the degree to 
which the auditor ensures compliance with accepted auditing principles and standards, 
as well as legislations concerning organising auditing. This compliance directly relates 
to the possibility of detecting auditors’ fundamental faults and contraventions (Wong, 
2004). However, in terms of measuring auditing quality, some researchers have utilised 
the Client-Bid-Ask spread, which is the difference between the demand price and 
supply price of stock in audited establishment (Balsam et al., 2003). 
From the above-mentioned, the researcher can conclude that, although there is no 
general agreement amongst studies on particular measures for auditing quality, 
researches specifying a group of measures can be dependent upon measuring auditing 
quality under auditor’s legal liability. 
 
3.5.3  The Relationship between Auditing Fees and Auditing Quality 
The paper of Jensen & Payne (2005) argues that auditing quality and quality fees in 
response agency costs are also important in terms of auditing—and even in any 
business. The use of advanced auditing methods is related to employing auditors with 
good skills and industry experience. The study adds that advanced methods have little 
effect on auditing fees; however, in some cases, an increase in quality is not necessarily 
related to higher auditing fees. Moreover, it is suggested that it is not clear whether or 
not focusing on fees leads to a significant increase in audit quality.  
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In connection to this, the study of Abbott, Parker & Peters (2006) reveals that auditing 
fees reduce with income reduction discretionary accruals and vice versa. They also 
identify that the increase in auditing fees for positive discretionary accruals is 
significant for firms with higher price earnings, which may be owing to auditors’ 
prejudice; such prejudice results from irregular law suits, meaning the audit risk model 
does not sufficiently explain the auditor’s attitude with regard to audit planning and 
investment, and that the litigation risk component of auditor production function is 
useful in terms of maintaining higher auditing quality. 
Moreover, various authors (Palmrose 1986; Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995) have 
dealt with the relationship between the quality of the auditing process and the size of 
the auditing firm, making use of auditing fees as an indicator of quality, as they 
supposed differences in quality of professional performance between audit firms, and 
under the competitive market, there was a reflection of supposed differences in quality 
in auditing fees. The results indicate that large audit firms obtain more fees than small 
audit firms, in spite of controlling the variables related to audit risks, client size and the 
overall complexity of the auditing process. It was found that there was a subsidiary on 
auditing fees based on the size of the audit firm to which the auditor belongs (Colbert 
& Murray, 1998). 
Attempts have been made to determine whether or not there is a relationship between 
subsidiaries obtained by large audit firms and offering services of higher quality failed. 
In spite of the possibility of the existence of a positive correlation between auditing 
fees and the quality of the auditing process, as the literature indicates, until now, there 
has been no scientific evidence confirming the existence of such a relationship (Elitzur 
& Falk, 1996; Wooten, 2003). 
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3.5.4  The Relationship between Auditing Specialisation and Auditing Quality 
Auditing remains a bit of an ambiguity to those who are not familiar with the concept, 
as this process becomes more technical and sophisticated. Since the process is highly 
technical and complicated, it is necessary that it be handled by an individual who is an 
expert in this procedure. Thus, as indicated in the paper of Hogan & Jeter (1999), 
specialisation should be assigned enough importance to maintain the reliability of 
auditing procedures. For instance, whilst best practice has evolved and established 
certain tools for analytical audit or establishing audit trails, an element of subjective 
judgment remains as auditors determine what evidence to contain. Accordingly, the 
study of Low (2004) imposes a proposition that the auditor’s knowledge of the client’s 
industry improves the auditor’s overall ability to understand audit risks. The results 
indicate that the auditor’s knowledge of the client’s industry improves their audit risk 
assessments and directly affects the quality and nature of their audit planning decision. 
Aside from this, the study has found that the auditor’s knowledge of the client’s 
industry directly influences the way in which the auditor modifies the audit procedures.  
In this regard, Craswell, Francis & Taylor (1995) argue that there is a cost incurred by 
large auditing firms to form their brand name reputation and specialisation in a 
particular industry, which justifies obtaining a subsidiary in addition to fees to cover 
the costs. This study illustrates that, from the sample composed of 1484 firms 
registered on the Australian stock market, specialised large audit firms obtained more 
fees than non-specialised audit firms and large audit firms generally obtained more fees 
than other audit firms. Such results confirm a prevailing attitude towards demanding 
higher quality through using large audit firms. Their study was consistent with the 
study of Hogan & Jeter (1999) since this study has found that there is a positive 
association between audit specialisation in a specific industry, as well as the quality of 
the professional performance. This was based on the fact that an audit organisation 
dealing with many clients and belonging to the same industry is most likely to have 
deeper knowledge of the auditing risks and, in particular, the problems relating to this 
industry. It is recognised that this will lead to reducing litigation risk. Moreover, the 
study of Behn, Chai & Kang (2008) states that forecast accuracy is higher when firms 
hire industry specialist auditors owing to high audit quality. Notably, Kwon, Lim & 
Tan (2007) aimed in their study to explore whether the effects of industry specialists 
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auditors on earnings quality dependent on legal settings. The study found that the effect 
of auditor industry specialisation on earnings quality increases as the legal environment 
weakens, and there is also a role for industry specialists’ auditors within the legal 
environment. On the other hand, the profits of companies increase when such 
companies are audited by specialists. 
 
3.5.5  Strong Control Procedures 
Conversely, various individuals indicate the existence of a relationship between raising 
the auditing quality, on the one hand, and audit firms applying strong control 
procedures on the quality of the auditing performance, on the other hand. This result 
relies on the opinion that auditing firms are committed to the design and application of 
a more appropriate and comprehensive system for controlling the quality, thus leading 
to reductions in the possibility of not discovering fundamental errors during the 
implementation of audit works. As Malone & Robert (1996) state, an increase in the 
strength of control systems for the quality to which auditors are subjected reduces the 
possibility of the auditor’s involvement in behaviours resulting in a reduction of audit 
quality, such as inappropriately overlooking various auditing procedures as there is a 
reverse relationship between the auditor’s awareness to strengthen the control system 
for the quality and the procedures they follow in the audit firm, and between their 
awareness of sanctions’ strictness that the audit firm may apply if they committed 
actions leading to a reduction in auditing quality on the one hand and acts of auditors 
leading to reducing the possibility of quality on the other hand. The same study 
indicates that reducing the possibility of auditors’ acts that have special incentives to 
realise personal achievements and success on an individual level. 
As seen in the paper of Bedard, Deis, Curtis & Jenkins (2008), the auditing procedure 
is a fragile task and is crucial to the auditing firm, auditors and the company involved. 
With this in mind, Bedard, Deis, Curtis & Jenkins (2008) evaluate the risks monitoring 
and control practices in audit firms, and from their study, identify 46 questions which 
are a subject for further study in relation to risk management within the auditing 
process. Their evaluation indicates that risk management in the auditing procedure 
must be observed carefully. As part of risk management, the informing procedure 
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should be dealt well and, in accordance with this development, external auditor should 
exercise the auditing procedures in cooperation with the administration; this includes 
everything from the internal audits of quantitative exposure measurement models to the 
audits of accounting management procedures and policies. In essence, this process 
includes evaluation in terms of whether or not its management process works 
efficiently. This must be done so as to judge whether the firm under auditing addresses 
the risks and problems identified in the first process. Without this step, businesses 
would not be able to devise regulations and policies concerning standards, and also 
would not be able to determine whether their controlling processes are effective enough 
to recommend improvements of their processes and profit. 
In actual fact, with regard to investors’ rights and protection, auditing creates a good 
role and function. The study of Newman, Patterson & Smith (2005) states that an 
increase in auditor sanctions for undiscovered expropriation leads to a total investment 
increase as well as an increase of audit fees and an increase in insider's penalties; 
hence, the probability of audit failure will be less in such circumstances.  
 
3.5.6  Independence of the Auditor and Audit Quality 
It is worth noting that the ability of reporting in terms of affecting errors in financial 
statements depends on the independence of the auditor, and is considered to be a 
cornerstone in the auditing profession. From this perspective, we can define ‘auditor 
independence’ as the ability of the auditor to compile a report on deficiency aspects in 
the client’s financial reports. Accordingly, an auditor who enjoys a relatively high 
degree of independence has a higher possibility of reporting such errors (Calbert & 
Murry, 1998). 
The need for independent auditing has grown in order to improve the information flow 
between the management and users of financial statements, give confidence to the 
financial statements, increase the degree of dependence of various parties that may be 
used in evaluating the efficiency of the administration, and thereby determine the 
market value of the shares of the company under audit. With this in consideration, the 
paper of Mayhew & Pike (2004) has investigated whether or not investor selection of 
auditors improves auditor independence. The study found that giving investors the 
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authority to employ and remove auditors ultimately decreases auditor independence 
breaches, which will lead to enhanced economic surplus. 
There is no doubt that an increase in auditors’ independence will lead to an opinion 
expressed with full transparency and sincerity concerning the financial statements. 
Authors, such as Goldman & Barlev (1974), define ‘auditor independence’ as the 
ability of the auditor to resist management’s attempts to intervene in their work and 
press upon him behavioural and decision-related changes. The sources of client 
strength (management) to press on the auditor are: choosing a management amongst a 
large number of alternative audit firms, changing the auditor if he did not satisfy the 
management’s desires and determining his fees. If an auditor is subjected to personal or 
financial pressures, his professional independence may be suspected or a user of 
financial statements may see the dependence on his work as ineffective, thus increasing 
the possibility of audit failure. 
Auditing independence is viewed as being a factor related with audit cases, whereas the 
attitudes of auditors not to declare errors discovered through their work is viewed as 
being one of the factors causing auditing failure. Significantly, if the client has the 
power to pressure on the auditor not to report detected errors, the possibility of the 
auditor litigation increases. In this regard, Watts & Zimmerman (1981) indicate that the 
possibility of an auditor’s exposure to civil allegation when issuing a unqualified 
opinion depends on issuing the client misleading financial statements and the failure of 
the auditor to report this fact owing to not discovering the deficiency or errors in the 
client’s account systems (deficiency of competence) or otherwise owing to the inability 
of the auditor to declare found errors in spite of their discovery (weakness of 
independence) (Lys & Watts, 1994). 
It is generally recognised that large audit firms are less exposed to less independence, 
which is a belief potentially attributed to two reasons: the first is that large audit firms 
are less dependent on particular clients compared with other audit firms as large firms 
have several clients, and so auditor fees from one client represent a scant ratio from the 
gross income of the firm, thus meaning there is no justification to expose its reputation 
to risk; the second is the nature of the work in small audit firms, which is characterised 
by special features, leading to the loss of independence, such as the small volume of 
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clients, a personal tendency in performing the audit service, and the auditor’s personal, 
close relationship with the clients (Shockley, 1981). 
 
3.5.6.1 Maintenance of the Independence of Auditing: 
Palmrose (1988) offers evidence to support that large audit firms reduce their exposure 
to litigation through maintaining their independence, with the reflection of this 
independence in high-quality auditing compared with small audit firms. Upon this, we 
can conclude that the auditor’s legal responsibility enhances the auditor to carry out 
audits of a higher quality. 
In this regard, DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam (2002) have explained that the 
risk threatening auditors in terms of being exposed to litigation gives them a strong 
incentive to maintain their independence and interest in auditing quality—especially in 
the USA, where large audit firms incurred, in 1993 alone, more than US$1 billion as 
expenses related to litigation. The study indicates that there are incentives concerned 
with the market, which markedly enhance the auditor’s capacity to maintain 
independence. Such incentives are most keenly related to reputation and litigation 
expenses. Lennox (1999b) investigates several reasons as for why large auditing firms 
carry out audits more accurately than small audit firms. These reasons concentrate on 
auditor reputation and financial ability, and conclude that large auditing firms are more 
exposed to litigation, in some situations, despite their accuracy compared with small 
audit firms. Markedly, this conflicts with the reputation hypothesis but agrees with the 
financial ability hypothesis for large audit firms, where the study has found that such 
firms enjoy larger financial abilities, thus making them a fruitful target for litigation. 
Accordingly, such firms must have greater accuracy in terms of offering their 
professional services.  
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3.5.7  Length of Auditor Tenure  
On the other hand, during the last period, interest in studying the relationship between 
the continuity of an auditor in terms of auditing the accounts of the same client and 
audit failure was increased. This interest crystallised in calling for the American stock 
market (SEC) to carry out more research in this regard. Furthermore, the interest of 
several professional and organisational bodies in different countries to settle this 
dispute was raised on an international level with regard to obligatory auditor change to 
support his independence and objectivity. 
The study of Kealey, Lee & Stein (2007) illustrates that the length of the relationship 
between the customer and the auditors is a source of interest for congress, thus 
suggesting that the period is not in excess of 5 years and issued an act for obligatory 
changing auditors. Geiger & Raghunandan (2002) consider this on the contrary since 
their study indicates that, if the period of the audit tenure is increased, the auditor 
would then gain better experience and a deeper understanding of the risks associated 
with the client, therefore leading to auditing quality. The study concludes with the 
absence of empirical evidence linking the length of auditor tenure in cases of audit 
failure; therefore, it does not support the view that states that mandatory auditor 
rotation is necessary to improve audit quality. 
Moreover, audit failure may be more common in cases of short period auditor 
continuity with the same client, as the auditor—after accepting the new client—needs 
some time to understand the nature of the client’s process, which causes the auditor not 
to discover physical errors in financial statements; whereas, with a long period 
employment of an auditor, the auditor acquires better experience and a deep 
understanding of the risks associated with the client firm, as well as the way in which 
their accounting systems work as well as the strong and weak points in the systems. 
Accordingly, the auditor is able to determine zones characterised with a high degree of 
risks, increase the possibility of significant errors in these systems, thus inducing him to 
exert more effort and more time when examining such financial statements, and 
therefore performing a high-quality audit (Turner & Godwin 1999; Geiger & 
Raghunandan 2002). 
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Similarly, Stice (1991) considers that there is an increase in risks owing to failing to 
discover errors in preliminary audit periods owing to the non-familiarity of the auditor 
with special operations in audited firms, which increases the possibility of auditors 
overlooking errors in financial statements, audit failure, and subsequently increasing 
the possibility of litigation against the auditor with a decreased period in auditing the 
client’s accounts (3 years and less). Stice (1991) depends on what is explained by 
Pierre & Anderson (1984) in terms of educating in the field of auditing, which occurs 
with an increase in experience of dealing with the client of an audit firm and thus the 
efficiency of an auditor to evaluate events increases. 
Although an increase in the continuity of the auditor auditing the accounts of the same 
client at an exaggerated degree may lead to an audit operation of low quality, Deis & 
Giroux (1992) suggest that the quality of the audit decreases with the increase of 
auditor continuity as it is considered that long correlations between the auditor and 
client mean consolidated relations between them, and so the auditor loses his 
independence and objectivity where the auditor has the desire to satisfy the client as he 
performs less accurate auditing and accepts confirmation from management easily and 
loses renewed sight, which makes the auditing process more effective. Accordingly, the 
auditor has no incentive to innovate in auditing and accuracy in committing with its 
procedures. In this regard, Lys & Watts (1994) indicate that, when a relationship 
between the auditor and his client is consolidated, the auditor’s independence decreases 
and increases the possibility of his overall exposure to litigation. 
 
3.5.7.1 Obligatory Alternation Policy: 
Darbyshire (1992) suggests that the existence of a regular alteration policy for auditors 
supports auditing quality where the auditor is changed following a particular period and 
does not go back to the same client, except after a particular period. 
Elitzur & Falk (1996) indicate that there is a passive effect for the obligatory 
alternation policy on auditor planning for audit quality, where the study indicates that 
the planning of the audit quality for any period depends on receipts expected to be 
obtained in the future, and so determining a particular period for the auditor’s contract 
with the client ensures the current value of expected receipts in the next period decrease 
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with the passing of time, thus reducing the planned level of audit quality. Similarly, 
Geiger & Raghunandan (2002) conclude that there is no practical evidence for a 
relationship between an auditor’s long period of continuity and audit failure cases in 
those firms that have declared their bankruptcy during the period 1996–1998. 
 
3.5.8  Compensation Level and Auditing Quality  
Auditing standards are viewed as being one of the most important components for 
activating the auditor’s legal responsibility and incentives for committing to such 
standards are directly related to the level of applied sanctions for not committing to 
these standards. There is no doubt that the compensation level associated with civil 
legal responsibility, as a monetary sanction, has a great deterring effect on the auditor’s 
behaviour. 
Results of many studies in the field of the auditor’s legal responsibility indicate that 
there is a correlation between audit quality and the compensation level imposed upon 
the auditor (Palmrose, 1988; Melumad & Thoman, 1990; Dye, 1995; Schwartz, 1997; 
King & Schwartz, 2000; Zhang & Thoman, 1999), whereas such studies suggest that an 
increase in auditor’s commitment with regard to paying compensation for injuries 
results from auditing failure, which subsequently increases auditing quality as a 
particular threat for payment associated with legal responsibility, which creates an 
incentive for the external auditor to work and report honestly (Melumad & Thoman, 
1990). Moreover, the auditor chooses the effort level, which reduces the costs of the 
audit in addition to payments of expected civil responsibility in the case of audit failure, 
as costs associated with audit effort increase with surges in auditing effort, whereas 
costs associated with legal responsibility decrease with the increase in audit effort. 
Subsequently, auditors must balance the two forms of costs when making decisions 
with regard to the level of effort offered during auditing (Schwartz, 1997). 
The study of King & Schwartz (2000) explain that financial sanctions are imposed 
upon the auditor in a funnel effect, where they observe more changes in auditing efforts 
in the near period of imposing the sanction, with such changes decreasing when 
imposing the sanction period. This study also concludes that, in spite of this, economic 
models suppose that experiment items adopt their strategy under the sanction, and that 
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the financial sanction does not encourage the individual to modify their strategies; 
however, results indicate that financial sanction affects the auditor’s choice of audit 
effort in the following periods as such sanctions lead to a shock and increase in the 
intensity of the variety of exerted efforts. 
Moreover, Elitzur & Falk (1996) suggest that the planned level of auditing quality is 
positively related to the expected payments in the following periods. As the contracting 
period—according to the model on which the study is based—is determined and the 
date of the end of the contract is established and known absolutely, the current value of 
the payments during the following periods decreases with time. The same matter occurs 
for the planned quality level. The previous result agrees with the results presented by 
Deis & Giroux (1992), who noticed, in practice, a decrease of auditing quality with 
time. 
In spite of the difficulty in terms of controlling the auditing quality, it is possible to 
establish guarantees that provide confidence in terms of auditing quality. The most 
important of these guarantees include the following: 
a. following controlling methods on the quality of auditing processes; 
b. formation of auditing commissions; and 
c. activating a balance system for the auditor’s legal responsibility. 
 
3.6  Legal Responsibility Rules and their Impact on Auditing Quality and 
Investments Value 
It has been recognised that there are many disputes concerning the rules of legal 
responsibility that achieve optimal levels of auditing quality and the size of investments 
in business firms. Although many previous studies (Palmrose, 1988; Melumad & 
Thoman, 1990; Elitzur & Falk, 1996) indicate that there is a positive correlation 
between levels of expected compensation imposed by legal rules regulating the 
auditor’s civil responsibility, on the one hand, and auditing quality, on the other hand, 
the studies of Narayanan (1994) and Patterson & Wright (2003) adopt another 
direction: imposing an increase in the auditor’s civil responsibility in itself does not 
guarantee a corresponding increase in terms of effort level (auditing quality), as some 
particular legal rules increase the auditing quality or reduce the possibility of audit 
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failure, in spite of imposing little responsibility upon the auditor, compared with other 
alternative rules that are more strict on auditors. 
On the other hand, Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) indicate that the legal 
system for civil responsibility achieves the greatest level of effort (auditing quality), but 
does not necessarily produce the greatest efficiency in terms of society, as payments of 
civil responsibility do not just encourage auditors to increase their audit effort but do 
make available insurance for investors against investment losses in business firms. 
Upon this, imposing increasing levels of civil responsibility on the auditor may 
encourage the investors of user financial statements to exaggerate in terms of 
investments and assets with higher degrees of risk compared with optimal investment 
level for society. Rather, an excessive increase in the level of legal responsibility may 
lead to encouraging unjustified civil cases against auditors. On the other hand, Shibano 
(2000) and Yu (2001) indicate that imposing high levels of legal responsibility upon the 
auditor makes the auditor more conservative in his report, thus leading to a greater 
possibility of refusing auditors for client’s financial reports, subsequently making it 
difficult for business firms to obtain funds necessary for practicing their investment 
activities, although such activities have investment opportunities for society. 
Accordingly, it is considered necessary for legislators in any country to be careful in 
terms of differentiating amongst alternative legal rules, at the level of each of the 
dimensions of responsibility, including legal rules that work jointly to improve the 
efficiency of society resources allocation, recognising that every alternative legal rule 
has a different effect on the decisions associated with auditing quality and investment 
in business firms. 
 
3.6.1  Alternative Rules for the Legal Responsibility of Auditors 
In practice, it has been observed that there are additional alternatives for every legal 
rule, regulating the dimensions of the auditor’s civil responsibility. Such alternatives 
differ amongst themselves in regard to the responsibility level imposed upon the 
auditor and the compensation level, which must be paid, if it is judged that he was 
responsible for the injury incurred by the plaintiff. Importantly, regulating the auditor’s 
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civil legal responsibility depends on combining the rules regulating the dimensions 
considered below. 
o Determination of the scope of the parties with the right to litigate the auditor 
civically; we can see that there are many alternative rules for this dimension, 
including:  
a. The rule of participation in the contract (particularly by contracting).  
b. Beneficiary rule (primary user). 
c. Rule of beneficiary who must be expected. 
d. Rule of beneficiary who can be expected. 
o Incident creating the auditor’s responsibility: 
a. Full responsibility rule. 
b. Negligence responsibility rule. 
o Scale used in estimating damage necessitating compensation:         
a. The scale of real damage related with investment – OOP (full 
compensation). 
b. Independent measure from real investment – IOI. 
o Responsibility for paying compensation determined by the court for the sake of the 
plaintiff: 
a. Joint and several liability rule. 
b. Pure proportional rule. 
c. Hybrid proportional liability rule. 
These rules are considered from the aspect of insurance amount against the deficit firm 
(client) which the auditor must make available in favour of the plaintiff. It must be 
noted that, in the case of the financial ability of all defendants who must pay all their 
shares in the compensation, there are no differences in terms of applying the previous 
rules (paying compensation rules), as there are no unpaid sums in terms of 
compensation. In this case, the responsibility for paying the compensation is allocated 
according to contributions to the errors and the fraud in which they participated, as 
determined by the court. 
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The joint and several liability rule offers insurance that can be described as complete 
insurance for the plaintiff (investor) since the auditor (defendant) must pay his share of 
the compensation determined by the Court, in addition to the unpaid share that must be 
paid by other defendants—regardless of the amount of injury caused by the auditor and 
ratified by the court. This means that auditors may afford the bankruptcy of other 
defendants, whatever their share of responsibility (Hillegeist, 1999).  
According to the pure proportional liability rule, the defendant (auditor) who is 
responsible is required to pay only a share that represents a percentage of the 
compensation sum ratified by the court. This sum is determined depending on the 
degree of their participation in the error or fraud. This percentage may be 10%, 20% or 
30%, but not 100%. This rule is applied currently in Canada. It is clear that this 
percentage does not present insurance from the auditor against the deficiency of other 
defendants. Thus, the auditor’s responsibility is exclusively his share of damages 
ratified by the Court, and so plaintiffs must afford the full risk of bankruptcy of other 
defendants (Hillegeist, 1999). 
The hybrid proportional liability rule is placed between the other two rules, where the 
auditor is responsible for only a share of the bankruptcy of other defendants; thus, the 
auditor provides a limited insurance for investors against the deficiency of other 
defendants (Hillegeist, 1999). 
From the above-mentioned, under the existence of more alternatives for each legal rule 
composing the system, it may be stated that there are many alternative systems 
determining the auditor’s legal responsibility, where the legislative authority in the 
state differentiates between them when selecting the most appropriate legal system, as 
it is supposed that every alternative system has a different effect on both the auditing 
quality and the investor’s decisions in terms of determining the volume of his 
investment.  
 
3.7  Importance of Accounting Information for Making Decisions 
In spite of the importance of audited accounting information for the various parties who 
use them when making decisions (for example, the project’s management, owners and 
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users, government bodies, creditors and suppliers, banks and other financial 
institutions), there are those who believe that the financial information is not more 
important than the non-financial information when analysing a stock recommendation. 
Moreover, balance sheet information is not more important than other financial 
information. Furthermore, information provided by analysts affects the ultimate 
decisions of investors and the firm value, and motives must be given to analysts to 
provide extra information and to determine considerations that drive particular security 
recommendations (Breton & Taffler, 2001). With this in consideration taken into 
account, the paper of Ball & Shivakumar (2008) reviews and estimates the importance 
of profits in terms of providing new information to the stock market, and through the 
auditing procedure it was found that the average quarterly earnings announcement is 
related at approximately 1%–2% of the total annual information. Accordingly, this 
result supports the view that the reported earnings are not timely in terms of giving new 
information to the stock market; however, they have found that their subject company 
has participated more to return volatility in recent years, which may emphasise that 
earnings have increased significance as a source of new information. 
In actual fact, audited financial statements provide information concerning the 
possibilities of future success or the profitability of the business firm, as it summarises 
the current economic state in the business firm, which gives a good indication about the 
future profits. Accordingly, the auditing process aims at reducing uncertainty related to 
future cash flows for this business firm, as audit value created from reducing losses 
might be the result of relying on misleading financial statements and making 
investment decisions in relation to such statements. As such, the value of accounting 
information contained in financial statements depends on auditing quality, as the 
auditing service may offer valuable information to society through the auditing process 
with reasonable quality, as these statements enable establishing the financial state in the 
firm and also facilitate excluding the non-profit firms, thereby avoiding society from 
incurring damages resulting from exercising non-profit activities. 
Financial statements are, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976), the universally 
accepted tools for the analysis of a business entity, therefore managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and the ownership structure that builds the firm should be carefully 
evaluated. If properly understood, they provide users with understanding of company's 
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progression and its performance. They are, at best, an estimation of the economic 
reality due to the selective reporting of economic events by the accounting system, 
associated with alternative accounting methods and estimates (Dopuch, Ingberman & 
King 1997). The objective of financial statements is to give users (business owners, 
lenders, managers, suppliers, customers, attorneys, litigants, employees and job 
seekers) with a set of financial data which, in summary, fairly represents the financial 
performance and strength of a business (Titman & Trueman, 1986; Breton & Taffler, 
2001; Hillegeist, 1999). Importantly, they expose prospects and thus provide security 
against financial dangers. Ideally, financial statements analysis provides information 
that is useful to present, to potential investors, creditors and other users in terms of 
making rational investments, credit risk monitoring, and other similar decisions 
(Bedard, Deis, Curtis & Jenkins, 2008). Furthermore, they are comparative 
measurements of risk and return to make investments or credit decisions as they 
provide a basis for predicting future earnings and cash flows. 
In this regard, the role of auditors is concentrated on providing users of financial 
statements with authenticity on accounts presented by client, in order to improve their 
decisions associated with the allocation of capital as investors may not provide the 
necessary financing (capital or credit) unless auditor reports indicate the good financial 
situation of the firm. This improvement associated with the allocation of capital can be 
considered as an audit value. 
 
3.7.1  Auditing Quality Imparts Authenticity on Accounting Information 
Investment decisions by users of financial statements are considered to be vital 
decisions for any society depending on rational investments. Importantly, they lead to 
increasing net society wealth on an economic level, although it is inappropriate to 
classify the systems of legal responsibility of the auditor only from the perspective of 
auditing quality; this responsibility enhances its occurrence. As auditing effort is not a 
target in itself but rather a means to imparting authenticity on accounting information, 
investors and others users of financial statements may seek access to such data when 
making decisions related to the business firm. Accordingly, the most complete analysis 
within this field must test aspects relating to the decisions of users of financial 
Chapter Three 
 86 
statements—depending, to a great extent, on the auditing process and the reflections of 
such decisions on social welfare—as a main aspect of determining the overall 
efficiency of resource allocation in any society. As such, it is required that the 
proficiency of the proposed legal responsibility rules be evaluated in terms of its effects 
on social welfare through testing the reflections of these rules on decisions associated 
with auditors (level of auditing effort) and investors (investment level). 
The main purpose of evaluating legal responsibility rules is through presenting 
proposed help in the design of a civil legal responsibility system for auditors, thus 
producing a balance amongst the interests of parties associated with the auditing 
process. Accordingly, the situation requires reviewing the legal situation of accounting 
and auditing in Kuwait, and a description of the civil responsibility system to which the 
auditors are currently subjected, according to legal texts in related Kuwait legislations 
and problems in terms of practically implementing this system in Kuwait business 
settings. 
3.8  Role of Auditing as a Source of Insurance for Investment Value 
There are many studies analysing the reactions concerning alternative legal rules 
regulating the auditor’s responsibility, on the one hand, and the decisions of users of 
financial statements—especially investors’ decisions—on the other. Franz, Crawford & 
Johnson (1998) indicate another source for requiring an audit service, rather than 
obtaining reasonable authentication that management errors and fraud will be 
discovered and reported by them. There is a request for auditing as a source of 
insurance, as an auditor acts as a partial guarantor for the investment value in the 
business firm’s financial statements, with losses resulting from the value of errors in 
financial statements covered by management through litigation against the auditor. 
The experimental results of Dopuch & King’s (1992) study—which simulated the roles 
of auditors, firm management and users of audit information, as they represent probable 
litigates—proposed that systems of civil legal responsibility provide incentives for 
auditors to balance the predicted costs of the audit, on the one hand, with payments of 
predicted civil responsibility on the other hand. The study also indicates that, in the 
case of the existence of legal responsibility systems and authenticated auditing, the 
firms (clients) have to audit service voluntary. This situation encourages making 
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investment decisions for costly investments, which produce higher levels of economic 
efficiency, leading to increases in total wealth and improved social welfare compared 
with the absence of this system regulating legal responsibility. 
The study of Zhang & Thoman (1999) deals with the effects of legal responsibility 
rules on net social welfare owing to the auditing process, under a possible agreement 
between the investor (plaintiff) and auditor (defendant) on a pre-trial settlement. The 
study indicates that, with the settlement option, the trial will be uncertain. For this 
reason, through reducing trials, settlements may reduce unjustified juridical charges, 
which do not bring value to society. 
3.8.1  Effect of Auditors’ Legal Responsibility Level on the Investment  
Some studies in the USA have dealt with the predicted effects of the auditor’s legal 
responsibility level on investment decisions, such as Sarath & Wolfson (1993), who 
tested a model to analyse the audit’s effect on the volume of trade and the effect of 
imposing sanctions on the auditor so as to guarantee a reasonable level of auditing 
effort. Those authors conclude that increasing the sanctions imposed upon auditors 
leads to a high-quality audit, although this higher level does not necessarily result from 
an increased investment value (Schwartz 1997). 
Schwartz (1997) presents an analytical model aiming to discover the effects of the 
auditor’s legal responsibility in terms of auditing quality and investment. This model is 
more keenly interested in the effects of damage measures as a main determinant of 
investment efficiency in a business firm. This model tested the effects of four different 
effects of auditor legal responsibility. Each of them was composed of a rule for 
determining the responsibility act (strict and vague negligence) with a damage measure 
(real damages related to investment [OOP]—independence measure from real 
investment [IOI]).  
From the above-mentioned, the existence of an appropriate system for the auditor’s 
legal responsibility is considered to be one of the most important guarantees for the 
quality of the auditor’s professional performance under the availability of components 
to activate this system in a balanced manner. 
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3.9  Conclusion and Motivation for the Current Research  
From the previous conceptual framework, a conflict between increasing auditors’ 
liabilities and attaining audit quality can be seen. Audit quality supports the investment 
process in society and promotes development. This conflict requires further research 
concerning the optimal level of audit quality. The problem becomes more apparent in 
developing countries, where it is necessary that the auditor legal responsibility system 
in emerging countries, such as Kuwait, includes legal rules which enhance, at 
appropriate levels, the business settings, the audit effort and investment, which 
increases social welfare from auditing. This requires reviewing the needs of users of 
financial statements (e.g. investors) from auditing and establishing the reaction of 
auditors toward them, as well as their effects on the auditing profession and its costs. 
Moreover, it requires a review of the current legal responsibility regulating the audit 
civil responsibility, in Kuwait, as documented with related legislations, in Kuwait, 
determining problems that impair the activation of this system in practice, and 
establishing the need to modify legal texts in current legislations. Otherwise, new laws 
could be enacted in order to achieve aspects of civil responsibility within the legal 
system; this will help to achieve the desired social welfare and thus increase the profits 
of all parties relating to auditing, which subsequently enhances social welfare in 
emerging markets. So, in order to meet the study objectives, this research will seek to 
test four hypotheses and their associated sub-hypotheses, considering the users of 
financial statements (the demand side of the auditing services) at the first stage of the 
study. In the second stage of the study, the first and third hypotheses are tested, 
considering the auditors (the supply side of the auditing services). The four hypotheses 
are formulated as follows: 
H1: The degree of the civil legal liability system within society has no effect on the 
auditing profession. 
H1/1 The weakness of the civil legal liability system does not affect the demand on 
auditing services. 
H1/2 The weakness of the civil legal liability system has no effect on the frequency 
of using published financial statements. 
H2: The Legal liability rule is not the main factor affecting auditing quality. 
H2/1 Increasing legal compensation will not increase audit quality. 
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H2/2 Whenever the period of auditor tenure increases, audit quality increases. 
H2/3 Whenever auditor experience increases, audit quality increases  
H2/4 Whenever there is an auditor industry specialisation, auditing quality increases. 
H2/5 Whenever the audit firm size increases, audit quality increases. 
H3: Increasing the legal liability of auditors will not increase audit quality. 
H3/1 Applying a strict liability rule improves audit quality, whilst applying 
negligence rule has a lesser effect on audit quality. 
H3/2 A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not increase 
audit quality more than legal deterrence rule. 
H3/3 Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may 
cause due to auditing failure, will not increase audit quality. 
H3/4 Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for the 
plaintiff against the auditor who is charged due to his negligence) will not 
increase auditing quality. 
H3/5 Increasing the auditor’s liability in terms of paying unpaid compensation by 
other insolvent defendants will not increase auditing quality. 
H4: Investment level within society is not dependent on the legal rules applied. 
H4/1 Applying a strict liability rule increases investment level, whilst applying 
a negligence rule has a lesser effect on investment level. 
H4/2 A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not 
increase investment level more so than the legal deterrence rule. 
H4/3 Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he 
may cause due to auditing failure will not increase investment level. 
H4/4 Increasing the compensation amount (as determined by the Court for the 
plaintiff against the auditor charged with negligence) will not increase 
investment level. 
H4/5 Increasing the auditor’s overall liability for paying unpaid compensation 
by other insolvent defendants will not increase investment level. 
 
The next chapter is the survey for financial reports’ users, in which the four main 
hypotheses will be tested, in order to study the effects of the legal liability system and 
its subsequent impacts on society. 
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Chapter Four: Survey for Financial Reports Users 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In order to achieve the study objectives, the researcher carried out a field study so as to 
survey the opinion of the community concerning the auditor's responsibility and the 
liability system, as well as its effects on the auditing quality and investment level 
within society. The researcher divided the study into two stages: the first stage 
concerned the users of the financial statements as they represent the demand side for 
the auditing services; the second stage considered the auditors as they represent the 
supply side for the auditing services. Finally, a comparison between the views of the 
two groups was undertaken with the aim of drawing a conclusion for the optimal legal 
liability system for society. Importantly, this chapter is dedicated to the first stage of 
the study, whilst the following chapters consider the subsequent stages. 
In the first stage of the study, four main hypotheses will be tested so as study the effects 
of the legal liability system and its subsequent impacts on society. The first hypothesis 
has been designed to test whether the degree of the civil legal liability system in society 
has an effect on the auditing profession. To test the effect of legal liability rules on 
audit quality, a second hypothesis was designed to test the most importance factor 
affecting auditing quality, including the legal liability rules applied as a main quality 
factor. Subsequently, in order to explore the preferable rules amongst different liability 
rules, a third hypothesis was dedicated to testing which liability rules affect auditing 
quality. Finally, a fourth hypothesis tests which of the liability rules mentioned in the 
third hypothesis affect the investment level on the society with the objective to study 
the effects of these rules on investment level. 
 
4.2  Survey Instrument and Sample 
Some studies (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2006; 
Collis & Hussey, 2003) indicate that the data can be gathered by various methods 
(surveys, case studies, experiments, etc.).The used approach depends on research 
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questions (Avison et al., 1999). Many studies used questionnaire method for data 
collection (Bobek et al., 2012; Ng, 2007; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Kachelmeier & Towry, 
2002; Nelson et al., 2002; Rudolph & Welker, 1998; Flory et al., 1992). With is in 
mind, using questionnaire is consider easy to be distributed in many places during a 
short time, reaching wide range of participants, and is less costly (Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Yin, 2009). 
Therefore, in order to achieve the study objectives, this research used quantitative 
approach by questionnaire, since it is consider the most suitable and appropriate tool 
for this field study compared with other approaches in aim to survey the opinion of two 
groups as previously mentioned. 
The survey instrument was developed following the review of related literatures in this 
field, and was accordingly tested with a pilot study, including 10 financial statement 
users. 
The questionnaire included individual data for the respondents concerning their jobs, 
education level, number of years’ experience, and the frequency of using financial 
statements.  
The questionnaire utilised rating questions used to garner opinion data, which are a 
strong set of questions or items considered as indicators of a construct or concept 
(Corbetta 2003). Rating questions most frequently adopt a Likert-scale rating in which 
the respondent is questioned about how strongly she or he agrees or disagrees with a 
statement or series of statements, generally on a four-, five-, six- or seven-point scale 
(Saunders, 2009). Thus, the present study has adopted a Likert scale with 5 degrees, 
ranging from 1 to 5 (5 = strongly agree; 4 = agree; 3 = No opinion; 2 = disagree; and 1 
= strongly disagree). 
The questionnaires were distributed to different categories, mainly those who are 
related or use financial reports and investment, in Kuwait. This included the Kuwait 
Exchange market dealers, brokerage companies, commercial banks, and securities 
investment companies. Such firms were randomly selected from existing firms 
currently working in Kuwait State, as illustrated in the following table (4.1).  
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Table 4.1: Number of firms in the research sample 
 
Type No. of Selected firms No. of Firms Working 
in Kuwait 
Brokerage firms 6 14 
Investment firms 6 24 
Commercial Banks 4 9 
Stock Exchange 1 1 
 
In order to ensure that the research sample was unbiased and representative of all users 
of financial statements, the sample included different categories, all of which used 
financial statements; therefore, they are classified as investors, financial managers, 
creditors, financial analysts, and others. Moreover, prior to conducting the empirical 
study, the researcher counted all institutions working in the state of Kuwait (brokerage 
firms, commercial banks, and securities investment companies), and accordingly 
ranked them by capital and randomly selected the 16 institutions to be the field of study 
in proportion to their size. Following, the questionnaires were randomly distributed to 
the users of financial statements, all of whom were known to be working or dealing 
with these institutions, as well as to investors dealing directly with the Kuwait stock 
exchange. All procedures were carried out in order to ensure that the responses would 
not be biased. Indeed, after analysing the responses, it became clear that there is no 
indication of a systematic response across the respondents’ categories.  
As well as the results of Kolmogorov-Simirov test, the responses are shown to be 
subject to normal distribution, which gives reliability to the results of the questionnaire; 
therefore, the results can be generalised across all of society. Table (4.2) illustrates the 
results of this test. 
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Table 4.2:  Normality test (Kolmogrov-Smirnov) for users’ response 
Variable N Statistic Sig  Variable N Statistic Sig 
Q1.1 105 3.160 .000  Q10.1 105 2.757 .000 
Q1.2 105 3.135 .000  Q10.2 105 3.399 .000 
Q1.3 105 2.615 .000  Q10.3 105 2.148 .000 
Q1.4 105 2.559 .000  Q10.4 105 2.962 .000 
Q1.5 105 2.495 .000  Q10.5 105 2.685 .000 
Q1 105 2.553 .000  Q10 105 1.967 .001 
Q2.1 105 2.540 .000  Q11.1 105 3.212 .000 
Q2.2 105 2.737 .000  Q11.2 105 2.468 .000 
Q2.3 105 2.673 .000  Q11.3 105 3.080 .000 
Q2.4 105 3.007 .000  Q11.4 105 2.365 .000 
Q2.5 105 2.917 .000  Q11.5 105 2.579 .000 
Q2 105 1.610 .011  Q11 105 1.866 .002 
Q3.1 105 2.350 .000  Q12.1 105 2.985 .000 
Q3.2 105 3.176 .000  Q12.2 105 2.871 .000 
Q3.3 105 3.228 .000  Q12.3 105 2.669 .000 
Q3.4 105 2.948 .000  Q12.4 105 2.421 .000 
Q3.5 105 3.008 .000  Q12.5 105 2.889 .000 
Q3 105 1.634 .010  Q12 105 2.271 .000 
Q4.1 105 3.254 .000  Q13.1 105 3.530 .000 
Q4.2 105 2.055 .000  Q13.2 105 3.770 .000 
Q4.3 105 2.669 .000  Q13.3 105 2.788 .000 
Q4.4 105 3.479 .000  Q13.4 105 2.639 .000 
Q4.5 105 2.679 .000  Q13.5 105 2.612 .000 
Q4 105 1.384 .043  Q13 105 1.461 .028 
Q5.1 105 2.696 .000  Q14.1 105 3.157 .000 
Q5.2 105 2.220 .000  Q14.2 105 3.655 .000 
Q5.3 105 2.492 .000  Q14.3 105 2.498 .000 
Q5.4 105 3.128 .000  Q14.4 105 3.110 .000 
Q5.5 105 2.726 .000  Q14.5 105 2.597 .000 
Q5 105 1.303 .067  Q14 105 1.463 .028 
Q6.1 105 2.035 .001  Q15.1 105 3.717 .000 
Q6.2 105 2.320 .000  Q15.2 105 3.898 .000 
Q6.3 105 2.402 .000  Q15.3 105 2.958 .000 
Q6.4 105 3.091 .000  Q15.4 105 2.694 .000 
Q6.5 105 2.245 .000  Q15.5 105 2.460 .000 
Q6 105 1.582 .013  Q15 105 1.925 .001 
Q7.1 105 3.104 .000  Q16.1 105 2.882 .000 
Q7.2 105 2.743 .000  Q16.2 105 3.457 .000 
Q7.3 105 2.843 .000  Q16.3 105 3.033 .000 
Q7.4 105 2.336 .000  Q16.4 105 2.945 .000 
Q7.5 105 2.124 .000  Q16.5 105 2.446 .000 
Q7 105 1.859 .002  Q16 105 1.815 .003 
Q8.1 105 2.814 .000  Q17.1 105 4.108 .000 
Q8.2 105 3.109 .000  Q17.2 105 3.065 .000 
Q8.3 105 2.175 .000  Q17.3 105 3.401 .000 
Q8.4 105 2.558 .000  Q17.4 105 2.750 .000 
Q8.5 105 2.941 .000  Q17.5 105 2.648 .000 
Q8 105 1.156 .138  Q17 105 1.819 .003 
Q9.1 105 3.067 .000      
Q9.2 105 4.306 .000      
Q9.3 105 2.428 .000      
Q9.4 105 2.870 .000      
Q9.5 105 3.118 .000      
Q9 105 1.977 .001      
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287 questionnaires were distributed in the period February–April, 2010, with returned 
questionnaires amounting to 112 (39%), as illustrated in Table (4.3). 
 
Table (4.3): Number of distributed and received questionnaires 
Date   Investors 
Financial 
Managers 
Creditors 
Financial 
Analysts 
Others Total 
Response 
Ratio 
18/02/2010 
Distributed 25     25 
32.00% 
Received 8     8 
22/02/2010 
Distributed 14     14 
35.71% 
Received 5     5 
24/02/2010 
Distributed  1  3 2 6 
33.33% 
Received  1  1 0 2 
03/03/2010 
Distributed  2 9 3 4 18 
44.44% 
Received  1 4 1 2 8 
04/03/2010 
Distributed  1  6 1 8 
37.50% 
Received  0  2 1 3 
08/03/2010 
Distributed 18 1  2  21 
28.57% 
Received 6 0  0  6 
10/03/2010 
Distributed  3 7 2 3 15 
40.00% 
Received  2 2 1 1 6 
14/03/2010 
Distributed  5  5 5 15 
46.67% 
Received  2  2 3 7 
17/03/2010 
Distributed 9 1  2 2 14 
28.57% 
Received 3 0  1 0 4 
22/03/2010 
Distributed  4 6 1 2 13 
53.85% 
Received  2 4 0 1 7 
28/03/2010 
Distributed 12 1  2 2 17 
35.29% 
Received 5 1  0 0 6 
30/03/2010 
Distributed  6  4 7 17 
52.94% 
Received  3  2 4 9 
04/04/2010 
Distributed 13 1  3 2 19 
31.58% 
Received 5 1  0 0 6 
07/04/2010 
Distributed  4  6 3 13 
38.46% 
Received  1  2 2 5 
13/04/2010 
Distributed 11   2  13 
38.46% 
Received 4   1  5 
18/04/2010 
Distributed  5  3 5 13 
38.46% 
Received  2  1 2 5 
20/04/2010 
Distributed  2 7 3 1 13 
53.85% 
Received  1 5 1 0 7 
28/04/2010 
Distributed 33     33 
39.39% 
Received 13     13 
Total 
Distributed 135 37 29 47 39 287   
Received 49 17 15 15 16 112 39.02% 
Response Ratio   36.30% 45.95% 51.72% 31.91% 41.0% 39%   
 
After reviewing the returned questionnaires, it appeared that 7 questionnaires were 
invalid for analysis owing to a lack of data; meaning that the net valid questionnaires 
for analysis were 105 (36.5%). The individual characteristics data for this sample is 
detailed accordingly in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4: Users’ characteristics data 
Characteristics of Respondents N = 105 % 
Respondents Job: 
1) Investor 
2) Financial Manager 
3) Creditor 
4) Financial Analyst 
5) Other 
 
47 
16 
12 
14 
16 
 
44.8 % 
15.2 % 
11.4 % 
13.3% 
15.3 % 
Respondents Education: 
1) Professionals 
2) PhD 
3) MSc 
4) BSc 
5) Less 
 
30 
9 
7 
44 
15 
 
28.5 % 
8.6 % 
6.7 % 
41.9 % 
14.3 % 
Respondents years of experience: 
1) More than 10 years 
2) More than 5 years & less than 10 years 
3) Less than 5 years 
 
34 
51 
20 
 
32.4 % 
48.6 % 
19.0 % 
Respondents no. of using financial reports: 
1) Very frequently 
2) Frequently 
3) Occasionally 
4) Rarely 
5) Never 
 
28 
39 
29 
6 
3 
 
26.7 % 
37.1 % 
27.6 % 
5.7 % 
2.9 % 
 
4.3  Results of the Hypotheses Test 
This first stage of the study includes testing the previously detailed four main 
hypotheses, in order to study the effects of the legal liability system and its impacts on 
society. The first hypothesis tested the effect of the legal liability rules on the demand 
for auditing services, and then tested the ranking of the factors affecting auditing 
quality, including the legal liability rules, through the second hypothesis. The third 
hypothesis was dedicated to testing which liability rules affect auditing quality, and 
finally, a fourth hypothesis tested the effects of liability rules on the investment level 
within society. Such hypotheses were divided into secondary hypotheses for 
performing tests from several different dimensions, as discussed below. 
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4.3.1 The Effect of the Civil Legal Liability System on the Auditing Profession 
The first hypothesis was designed to test the extent of the effect of auditor civil legal 
liability system on the auditing profession within society.  
H1: The degree of the civil legal liability system within society has no effects on the 
auditing profession. 
This hypothesis was tested by creating two secondary hypotheses: the first secondary 
hypothesis was used in order to illustrate the effects of civil legal liability on the 
demand on the auditing profession in society; the second secondary hypothesis tested 
the effect of civil legal liability on the frequency of using the published and audited 
financial statements. 
H1/1: The weaknesses of the civil legal liability system do not affect the demand 
on auditing services. 
Testing this hypothesis comprised five statements concerning demand for auditing 
profession without the civil legal liability system, as illustrated in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Tests for hypothesis 1/1 
The weaknesses of the civil legal liability system do not affect the demand on auditing services. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q1. The absence of a civil 
legal liability system will: 
       
1 decrease the number of 
clients seeking auditing 
services. 
96.857 
(0.00)** 
91 (87%) 4.14 0.975 11.98 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.33 
2 decrease the auditing fees. 55.333 
(0.00)** 
74 (70%) 3.70 1.151 6.23 
(0.00)** 
3.48 3.93 
3 decrease the auditor 
assessment of clients’ risk. 
61.143 
(0.00)** 
80 (76%) 4.02 1.126 9.28 
(0.00)** 
3.80 4.24 
4 increase the probability of 
audit failure. 
62.571 
(0.00)** 
79 (75%) 4.05 1.121 9.59 
(0.00)** 
3.83 4.26 
5 decrease the number of 
certified public 
accountants. 
71.238 
(0.00)** 
82 (78%) 4.12 0.978 11.73 
(0.00)** 
3.93 4.31 
 Average score 102.076 
(0.00)** 
79 (75%) 4.008 0.931 11.09 
(0.00)** 
3.827 4.188 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
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From the Chi square test, it appears that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the 
respondents have a preferred answer. Depending upon the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
From the above-mentioned responses, it appears that 75% of respondents see that the 
lack of the civil legal liability system affects the demand for auditing professions within 
society (response mean 4.008). 
Markedly, 87% consider that this lack as being able to reduce the number of clients 
seeking auditing services, whilst 70% of consider that this will reduce auditing fees 
owing to a reduced demand for auditing. Furthermore, 76% see that this conduct 
auditor decreases the assessment of a client’s risk in order to increase the number of 
auditing processes carried out by him. Moreover, 75% consider that this will increase 
the overall probability of auditing failure, whilst 78% view this as potentially reducing 
the number of certified public accountants in society. 
The second secondary hypothesis was designed in order to test the effects of the civil 
legal liability on the frequency of using financial statements. 
H1/2: The weakness of the civil legal liability system has no effect on the 
frequency of using published financial statements. 
 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not the 
existence of the auditor's civil legal liability system would increase the use of 
financial statements, and thereby increase dependence on them, as illustrated in 
Table 4.6.      
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Table 4.6: Tests for hypothesis 1/2 
The weakness of the civil legal liability system has no effect on the frequency of using published financial 
statements. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q2. Do you think the existence 
of a civil legal liability system 
will: 
       
1 increase the investors’ 
dependence on audited 
financial reports 
39.19 
(0.00)** 
80 (76.2%) 4.03 0.814 12.96 
(0.00)** 
3.87 4.19 
2 increase the publishing of 
interim financial reports 
74.76 
(0.00)** 
81 (77.1%) 4.01 0.872 11.86 
(0.00)** 
3.84 4.18 
3 increase the need for high-
quality accounting standards 
92.76 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%) 4.22 0.899 13.90 
(0.00)** 
4.05 4.39 
4 enhance the publishing of 
financial reports on a timely 
basis 
103.52 
(0.00)** 
91 (86.7%) 4.31 0.891 15.06 
(0.00)** 
4.14 4.49 
5 enhance management in 
terms of voluntary disclosure 
108.57 
(0.00)** 
92 (87.6%) 4.18 0.782 15.46 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.33 
 Average score 74.09 
(0.00)** 
80 (76%) 4.15 0.518 22.74 
(0.00)** 
4.05 4.25 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
It appears from the answers that 76% of those respondents see that the existence of civil 
legal liability system would increase the usage of financial statements and would also 
increase the overall dependence on them (response mean 4.15). 
Since 76.2% see that this could lead to an increase in the dependence on audited 
financial reports, 77.1% consider that this would increase the publishing of interim 
financial reports. Furthermore, 85.7% see that this will lead to increasing the need for 
high-quality accounting standards, and 86.7% consider that this would enhance the 
publishing of financial reports on a timely basis. As a final result, 87.6% see that this 
will enhance overall management in terms of voluntary disclosure in the financial 
statements. 
The results of the first main hypothesis test confirm that the respondents support the 
necessity of the existence of a civil legal liability system within the community, 
rationalising that this would support the demand on the auditing profession and thereby 
increase the use of financial reports. This result shows that users in need of the auditing 
service understand the auditor’s role in society, acknowledging that they play a 
significant role in the development of a certain business and are also responsible for the 
analysis of the financial statements of a certain business (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 
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1995). Notably, users hold the view that, in order to achieve the optimal result of the 
auditing services, there is a need for a civil legal liability framework. 
 
4.3.2 Factors Affecting Auditing Quality 
Auditing quality is affected by many factors, namely auditor tenure, auditor experience, 
auditor specialisation, and the size of the auditing firm, as well as the existence of a 
civil legal liability system. The second hypothesis was designed to test the most 
important factor affecting auditing quality. 
H2: The Civil legal liability rule is not the main factor effecting audit quality. 
This hypothesis was tested through putting forward five sub-hypotheses in order to test 
the different factors relating to auditing quality, which are increased legal 
compensations imposed on auditors, increased auditing tenure, increased auditing 
experience, industry specialisation, and increased size of auditing firm. In each of these 
five sub-hypotheses, five statements were used to measure the effect of such factors on 
auditing quality. The first sub-hypothesis was formulated as follows: 
H2/1: Increasing legal compensation will not increase audit quality. 
 
Table 4.7: Tests for hypothesis 2/1 
Increasing legal compensation will not increase audit quality. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q3. An increase in expected 
compensation will: 
       
1 increase the confidence in 
financial statements 
38.66 
(0.00)** 
81 (77.1%) 4.09 0.81 13.78 
(0.00)** 
3.93 4.24 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
102.48 
(0.00)** 
86 (81.9%) 4.02 0.83 12.56 
(0.00)** 
3.86 4.18 
3 increase supervising and co-
ordination of audit team 
92.86 
(0.00)** 
86 (81.9%) 4.01 0.93 11.06 
(0.00)** 
3.83 4.19 
4 increasing auditor due care  72.56 
(0.00)** 
96 (91.4%) 4.36 0.72 19.30 
(0.00)** 
4.22 4.50 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
95.71 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%) 4.14 0.89 13.08 
(0.00)** 
3.97 4.32 
 Average score 62.51 
(0.00)** 
78 (74.3%) 4.124 0.59 19.59 
(0.00)** 
4.010 4.238 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
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The five statements included in the questionnaire, as shown in Table 4.7, were 
considered so as to study whether or not the increase of legal compensation imposed on 
auditors would increase auditing quality. Notably, it may accept the alternative 
hypothesis, which states that respondents have a preference for one of the five 
responses. The result of this sub-hypothesis agree with the results of many studies in 
the field of auditors’ legal responsibility, indicating that there is a correlation between 
auditing quality and the compensation level imposed upon the auditor (Palmrose, 1988; 
Melumad & Thoman, 1990; Dye, 1995; Schwartz, 1997; King & Schwartz, 2000; 
Zhang & Thoman, 1999), whereas such studies suggest that an increase in auditor 
commitment with regard to paying compensation for injuries resulting from audit 
failure increase audit quality. 
H2/2: Whenever the period of auditor tenure increases, audit quality increases. 
 
 
The five statements were included in order to test whether or not auditor tenure 
increase would lead to increased auditing quality. We may reject the null hypothesis 
and accept the alternative hypothesis, which states that respondents have a preference 
Table 4.8: Tests for hypothesis 2/2 
Whenever the period of auditor tenure increases, audit quality increases. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondent
s agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q4. Increasing the period of 
auditor tenure will: 
       
1 increase the confidence in 
financial statements 
57.48 
(0.00)** 
12 (11.4%) 2.70 0.786 -3.91 
(0.00)** 
2.54 2.85 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
45.62 
(0.00)** 
21 (20.0%) 2.69 0.954 -3.32 
(0.00)** 
2.50 2.87 
3 increase supervising and co-
ordination of audit team 
72.86 
(0.00)** 
17 (16.2%) 2.75 0.864 -2.96 
(0.00)** 
2.59 2.92 
4 increasing auditor due care  62.20 
(0.00)** 
8 (7.6%) 2.59 0.817 -5.14 
(0.00)** 
2.43 2.75 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
39.95 
(0.00)** 
7 (6.7%) 2.44 0.808 -7.10 
(0.00)** 
2.28 2.59 
 Average score 59.05 
(0.00)** 
0 (0%) 2.63 0.586 -6.43 
(0.00)** 
2.519 2.746 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
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for one response included in the questionnaire, as the mean indicates that the result is 
not in favour of increasing audit tenure. This result agrees with Lys & Watts (1994) and 
Deis & Giroux (1992), with such working emphasising that the quality of auditing 
decreases with the increase of auditor continuity, as it is considered that long 
correlations between the auditor and client create a relation between them, and thus the 
auditor loses his independence and objectivity. Notably, where the auditor has the 
desire to satisfy the client, the auditor’s independence decreases, thus affecting audit 
quality; it also increases the possibility of exposure to litigation. This result is found to 
be in contrast with Geiger & Raghunandan (2002) since their study indicates that, if the 
period of the auditing tenure is increased, the auditor would then gain better experience 
and a deeper understanding of the risks associated with the client, thus resulting in 
auditing quality. 
H2/3: Whenever auditor experience increases, audit quality increases. 
 
The statements were aimed at studying whether or not increased auditor experience 
would increase auditing quality. We may reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
Table 4.9: Tests for hypothesis 2/3 
Whenever auditor experience increases, audit quality increases. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondent
s agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q5. Auditor with more 
experience will: 
       
1 increase the confidence in 
financial statements 
89.33 
(0.00)** 
88 (83.8%) 4.24 0.883 14.38 
(0.00)** 
4.07 4.41 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
30.58 
(0.00)** 
68 (64.8%) 3.92 0.840 11.22 
(0.00)** 
3.76 4.09 
3 increase supervising and 
co-ordination of audit 
team 
61.81 
(0.00)** 
63 (60.0%) 3.68 0.882 7.90 
(0.00)** 
3.51 3.85 
4 increasing auditor due 
care  
50.77 
(0.00)** 
70 (66.7%) 3.71 0.805 9.03 
(0.00)** 
3.56 3.87 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
79.33 
(0.00)** 
60 (57.1%) 3.57 0.842 6.93 
(0.00)** 
3.41 3.73 
 Average score 63.11 
(0.00)** 
48 (45.7%) 3.825 0.4825 17.52 
(0.00)** 
3.731 3.918 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
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alternative hypothesis, which shows that the respondents have a preference for one 
response in the questionnaire.  
H2/4: Whenever there is an auditor industry specialisation, audit quality 
increases. 
 
Table 4.10: Tests for hypothesis 2/4 
Whenever there is an auditor industry specialisation, audit quality increases 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q6. Auditor industry 
specialisation will: 
       
1 increase the confidence in 
financial statements 
16.94 
(0.001)** 
65 (61.9%) 3.86 0.955 9.22 
(0.00)** 
3.67 4.04 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
37.90 
(0.00)** 
66 (62.9%) 3.74 1.038 7.30 
(0.00)** 
3.54 3.94 
3 increase supervising and co-
ordination of audit team 
15.42 
(0.001)** 
48 (45.7%) 3.48 0.952 5.16 
(0.00)** 
3.29 3.66 
4 increasing auditor due care  81.43 
(0.00)** 
43 (41.0%) 3.50 0.889 5.76 
(0.00)** 
3.32 3.67 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
50.00 
(0.00)** 
37 (35.2%) 3.15 0.978 1.57 
(0.00)** 
2.96 3.34 
 Average score 77.70 
(0.00)** 
43 (41%) 3.545 0.7117 7.84 
(0.00)** 
3.407 3.682 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The statements were devised in order to study whether or not increased auditor industry 
specialisation would accordingly increase auditing quality; however, the alternative 
hypothesis may be accepted, which suggests that the respondents have a preference for 
one response included in the questionnaire. Although the results of the study by Low 
(2004) indicate that the auditor’s knowledge of the client’s industry improves audit risk 
assessments, there is no evidence to suggest that the audit quality will improve. On the 
other hand, the study by Craswell, Francis & Taylor (1995) notes that there is a positive 
link between the auditing specialisation in a specific industry and the quality of 
professional performance. 
 
Chapter Four: Survey for Financial Reports Users 
 103 
H2/5: Whenever the audit firm size increases, audit quality increases. 
 
Table 4.11: Tests for hypothesis 2/5 
Whenever the audit firm size increases, audit quality increases 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number (%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q7. Increasing the size of 
audit firm will: 
       
1 increase the confidence 
in financial statements 
136.19 
(0.00)** 
98 (93.3%) 4.25 0.744 17.21 
(0.00)** 
4.10 4.39 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
66.54 
(0.00)** 
92 (87.6%) 4.20 0.726 16.93 
(0.00)** 
4.06 4.34 
3 increase supervising and 
co-ordination of audit 
team 
48.79 
(0.00)** 
77 (73.3%) 3.91 0.774 12.04 
(0.00)** 
3.76 4.06 
4 increasing auditor due 
care  
41.55 
(0.00)** 
78 (74.3%) 4.03 0.765 13.79 
(0.00)** 
3.88 4.18 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
31.19 
(0.00)** 
68 (64.8%) 3.88 0.829 10.87 
(0.00)** 
3.72 4.04 
 Average score 125.16 
(0.00)** 
76 (72.4%) 4.053 0.501 21.53 
(0.00)** 
3.956 4.150 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The five statements were devised in order to determine whether or not an increased size 
of auditing firm would increase auditing quality; however, the alternative hypothesis 
may be accepted, which states that the respondents have a preference for one response 
included in the questionnaire. The study of DeFond & Jiambalvo (1991) indicates that 
clients of large audit firms have reduced the possibility of committing errors or 
irregularities causing the manipulation of profitability. In the same context, the study of 
Becker et al. (1998) indicates that the Big Six auditing firms at that time (now four) 
offered auditing of higher quality than other small audit firms. 
In light of the previous tests, the number and percentage of respondents in agreement 
were arranged for the five statements in the frame of the five sub-hypotheses in a 
descending order, ranging from upper response to lower response as follows in Table 
4.12. 
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Table 4.12: Summary of the responses for the five sub-hypotheses for the second main hypothesis 
 Statement Increase legal 
compensation 
Increase 
size of 
audit firm 
Increase 
audit 
experience 
Industry 
specialisation 
Increase 
auditor 
tenure 
1 increase the confidence in 
financial statements 
77.1 % 93.3 % 83.8 % 61.9 % 11.4 % 
2 decrease the risk of audit 
failure 
81.9 % 87.6 % 64.8 % 62.9 % 20.0 % 
3 increase supervising and co-
ordination of audit team 
81.6 % 73.3 % 60 % 45.7 % 16.2 % 
4 increasing auditor due 
diligence 
91.4 % 74.3 % 66.7 % 41.0 % 7.6 % 
5 reduce the bias in auditor 
judgment 
85.7 % 64.8 % 57.1 % 35.2 % 6.7 % 
 Average score 74.3 % 72.4 % 45.7 % 41.0 % 0 % 
 
From these results, it appears that legal compensations imposed upon auditors is the 
main factor affecting auditing quality (74.3% of the sample), then, in approximate 
degree, the size of auditing firm (72.4%).  
As 77.1% of the sample show that increased legal compensations will increase their 
confidence in financial statements, 81.9% consider that increases will decrease the risk 
of auditing failure as a result of auditors seeking to avoid exposure to such 
compensations. Importantly, 81.6 % of the sample state that increases in legal 
compensation cause auditors to exert a greater degree of effort in terms of supervising 
team work, and also increases coordination degree amongst them. Moreover, 91.4% of 
the sample states that increased volume of compensation will increase the overall 
volume of auditors’ professional care, with 85.7% stating that increased compensation 
volume will reduce bias in auditors’ judgment. 
The results of the second main hypothesis test confirm that the respondents support the 
notion that the civil legal liability system is the main factor affecting auditing quality 
This result agrees with the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & Thoman (1990) and 
Elitzur & Falk (1996), which state that there is in general, positive correlation between 
the level of compensation expected by the plaintiff as a result of auditors’ liability 
towards them and auditing quality. Moreover, the study of Khurana & Raman (2004), 
which is related to the litigation risks and financial reporting credibility of the Big 4 
companies and non-Big 4 companies in Anglo-American countries, shows that the 
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exposure to litigation risk is the driver for perceived auditing quality more so than 
brand name protection.  
 
4.3.3 The Effect of Increasing Civil Legal Liability of Auditors on Auditing Quality  
The third hypothesis was designed to test the effect of auditors’ civil legal liability 
system on the auditing quality. 
H3: Increasing the civil legal liability of auditors will not increase audit quality. 
This hypothesis was tested through putting forward five secondary hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis was used in order to test the effect of auditor civil legal liability nature 
on auditing quality, testing whether or not the auditor should have full rather than 
limited responsibility for any fault in financial statements when performing auditing to 
increase auditing quality. The second secondary hypothesis tests whether or not 
imposing physical punishment (compensations) rather than imposing nonphysical 
punishment will be more effective on auditing quality. The third secondary hypothesis 
tests whether the increase of parties litigating auditor owing to auditing failure will 
increase auditing quality. The fourth secondary hypothesis is to test whether or not 
increases of the compensation amount imposed upon the auditor will increase auditing 
quality. The five secondary hypotheses test whether or not, if the auditor bears any 
obligations for defendants in the case of their insolvency for paying compensations, this 
will increase auditing quality.                                                                 
H3/1: Applying a strict liability rule improves audit quality, whilst applying 
negligence rule has a lesser effect on audit quality. 
Testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerned with whether bearing the 
auditor the civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements will provide greater 
protection to investors, thereby encouraging the investment process, as illustrated in 
Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13: Tests for hypothesis 3/1 
Applying a strict liability rule improves audit quality, whilst applying negligence rule has a lesser effect on audit 
quality. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q8. Requiring auditors to have 
full rather limited 
responsibility is likely to: 
       
1 increase auditor’s effort 
beyond the auditing 
standards 
97.81 
(0.00)** 
91 (86.7%) 4.20 0.859 14.31 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.37 
2 increase the conservatives in 
auditor’s opinions 
88.47 
(0.00)** 
83 (79.0%) 3.97 0.882 11.26 
(0.00)** 
3.80 4.14 
3 decrease the rate of accepted 
clients' risk 
17.78 
(0.00)** 
72 (68.8%) 3.94 0.979 9.83 
(0.00)** 
3.75 4.13 
4 increase the quality 
assessment of audit 
evidences 
98.38 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%) 4.21 0.768 16.14 
(0.00)** 
4.06 4.36 
5 increase the effectiveness of 
the audit committee 
31.50 
(0.00)** 
75 (71.4%) 3.83 0.935 9.09 
(0.00)** 
3.65 4.01 
 Average score 35.677 
(0.001)** 
66 (62.8%) 4.03 0.679 15.53 
(0.00)** 
3.899 4.162 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the above-mentioned responses, it appears that 62.8% of respondents support that 
imposing upon the auditor the civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements 
will increase audit quality (responses mean 4.03) as 86.8% support the fact that civil 
legal liability will increase auditors’ efforts beyond auditing standards, whereas 79% 
see that civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements will increase the 
conservatives in auditors’ opinions. Moreover, 68.8% see that this will cause the 
auditor to reduce the rate of accepted client risk, and 85.7% consider that this will 
increase the quality assessment of auditing evidence. Finally, 71.4% believe that this 
will increase the overall effectiveness of auditing committees; notably, this result is not 
in agreement with the studies of Schwartz (1997) and Radahakrishnan (1999), who 
argue that the inability of auditors to predicate the due care criterion (there is no strict 
rule to judge the auditors due care) to be used in evaluating their performance may be 
an incentive for them to increase their auditing effort or otherwise to present greater 
conservative opinions in auditing reports to reduce the possibility of their exposure to 
litigation risk or to negligence. 
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H3/2: A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not 
increase audit quality more than legal deterrence rule. 
The testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not 
auditors’ civil legal liability system—which depends on investors’ compensation rule 
rather than non-physical punishment rule—will increase audit quality, as illustrated in 
Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14: Tests for hypothesis 3/2 
A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not increase audit quality more than legal 
deterrence rule. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q9.Requiring auditors to 
compensate users for audit 
judgment errors rather than 
non-financial penalties is more 
likely to : 
       
1 increase auditing effort 
 
103.62 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%) 4.12 0.851 13.48 
(0.00)** 
3.96 4.29 
2 increase the number of 
auditing hours 
142.58 
(0.00)** 
92 (87.6%) 3.92 0.689 13.68 
(0.00)** 
3.79 4.06 
3 increase skills and 
professional competence of 
auditing team 
19.99 
(0.00)** 
71 (67.6%) 3.86 0.935 9.42 
(0.00)** 
3.68 4.04 
4 increase auditing cost 
 
51.46 
(0.00)** 
88 (83.8%) 4.27 0.824 15.79 
(0.00)** 
4.11 4.43 
5 issue more qualified 
opinions 
39.72 
(0.00)** 
78 (74.3%) 3.86 0.924 9.53 
(0.00)** 
3.68 4.04 
 Average score 99.40 
(0.00)** 
69 (65.7%) 4.006 0.593 17.37 
(0.00)** 
3.89 4.12 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
It appears from the response mean that 65.7% of the respondents support imposing 
physical compensations on the auditor as opposed to imposing non-physical 
punishments, with 85.7% considering that this will increase auditing effort. On the 
other hand, 87.6% see that this will increase the number of auditing hours. Moreover, 
67.6% consider that such an approach would increase the skills and professional 
competence of auditing costs, with 83.3% stating that this will increase audit costs. 
Finally, 73.3% believe that the auditor will issue more qualified opinions. This result 
agrees with the results of many studies in the field of auditors’ legal responsibility. 
Importantly, there is a recognised correlation between auditing quality and the 
compensation level imposed upon the auditor (Palmrose, 1988; Melumad & Thoman, 
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1990; Dye 1995; Schwartz, 1997; King & Schwartz, 2000; Zhang & Thoman, 1999), 
with such studies suggesting that an increase in auditor commitment with regard to 
paying compensation for injuries resulting from auditing failure, thereby creating an 
incentive for the auditor to work and to report honestly (Melumad & Thoman, 1990). In 
turn, it is considered that this will increase auditing quality. The auditor is required to 
choose the effort level, thus reducing the costs of the audit in addition to payments of 
expected civil responsibility in the case of audit. 
H3/3: Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may 
cause due to auditing failure, will not increase audit quality. 
The testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not 
increasing the number of parties who can litigate the auditor for any damage incurred 
owing to auditing failure will increase auditing quality, as illustrated in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15: Tests for hypothesis 3/3 
Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may cause due to auditing failure, will not 
increase audit quality. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q10.Allowing more than one party 
to sue the auditor for judgment 
errors will: 
       
1 increase legal consultants by 
auditor 
59.23 
(0.00)** 
91 (86.7%) 4.29 0.717 18.43 
(0.00)** 
4.15 4.42 
2 reduce acceptance of risky 
business clients 
108.19 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%)  4.06 0.897 12.10 
(0.00)** 
3.88 4.23 
3 make auditors more 
documentation of audit process 
16.03 
(0.00)** 
70 (66.7%) 3.90 0.970 9.50 
(0.00)** 
3.71 4.08 
4 increase advanced education of 
financial information users 
96.48 
(0.00)** 
89 (84.8%)  4.12 0.840 13.66 
(0.00)** 
3.96 4.29 
5 improve definition of legal rules 
 
18.39 
(0.00)** 
66 (62.8%)  3.67 0.977 7.02 
(0.00)** 
3.48 3.86 
 Average score 55.93 
(0.00)** 
73 (69.5%)  4.006 0.688 14.97 
(0.00)** 
3.87 4.14 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the responses, it is clear that 69.5% support the increased number of parties 
litigating the auditor in the case of auditing failure, as the responses mean was 4.006, 
with 86.7% considering that this would increase legal consultants with regard to the 
auditor’s work. Furthermore, 85.7% recognise that this will cause the auditor to limit 
his acceptance of clients with high-risk activities. Notably, 66.7% believe that this will 
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make auditors provide more documentation of the auditing process, with 84.8% 
considering that this increases the advanced education of financial information users. 
Finally, 62.8% see that it would improve the definition of legal rules.  
Increasing the number of parties having the right to litigate the auditor means that the 
quality of the auditor’s performance is scrutinised by more than one party, which could 
benefit society as a whole—not only the client of the auditing profession. In contrast, in 
the USA, by the 1980s, there was a strong direction calling for restricting the zone of 
the auditor’s legal responsibility owing to the negative effects exposed by the auditing 
profession and business environment; this is recognised as being due to an increased 
number of parties having the right to litigate auditors, this meaning increased exposure 
to litigation risk. 
H3/4: Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for 
the plaintiff against the auditor who is charged due to his negligence) will 
not increase auditing quality. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements regarding whether or not increasing the 
compensation amount to be paid by the auditor owing to auditing failure would 
increase auditing quality, as shown in the following table (Table 4.16). 
Table 4.16: Tests for hypothesis 3/4 
Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for the plaintiff against the auditor who 
is charged due to his negligence) will not increase auditing quality. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q11.Increasing 
compensation amount 
sought from the auditor due 
to audit judgment errors 
will: 
       
1 increase audit fees 
 
100.19 
(0.00)** 
80 (76.2%) 3.90 0.808 11.41 
(0.00)** 
3.74 4.05 
2 improve auditing 
programmes 
51.53 
(0.00)** 
88(83.8%)  4.19 0.773 15.77 
(0.00)** 
4.04 4.34 
3 increase tests of internal 
control accuracy 
84.29 
(0.00)** 
79(75.2%)  3.90 0.865 10.66 
(0.00)** 
3.73 4.06 
4 increase the size of audit 
sample 
38.12 
(0.00)** 
82(78.1%)  4.10 0.831 13.56 
(0.00)** 
3.94 4.27 
5 decrease acceptable audit 
risk 
97.62 
(0.00)** 
91(86.6%)  4.24 0.815 15.59 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.40 
 Average score 95.94 
(0.00)** 
77 (73.3%) 4.06 0.502 21.70 
(0.00)** 
3.97 4.16 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
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The results indicate that 73.3% of the respondents support increasing the compensation 
amount to be paid by the auditor as a result of auditing failure, with the response mean 
shown to be 4.6%. Clearly, 76.2% of the respondents believe that, owing to the increase 
in the compensation amount that the auditor has to pay in the case of auditing failure, 
the auditor’s fees will increase. Moreover, 83.8% state that the auditor will improve 
auditing programmes in order to reduce the probability of auditing failure. Furthermore, 
75.2% hold the belief that the auditor will increase the tests of internal control accuracy 
in order to reduce auditing failure probabilities. Moreover, 78.1% state that the auditor 
will increase the size of the auditing sample in order to achieve the same goal. Finally, 
86.6 % consider that the auditor will decrease the acceptable auditing risks, thus 
avoiding auditing failure and reducing the likelihood of auditor litigation, consequently 
bearing more compensation for injured persons as a result of auditing failure.  
 The result supports the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & Thoman (1990), Dye 
(1995), Schwartz (1997), King & Schwartz (2000) and Zhang & Thoman (1999), which 
suggest that an increase in auditor commitment with regard to paying compensation for 
injuries resulting from auditing failure will increase auditing quality. In this regard, 
future payment for compensation resulting from audit failure will drive auditors to 
improve their audit planning and ensure greater levels of due care and attention. 
  
H3/5: Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by 
other insolvent defendants, will not increase audit quality. 
 
Testing this hypothesis involved five statements concerning whether or not making the 
auditor responsible for any loss—regardless of who shared in the wrongdoing—would 
increase auditing quality, as illustrated in Table 4.17. 
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Table 4.17: Tests for hypothesis 3/5 
Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by other insolvent defendants, will not 
increase audit quality. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number (%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q12. Applying joint & 
several liability rule when 
suing auditors will: 
       
1 increase control over 
acts of management 
37.29 
(0.00)** 
78 (74.3%) 4.14 0.994 11.75 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.34 
2 achieve effective co-
ordination between 
different parties 
52.67 
(0.00)** 
72 (68.6%) 3.75 1.036 7.41 
(0.00)** 
3.55 3.95 
3 increase understanding 
of the client’s business 
52.48 
(0.00)** 
63 (60.0%) 3.60 0.967 6.35 
(0.00)** 
3.41 3.79 
4 increase size of 
disclosure about errors 
and illegal acts 
34.70 
(0.00)** 
81 (77.1%) 4.11 0.870 13.07 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.28 
5 promote multiplicity of 
auditors in client’s firms 
48.86 
(0.00)** 
77 (73.3%) 3.85 1.246 6.99 
(0.00)** 
3.61 4.09 
 Average score 67.43 
(0.00)** 
68 (64.8%) 3.89 0.856 10.65 
(0.00)** 
3.72 4.05 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The results indicate that 64.8% of the respondents support the view that the auditor 
should pay compensation, regardless of the extent to which other parties shared in the 
wrongdoing of the financial statements (joint and several liability). As can be seen from 
the table, 74.3% believe that this would increase the control over acts of management, 
whereas 68.6% consider that this would help to achieve effective co-ordination 
between different parties concerned with the preparation and review of financial 
reports. Furthermore, 60% see that the auditor will increase understanding of the 
client’s business, while 77.1% hold the view that this will increase size of disclosure 
concerning errors and illegal activity. Finally, 73.3% state that this will promote the 
multiplicity of auditors in clients’ firms. 
The results of the third main hypothesis test confirm that the respondents support 
increasing civil legal liability system within the community as it has a direct impact on 
the quality of audit. This result agrees with the model of Sarath & Wolfson (1993), 
which concludes that increasing the sanctions imposed upon auditors will lead to a 
greater degree of quality in terms of the audit. This result should be considered 
carefully as Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) indicate that the legal 
system for civil responsibility achieves the highest level of effort (auditing quality), but 
does not necessarily produce the greatest efficiency for society. Moreover, Narayanan 
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(1994) and Patterson & Wright (2003) conclude that imposing an increase in the 
auditor’s civil responsibility does not, in itself, guarantee a corresponding increase in 
effort level (auditing quality). 
 
4.3.4  The Effect of Civil Legal Liability Rules on Investment Levels   
The fourth hypothesis was designed to test the effect of the auditor’s civil legal liability 
system on the investment level within society.                            
H4: Investment level within society is not depended on the legal rules applied 
This hypothesis was tested by creating five secondary hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
was used in order to test whether or not the auditor should have full rather than limited 
responsibility for any fault in financial statements when performing auditing, so as to 
increase investment level. The second secondary hypothesis tested whether a liability 
system depending on the legal compensation rule would increase investment levels 
more so than the legal deterrence rule. The third secondary hypothesis considered 
whether an increase in the number of parties able to litigate the auditor as a result of 
auditing failure would increase investment level. The fourth secondary hypothesis 
tested whether increasing the compensation amount imposed upon the auditor will 
increase investment level. The five secondary hypotheses examined whether or not the 
auditor should bear any obligations for defendants in the case of their insolvency for 
paying compensations, and whether this would increase investment level. 
H4/1: Applying strict liability rule increase investment level, whilst applying 
negligence rule has a lesser effect on investment level 
Testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether bearing the 
auditor the civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements will have an effect 
on investment level in society, as illustrated in Table 4.18.         
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Table 4.18: Tests for hypothesis 4/1 
Applying strict liability rule increase investment level, whilst applying negligence rule has a lesser effect on 
investment level. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q13. Making auditors fully 
responsible for any error will 
encourage investors to: 
       
1 increase their investments value 111.04 
(0.00)** 
103 (98.1%) 4.32 0.596 22.69 
(0.00)** 
4.21 4.44 
2 increase the volume of trading in 
stock exchange 
54.23 
(0.00)** 
98 (93.3%) 4.22 0.554 22.56 
(0.00)** 
4.11 4.33 
3 ignore investment risk 82.09 
(0.00)** 
86 (81.9%) 4.10 0.887 12.70 
(0.00)** 
3.93 4.28 
4 reduce the use of the audited 
financial reports 
17.88 
(0.00)** 
89 (84.8%) 4.21 0.689 17.99 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.34 
5 less diversification of 
investments 
36.67 
(0.00)** 
77 (73.3%) 4.12 0.829 13.84 
(0.00)** 
3.96 4.28 
 Average score 62.52 
(0.00)** 
85 (80.9%) 4.19 0.420 29.13 
(0.00)** 
4.115 4.28 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The results indicate that 80.9% of the respondents support that forcing the auditor to 
bear the civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements would increase the 
investment level more so than in the case of applying the negligence rule, as it has been 
found that 98.1% support making auditors fully responsible for any errors, and that this 
would increase their investments value. On the other hand, 93.3% state that this will 
increase the volume of trading in stock. Moreover, 81.9% see that investors will ignore 
investment risk, with 84.8% believing that this will reduce the use of audited financial 
reports. Finally, 73.3% consider that this could lead to a lesser diversification of 
investments. 
 
H4/2: A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not 
increase investment level more than legal deterrence rule. 
 
The testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not 
auditors’ civil legal liability system—which depends on investors' compensation rule 
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rather than non-physical punishment rule—will increase investment levels in society, as 
illustrated in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19: Tests for hypothesis 4/2 
A liability system that depends on the legal compensation rule will not increase investment level more than legal 
deterrence rule. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number (%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q14. Requiring auditors to 
compensate users for audit 
judgment errors rather than 
being fined is more likely to: 
       
1 encourage investors to trade 
in stock exchanges 
84.52 
(0.00)** 
97 (92.4%) 4.28 0.628 20.88 
(0.00)** 
4.15 4.40 
2 Increase the volume of 
trading 
117.82 
(0.00)** 
97(92.4%) 4.14 0.595 19.63 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.26 
3 encourage banks to support 
business 
31.04 
(0.00)** 
79 (75.2%) 4.02 0.888 11.77 
(0.00)** 
3.85 4.19 
4 increase the relationship 
between stock prices and 
published financial 
statements 
27.14 
(0.00)** 
95 (90.5%) 4.38 0.656 21.55 
(0.00)** 
4.25 4.51 
5 increase the number of 
litigation cases made against 
auditors 
35.91 
(0.00)** 
83 (79.0%) 4.09 0.921 12.12 
(0.00)** 
3.91 4.26 
 Average score 64.50 
(0.00)** 
79 (75.2%) 4.18 0.533 22.69 
(0.00)** 
4.07 4.28 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the response mean, it appears that 75.2% of the respondents support imposing 
physical compensations upon the auditor as opposed to non-physical punishments in 
order to increase the investment levels in society, with 92.4% considering that this will 
encourage investors to trade in stock exchanges, this increasing the overall volume of 
trading. Furthermore, 75.2% see that this will encourage banks to support business, 
whilst 90.5% believe that this will increase the relationship between stock prices and 
published financial statements. Finally, 79% maintain that it will also increase the 
number of litigation cases made against auditors.                                             
H4/3: Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may 
cause due to auditing failure, will not increase investment level. 
The testing of this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not 
increasing the number of parties able to litigate the auditor for any damage incurred due 
to auditing failure would increase the investment level, as illustrated in Table 4.20. 
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Table 4.20: Tests for hypothesis 4/3 
Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may cause due to auditing failure, will 
not increase investment level. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q15.Increasing the number of 
parties who can litigate the 
auditor will: 
       
1 provide protection to 
shareholders 
130.39 
(0.00)** 
98 (93.3%) 4.12 0.600 19.12 
(0.00)** 
4.01 4.24 
2 provide oversight on 
management's acts  
126.96 
(0.00)** 
98 (93.3%) 4.15 0.551 21.38 
(0.00)** 
4.05 4.26 
3 encourage unjustified 
litigation against auditors 
73.24 
(0.00)** 
79 (75.2%) 3.91 0.942 9.89 
(0.00)** 
3.73 4.10 
4 improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation within 
society 
73.25 
(0.00)** 
95 (90.5%) 4.28 0.700 18.73 
(0.00)** 
4.14 4.41 
5 reduce the probability of 
auditing failure 
50.38 
(0.00)** 
67 (63.8%) 3.93 1.031 9.24 
(0.00)** 
3.73 4.13 
 Average score 74.77 
(0.00)** 
75 (71.4%) 4.08 0.486 22.75 
(0.00)** 
3.986 4.17 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the responses, it appears that 71.4% believe that increasing the number of parties 
able to litigate the auditor in the case of auditing failure will increase the investment 
level in society, with 93.3% considering that this will provide protection to 
shareholders and further provide oversight in regard to the management's acts; 
however, 75.2% state that it would cause unjustified litigation against auditors. 
Markedly, 90.5% state that the efficiency of resource allocation would be improved 
within society, with 63.8% stating that this will reduce the probability of auditing 
failure. 
 
H4/4: Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for 
the plaintiff against the auditor who is charged due to his negligence) will 
not increase investment level. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not increasing 
the compensation amount to be paid by the auditor as a result of auditing failure would 
increase investment level, as demonstrated in the following table (Table 4.21). 
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Table 4.21: Tests for hypothesis 4/4 
Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for the plaintiff against the auditor who is 
charged due to his negligence) will not increase investment level. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q16.Increasing the compensation 
amount sought from the auditor 
due to audit judgment errors will: 
       
1 make the investors ignore 
investment risk 
80.03 
(0.00)** 
97 (92.4%) 4.30 0.664 20.06 
(0.00)** 
4.17 4.42 
2 decrease the supply of auditing 
services 
91.23 
(0.00)** 
79 (75.2%) 3.87 0.621 14.35 
(0.00)** 
3.75 3.99 
3 increase the number of security 
trading process 
39.34 
(0.00)** 
81 (77.1%) 3.94 0.928 10.37 
(0.00)** 
3.76 4.12 
4 enhance disclosure in financial 
statements 
122.95 
(0.00)** 
95 (90.5%) 4.22 0.734 17.03 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.36 
5 increase the number of new 
investors entering into the 
market 
50.69 
(0.00)** 
85 (80.9%) 4.13 0.735 15.75 
(0.00)** 
3.99 4.28 
 Average score 97.18 
(0.00)** 
79 (75.2%) 4.09 0.482 23.19 
(0.00)** 
3.99 4.18 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the opinions of the respondents, it appears that 75.2% of them support increasing 
the compensations amount to be paid by the auditor following auditing failure, and that 
this will lead to increasing the investment level. Moreover, 92.4% see that increasing 
the compensation amount to be paid by the auditor in the case of auditing failure would 
make investors ignore investment risk, whereas 75.2% see that it will decrease the 
supply of auditing services. Furthermore, 77.1% consider that this would increase the 
number of the security trading process, and 90.5% believe that this will enhance 
disclosure in financial statements. Finally, 80.9% maintain that this will increase the 
number of new investors entering the market.   
          
H4/5: Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by 
other insolvent defendants, will not increase investment level. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements concerning whether or not making the 
auditor responsible for any loss regardless of who shared in the wrongdoing will 
increase investment level, as illustrated in Table 4.22. 
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Table 4.22: Tests for hypothesis 4/5 
Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by other insolvent defendants, will not 
increase investment level. 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Mean SD t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q17. Applying joint & several 
liability rule when suing 
auditors will: 
       
1 increase the number of cases 
against auditors 
126.12 
(0.00)** 
103 (98.1%) 4.64 0.606 27.73 
(0.00)** 
4.52 4.76 
2 decrease reliability of 
management report 
76.29 
(0.00)** 
97 (92.4%) 4.39 0.658 21.64 
(0.00)** 
4.26 4.52 
3 decrease investor care for 
investment decision 
86.05 
(0.00)** 
85 (80.9%) 3.96 0.678 14.50 
(0.00)** 
3.83 4.09 
4 increase the period of issuing 
auditor report 
17.20 
(0.00)** 
90 (85.7%) 4.28 0.700 18.73 
(0.00)** 
4.14 4.41 
5 increase investment level 41.86 
(0.00)** 
82 (78.1%) 4.18 0.794 15.22 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.33 
 Average score 88.07 
(0.00)** 
89 (84.8%) 4.29 0.410 32.20 
(0.00)** 
4.21 4.37 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
From the opinion of the respondents, it appears that 84.8% support that the auditor 
should pay compensation, regardless of the extent to which other parties shared in the 
wrongdoing in financial statements. Although 98.1% see that this will increase the 
number of cases against auditors, 92.4% see that it will decrease the overall reliability 
of the management report. Furthermore, 80.9% consider that this will lead to a decrease 
in investor care for investment decisions. On the other hand, 85.7% believe that this 
will increase the period of issuing an auditor report. Finally, 78.1% state that this will 
increase investment level. 
The results of the fourth main hypothesis test confirm that the respondents support 
increasing the civil legal liability system within the community, as it has a direct 
positive impact on the investment level within the community. This result further 
supports the study of Newman, Patterson & Smith (2005), which states that an increase 
in auditor penalties for undiscovered expropriation leads to a total investment increase. 
On the other hand, some (Schibano, 2000, in Yu, 2000) argue that greater levels of 
legal responsibility may force the auditor to show discretion when issuing reports, a 
development that would notably result in the potential rejection of financial statements 
issued by the auditor, subsequently causing business firms to experience difficulties in 
obtaining funds needed for conducting investment activities, despite being beneficial to 
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society. Also, Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) indicate that the legal 
system that might attain auditing quality is not necessarily the most efficient for society 
as legal responsibility enforces more accurate auditing besides protecting users of 
financial statements against potential losses. As a result, greater levels of legal 
accountability for auditors may prompt investors (amongst users of financial 
statements) to exaggerate investment compared with ideal levels for society. 
 
4.4 Tests for the Users of Financial Reports Characteristics Effect 
The questionnaire distributed to the users include information relating to users’ 
characteristics, such as their jobs, education, experience, and the frequency of using 
financial reports, in order to study whether these characteristics have an effect on users’ 
responses. For instance, it assumes that an investor prefers a responsibility system for 
the auditing procedures so as to save his investment, due to the fact that his only source 
of information is published financial statements; on the other hand, for the creditor, 
there is a lesser need for a liability system as funds can be protected through terms of 
credit covenant. Moreover, educated users are supposed to be more aware of the 
liability system consequence. 
In order to illustrate the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regard to the effects of the civil legal liability system on the auditing 
profession, a multi linear regression analysis was carried out in consideration of the 
results of the questionnaire. This was done after converting individual data into a 
quantitative measure for use in the regression analysis, using dummy variables to 
express the respondent’s characteristics. The dummy variables for each respondent’s 
characteristic are illustrated by the number of variables equal to the number of classes 
of each character taking the value of “0” or “1” creating 18 variables as follows in 
Table 4.23. 
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Table (4.23): Dummy variables used in tests for Users’ Characteristics effect 
Job: J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 
Investor 1 0 0 0 0 
Financial manager 0 1 0 0 0 
Creditor 0 0 1 0 0 
Financial Analysts 0 0 0 1 0 
Others 0 0 0 0 1 
Education: Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed4 Ed5 
Professional 1 0 0 0 0 
Ph.D. 0 1 0 0 0 
MSc 0 0 1 0 0 
BSc 0 0 0 1 0 
Less than BSc 0 0 0 0 1 
Experience: Ex1 Ex2 Ex3   
More than 10 yrs 1 0 0   
Less than 10 yrs & more than 5 yrs 0 1 0   
Less than 5 yrs 0 0 1   
Frequency of using Financial Information: U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 
Very Frequently 1 0 0 0 0 
Frequently 0 1 0 0 0 
Occasionally 0 0 1 0 0 
Rarely 0 0 0 1 0 
Never 0 0 0 0 1 
 
The average answers for the seventeenth main questions are regressed against each one 
of the four characteristics in a separate model, in order to capture the effect of each 
character on their responses, creating 68 models. 
By regressing all the 18 dummy variables representing the four characteristics in one 
model will cancel the effect of some characteristics in the output results. Accordingly, 
the researcher avoided it through processing the 68 models, 4 models for each one of 
the seventeenth main questions. The regression model applied as follow: 
Qi = ƒ { Characteristic i } 
Where:  
       Qi = Q1, Q2, …., Q17 
        Characteristic:    Job: J1, J2, J3, J4, J5 
                                   Education: Ed1, Ed2, Ed3, Ed4, Ed5 
                                   Experience: Ex1, Ex2, Ex3 
                                   Frequency of using financial information: U1, U2, U3, U4, U5 
 
The test’s results relating to the four characteristics using linear regression, demonstrate 
β coefficient for each class of characteristic, this coefficient represents the average 
opinion for each class regarding the dependent variable, measured on Likert scale used 
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in the questionnaire (from score of 5 representing to strongly agree to score of 1 
representing to strongly disagree). An adjusted one-side t-test applied to measure the 
significance answers that agree with the dependent variable (with a score more than 3 
“neutral”). The results of the tests are discussed below. 
Test for Q1: 
This question relates to the effects of the civil legal liability system on the demand of 
auditing services, with the effects of individual characteristics results on responses as 
follows (Table 4.24): 
Table 4.24: The effects of users characteristics for Q1 (Imposing an legal compensation rule on auditor) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
   
 
Job 
 
 
Model: Q1 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.63 0.085 54.16 19.176 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.12 0.146 28.11 7.671 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.00 0.169 23.6 5.917 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 3.34 0.156 21.31 2.179 Yes 
Others (J5) 2.62 0.146 17.89 -2.603 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1101 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q1 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 3.78 0.169 22.31 4.615 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.04 0.309 13.05 3.366 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.80 0.351 10.82 2.279 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.21 0.14 30.07 8.643 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.92 0.239 16.33 3.849 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .95 F-test = 391 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q1 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.35 0.155 27.95 8.710 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
3.83 0.127 30.13 6.535 
Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.87 0.203 19.06 4.286 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.95 F-test = 683 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q1 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.62 0.141 32.56 11.489 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.18 0.12 34.8 9.833 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.60 0.139 25.81 4.317 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 2.80 0.306 9.13 -0.654 No 
Never (U5) 2.33 0.433 5.38 -1.547 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .96 F-test = 609 N=105    
 
From the results, it can be seen that the most effective characteristics in the 
questionnaire were the job. Moreover, it has been established that investors were at the 
front in terms of supporting the necessity of existence of the civil legal liability system, 
with financial managers and creditors following subsequently with a possibility rate of 
98%. 
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On the other hand, the education and experience factors also have an effect on the 
opinions of the respondents.  
With regards to the frequency of using financial reports, it has been found that the most 
supporting categories believing that the lack of the civil legal liability system will affect 
the auditing profession in the community were those who frequently use the financial 
reports; meaning that the increase of using financial reports requires the existence of a 
civil legal liability system. 
Test for Q2: 
This question related to the effects of civil legal liability system on the frequency of 
using financial reports and the dependence on them by the community. The effects of 
individual characteristics results on responses are as follows (Table 4.25): 
Table (4.25): The effects of users characteristics for Q2 (Imposing a legal deterrence rule on auditor) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q2 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.45 0.058 75.53 25.000 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.28 0.101 42.41 12.673 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 3.71 0.116 31.84 6.121 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 3.65 0.108 33.84 6.019 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.87 0.101 38.33 8.614 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2226 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q2 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4 0.093 42.9 10.753 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.06 0.17 23.89 6.235 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4.2 0.193 21.76 6.218 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.17 0.0769 54.19 15.215 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.41 0.131 33.47 10.763 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1388 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q2 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.25 0.088 47.89 14.205 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.09 0.072 56.41 15.139 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.13 0.115 35.67 9.826 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 2249 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q2 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.45 0.09 48.99 16.111 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.13 0.076 53.77 14.868 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4 0.089 44.82 11.236 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.86 0.196 19.71 4.388 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.53 0.277 12.73 1.913 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1570 N=105    
 
From the results, it was observed that the most effective characteristics in the 
questionnaire was the job, with supporters of this hypothesis who consider that the 
existence of the civil legal liability system increases the usage and dependence of 
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financial reports in the community recognised as the investors, followed by financial 
managers, with a possibility rate of 99%. Notably, the other factors also have a 
converging effect. 
Test for Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, and Q7: 
The effects of the individual characteristics of the respondents with regards to their 
opinions concerning the most important factors having an effect on auditing quality are 
captured through the questionnaire in five sections include the same statements about 
audit quality,  each section discuss the effect of a five different factors on audit quality. 
These factors are legal liability (table 4.26), auditor tenure (table 4.27), auditor 
experience (table 4.28), auditor industry specialization (table 4.29), and audit firm size 
(table 4.30). 
Table (4.26): The effects of users characteristics for Q3 (Increase expected compensation on auditors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standa
rd 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q3 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.36 0.062 69.32 21.935 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.18 0.107 38.79 11.028 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.56 0.124 36.64 12.581 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 3.78 0.115 32.8 6.783 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.31 0.107 30.69 2.897 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1934 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q3 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.13 0.107 38.59 10.561 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.08 0.195 20.91 5.538 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.91 0.221 17.65 4.118 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.23 0.088 47.85 13.977 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.9 0.151 25.79 5.960 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1038 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q3 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.22 0.1 42 12.200 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.121 0.082 50.19 13.671 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.96 0.131 30.2 7.328 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1731 N=105    
Using financial 
reports 
Model: Q3 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.4 0.093 47.08 15.054 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.22 0.079 53.21 15.443 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.02 0.091 43.71 11.209 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.1 0.202 15.33 0.495 No 
Never (U5) 3.26 0.285 11.42 0.912 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test  = 1464 N=105    
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Table (4.27): The effects of users characteristics for Q4 (Increase the period of auditor tenure) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q4 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 2.95 0.072 40.81 -0.694 No 
Financial manager (J2) 2.5 0.124 20.13 -4.032 No 
Creditor (J3) 2.01 0.143 14.06 -6.923 No 
Financial Analysts (J4) 2.5 0.132 18.83 -3.788 No 
Others (J5) 2.38 0.124 19.22 -5.000 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.96 F-test = 598 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q4 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 2.37 0.099 23.89 -6.364 No 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 2.73 0.181 15.07 -1.492 No 
MSc (Ed3) 2.11 0.205 10.28 -4.341 No 
BSc (Ed4) 2.77 0.082 33.81 -2.805 No 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 2.92 0.14 20.79 -0.571 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .96 F-test = 495 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q4 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 2.8 0.099 28.27 -2.020 No 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
2.54 0.081 31.4 -5.679 No 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 2.56 0.129 19.78 -3.411 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .95 F-test = 725 N=105    
Using financial 
reports 
Model: Q4 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 2.92 0.105 27.67 -0.762 No 
Frequently (U2) 2.61 0.089 29.17 -4.382 No 
Occasionally (U3) 2.44 0.103 23.48 -5.437 No 
Rarely (U4) 2.26 0.228 9.91 -3.246 No 
Never (U5) 2.66 0.323 8.25 -1.053 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.95 F-test = 466 N=105    
 
 
Table (4.28): The effects of users characteristics for Q5 (Auditor with more experience) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q5 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.05 0.06 66.63 17.500 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 3.37 0.104 32.35 3.558 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 3.95 0.12 32.79 7.917 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 3.65 0.111 32.79 5.856 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.65 0.104 34.99 6.250 Yes 
  Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1772  N=105    
Education 
Model: Q5 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 3.72 0.086 42.9 8.372 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 3.64 0.158 22.98 4.051 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.6 0.179 20.02 3.352 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 3.93 0.071 54.81 13.099 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.92 0.122 31.91 7.541 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1358 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q5 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 3.79 0.082 46.14 9.634 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
3.77 0.067 56.25 11.493 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4 0.107 37.31 9.346 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2228 N=105    
Using financial 
reports 
Model: Q5 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 3.97 0.088 44.7 11.023 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 3.79 0.075 50.32 10.533 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.83 0.087 43.85 9.540 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.4 0.192 17.68 2.083 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.53 0.271 13 1.956 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1387 N=105    
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Table (4.29): The effects of users characteristics for Q6 (Auditor industry specialization) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q6 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 3.67 0.092 39.49 7.283 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.12 0.159 25.88 7.044 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 3.31 0.184 18.02 1.685 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 3.1 0.17 18.19 0.588 No 
Others (J5) 3.15 0.159 19.76 0.943 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .97 F-test = 655 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q6 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 3.47 0.123 28.03 3.821 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 3.84 0.226 16.99 3.717 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.6 0.256 14.03 2.344 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 3.7 0.102 36.25 6.863 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3 0.175 17.12 0.000 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .96 F-test = 575 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q6 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 3.54 0.119 29.75 4.538 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
3.68 0.097 37.93 7.010 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.19 0.155 20.55 1.226 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .96 F-test = 915 N=105    
Using financial 
reports 
Model: Q6 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 3.84 0.13 29.51 6.462 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 3.57 0.11 32.39 5.182 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.32 0.127 25.97 2.520 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.3 0.281 11.73 1.068 No 
Never (U5) 3 0.397 7.54 0.000 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .96 F-test = 557 N=105    
 
 
Table (4.30): The effects of users characteristics for Q7 (Increase size of audit firm) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q7 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.08 0.074 55.09 14.595 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.03 0.127 31.77 8.110 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.11 0.146 28.05 7.603 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.01 0.135 29.54 7.481 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.96 0.127 31.18 7.559 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1334 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q7 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.05 0.086 47.08 12.209 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4 0.157 25.45 6.369 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.85 0.178 21.64 4.775 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.22 0.071 59.47 17.183 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.66 0.121 30.12 5.455 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1555 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q7 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 3.91 0.084 46.43 10.833 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.06 0.068 59.03 15.588 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.25 0.11 38.63 11.364 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2377 N=105    
Using financial 
reports 
Model: Q7 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.17 0.093 44.73 12.581 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.02 0.079 50.8 12.911 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.08 0.091 44.48 11.868 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.63 0.201 18.01 3.134 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.86 0.285 13.55 3.018 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1413 N=105    
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From the above results, it can be seen that the job factor has an essential effect on the 
sample responses with regards to the factors having the most effect on the increase of 
auditing quality. The supporters who believe that increased legal compensations 
imposed on auditors is the most important factor affecting auditing quality are 
creditors, followed by investors, financial managers, financial analysts, and finally 
others. 
Test for Q8: 
Table (4.31) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regards to whether the auditor bearing the civil legal liability for any 
fault in financial statements will provide a greater degree of protection to investors.  
Table (4.31): The effects of users characteristics for Q8 (Requiring auditors to have full rather limited 
responsibility) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q8 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.22 0.093 45.29 13.118 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 3.67 0.159 23.01 4.214 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 3.66 0.184 19.88 3.587 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.32 0.17 25.35 7.765 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.83 0.159 24.03 5.220 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .97 F-test = 839 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q8 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.06 0.122 33.2 8.689 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.2 0.223 18.78 5.381 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4 0.253 15.77 3.953 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 3.86 0.101 38.24 8.515 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.34 0.173 25.09 7.746 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 759 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q8 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.31 0.111 38.54 11.802 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
3.95 0.091 43.27 10.440 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.75 0.145 25.71 5.172 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 1339 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q8 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.12 0.129 31.98 8.682 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.02 0.109 36.75 9.358 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.04 0.126 31.91 8.254 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.63 0.278 13.03 2.266 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.86 0.394 9.8 2.183 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 731 N=105    
 
 
From the results of the regression test, it appears that there is an effect for job factor, as 
it has been found that financial analysts were at the front for supporting bearing auditor 
the legal labiality for any fault in the financial statements, with investors following. 
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With regard to the experience factor, persons with more than 10 years' experience are 
greater supporters for bearing auditor the civil legal liability for any fault in the 
financial statements. Moreover, the effect of education and frequency in terms of using 
financial reports has the same effect. 
 
Test for Q9: 
The effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ opinions with regards to 
whether or not imposing physical compensations on auditor rather than imposing non-
physical punishment will increase audit quality, as can be seen from Table (4.32).    
Table (4.32): The effects of users characteristics for Q9 (Requiring auditors to compensate users for audit 
judgment errors rather than non financial penalties) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q9 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.17 0.065 63.32 18.000 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.21 0.112 37.28 10.804 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.23 0.13 32.45 9.462 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.05 0.12 33.59 8.750 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.08 0.112 27.33 0.714 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1665 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q9 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.06 0.108 37.45 9.815 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 3.97 0.198 20.07 4.899 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.71 0.224 16.52 3.170 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 3.95 0.089 44.16 10.674 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.17 0.153 27.18 7.647 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .97 F-test = 953 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q9 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.14 0.095 43.58 12.000 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.09 0.077 52.65 14.156 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.55 0.124 28.61 4.435 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1829 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q9 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.18 0.104 40.03 11.346 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.06 0.088 45.84 12.045 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.98 0.102 38.79 9.608 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.3 0.225 14.61 1.333 No 
Never (U5) 3.2 0.319 10.02 0.627 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .98 F-test = 1104 N=105    
 
 
From the results, it appears that there is a middle effect for job factor on the opinions of 
respondents, where creditors were at the front for supporting the notion that imposing 
physical compensations on auditor as opposed to imposing non-physical punishment 
would increase audit quality, with financial managers and investors following. On the 
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other hand, the experience factor also has a middle effect on the opinions, appearing 
that persons with more than 10 years’ experience were greater supporters for bearing 
auditor compensations for any faults in financial statements. With regard to using the 
financial reports factor, the most supportive categories believing that imposing physical 
compensations on auditor instead of imposing non-physical punishment would increase 
audit quality were those who very frequently use financial statements.  
Test for Q10: 
Table (4.33) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regard to whether or not increasing the number of parties litigating 
auditor would increase audit quality. 
Table (4.33): The effects of users characteristics for Q10 (Allowing more than one party to sue the auditor 
for judgment errors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q10 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.19 0.087 47.81 13.678 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.11 0.15 27.37 7.400 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.15 0.173 23.92 6.647 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.08 0.16 25.43 6.750 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.17 0.15 21.13 1.133 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 939 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q10 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 3.94 0.121 32.42 7.769 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.22 0.221 19.03 5.520 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.51 0.251 13.97 2.032 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.18 0.1 41.72 11.800 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.7 0.171 21.57 4.094 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 762 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q10 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.11 0.115 35.51 9.652 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.05 0.094 42.87 11.170 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.68 0.151 24.34 4.503 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .97 F-test = 1230 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q10 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.15 0.121 34.32 9.504 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.22 0.102 41.12 11.961 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.75 0.119 31.58 6.303 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.2 0.261 12.23 0.766 No 
Never (U5) 3.8 0.37 10.27 2.162 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 824 N=105    
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q10 (R2 = 97-98%). 
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The investors, the PhD educated, those with more than 10 years’ experience, and those 
who use financial reports frequently are the more accepting for Q10. 
Test for Q11: 
The effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ opinions with regards to 
whether or not increasing the compensation amount to be paid by auditor as a result of 
auditing failure would increase auditing quality, as shown in Table (4.34).       
Table 4.34: The effects of users characteristics for Q11 (Increasing compensation amount sought from the 
auditor due to audit judgment errors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q11 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.12 0.073 56.25 15.342 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 3.88 0.125 30.94 7.040 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.15 0.145 28.6 7.931 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.12 0.134 30.74 8.358 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.95 0.125 31.44 7.600 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1374 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q11 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.14 0.09 45.88 12.667 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 3.88 0.164 23.61 5.366 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.94 0.186 21.11 5.054 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.15 0.074 55.76 15.541 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.81 0.127 29.88 6.378 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .99 F-test = 1422 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q11 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.06 0.084 48.26 12.619 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
3.96 0.068 57.7 14.118 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.31 0.109 39.24 12.018 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0 .99 F-test = 2399 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q11 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.08 0.092 44.18 11.739 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.07 0.078 51.97 13.718 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.17 0.09 45.92 13.000 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.73 0.199 18.69 3.668 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.4 0.282 12.03 1.418 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 1451 N=105    
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q11 (R2 = 98-99%). 
Markedly, creditors, BSc educated, the ones of average years of experience less than 5 
years, and the one's using financial report occasionally are the more accepting for Q11 
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Test for Q12: 
The following table (Table 4.35) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the 
respondents’ opinions with regards to whether or not making the auditor responsible for 
any loss—regardless of who shared in the wrongdoing—will increase auditing quality. 
Table 4.35: The effects of users characteristics for Q12 (Applying joint & several liability rule when suing 
auditors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q12 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 3.87 0.112 34.44 7.768 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.38 0.192 22.77 7.188 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.18 0.222 18.8 5.315 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.1 0.205 19.9 5.366 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.05 0.192 15.83 0.260 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.96 F-test = 541 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q12 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.1 0.137 29.8 8.029 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.48 0.251 17.84 5.896 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.88 0.285 13.62 3.088 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 3.95 0.113 34.79 8.407 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 2.9 0.194 14.91 -0.515 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.96 F-test = 564 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q12 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 3.95 0.142 27.77 6.690 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.03 0.116 34.67 8.879 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 3.41 0.185 18.35 2.216 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.95 F-test = 769 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q12 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.1 0.152 26.91 7.237 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.12 0.129 31.98 8.682 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 3.62 0.149 24.19 4.161 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.06 0.329 9.32 0.182 No 
Never (U5) 3.13 0.465 6.73 0.280 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.96 F-test = 492 N=105    
 
From results of regression, it appears that the individual factors have an effect, although 
it is weak. With regard to the job factor, it has been found that the financial managers 
are the most dominant supporters, believing that making auditor pay compensation, in 
the case of insolvency of other parties, regardless of his fault ratio in the financial 
statements, will increase auditing quality, with creditors and financial analysts 
following subsequently.                            
With regard to the education factor, Ph.D. holders were most supportive, followed by 
professional certificates holders. Experience and use of financial reports factors were 
extremely weak in terms of effects.                                                
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Test for Q13: 
Table (4.36) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regards to whether or not making the auditor fully responsible for any 
errors in financial statements, as opposed to having limited liability, will give greater 
protection to investors and increase investment levels within society. 
Table (4.36): The effects of users characteristics for Q13 (Making auditors fully responsible for any error) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q13 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.09 0.059 68.83 18.475 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.27 0.102 41.89 12.451 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.13 0.117 35.08 9.658 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.18 0.109 38.37 10.826 Yes 
Others (J5) 4.46 0.102 43.73 14.314 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2221 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q13 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.22 0.076 54.88 16.053 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.13 0.14 29.44 8.071 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4.4 0.159 27.64 8.805 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.2 0.063 66.29 19.048 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.05 0.108 37.27 9.722 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2085 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q13 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.1 0.068 59.7 16.176 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.14 0.056 73.99 20.357 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.48 0.089 50.03 16.629 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 3846 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q13 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.13 0.08 51.27 14.125 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.2 0.068 61.45 17.647 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.24 0.079 53.51 15.696 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 4.2 0.174 24.1 6.897 Yes 
Never (U5) 4.26 0.246 17.31 5.122 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2029 N=105    
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q13 (R2 = 99%). The 
Others, the MSc education, those with an average of less than 5 years’ experience, and 
those that never use financial reports are the more accepting for Q13. 
 
Test for Q14: 
Table (4.37) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regards to whether or not auditors’ civil legal liability system—which 
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depends on investors’ compensations rule rather than non-physical punishment rule—
will increase investment levels within society. 
 
Table (4.37): The effects of users characteristics for Q14 (Requiring auditors to compensate users for audit 
judgment errors rather than being fined) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q14 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.14 0.071 57.92 16.056 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.25 0.122 34.65 10.246 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.26 0.141 30.13 8.936 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.61 0.131 35.19 12.290 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.77 0.122 30.78 6.311 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1529 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q14 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.32 0.096 44.63 13.750 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.28 0.176 24.23 7.273 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4.14 0.2 20.64 5.700 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.12 0.08 51.56 14.000 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4 0.137 29.18 7.299 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1303 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q14 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.35 0.089 48.85 15.169 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.05 0.072 55.61 14.583 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.21 0.116 36.19 10.431 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2262 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q14 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.17 0.101 41.06 11.584 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.19 0.086 48.64 13.837 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.23 0.1 42.34 12.300 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.93 0.219 17.89 4.247 Yes 
Never (U5) 4 0.31 12.86 3.226 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1265 N=105    
 
From the results, it is clear that there is an effect for the job factor as the determination 
coefficient was 98%. Moreover, it has been found that the most supportive categories 
who believe that the auditor’s civil legal liability system, i.e. giving compensation to 
users hurt by auditing failures, will increase investment levels in society more so than 
other systems, such as fines, were financial analysts.                                                                   
Test for Q15: 
The effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ opinions with regards to 
whether or not increasing the number of parties who can litigate the auditor will 
increase investment level in society are as follows (Table 4.38): 
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Table (4.38): The effects of users characteristics for Q15 (Increasing the number of parties who can litigate 
the auditor) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q15 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.08 0.067 60.47 16.119 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.3 0.115 37.1 11.304 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.11 0.133 30.76 8.346 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.18 0.123 33.78 9.593 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.71 0.115 32.03 6.174 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 1629 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q15 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.09 0.085 48.03 12.824 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.28 0.155 27.56 8.258 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 3.71 0.176 21.05 4.034 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.17 0.07 59.36 16.714 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 3.81 0.12 31.64 6.750 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 1607 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q15 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.12 0.084 49.07 13.333 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.04 0.068 58.99 15.294 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.09 0.109 37.33 10.000 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2427 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q15 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.1 0.087 46.79 12.644 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.16 0.074 56.06 15.676 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.1 0.086 47.58 12.791 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.53 0.189 18.63 2.804 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.53 0.268 13.18 1.978 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1623 N=105    
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q15 (R2 = 98- 99%). 
The Financial Managers, the PhD educated, those with an average of more than 10 
years’ experience, and those using financial reports frequently are the most accepting 
for Q15. 
 
Test for Q16: 
Table (4.39) shows the effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ 
opinions with regards to whether or not increasing the compensations amount to be 
paid by the auditor in the case of auditing failure would increase investments level.  
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Table 4.39: The effects of users characteristics for Q16 (Increasing the compensation amount sought from 
the auditor due to audit judgment) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q16 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.14 0.065 63.79 17.538 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.13 0.111 37.12 10.180 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.4 0.128 34.18 10.938 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.07 0.119 34.17 8.992 Yes 
Others (J5) 3.66 0.111 32.86 5.946 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1772 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q16 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.06 0.089 45.51 11.910 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.24 0.162 26.06 7.654 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4.08 0.184 22.12 5.870 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.06 0.073 55.23 14.521 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.13 0.126 32.76 8.968 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1472 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q16 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.05 0.083 48.69 12.651 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.11 0.068 60.44 16.324 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.09 0.108 37.63 10.093 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2479 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q16 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.19 0.091 46 13.077 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.08 0.077 52.92 14.026 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.07 0.089 45.51 12.022 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 3.9 0.196 19.81 4.592 Yes 
Never (U5) 3.73 0.278 13.41 2.626 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1511 N=105    
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q16 (R2 = 98%). The 
Creditors, the PhD educated, those with less than 10 years’ and more than 5 years’ 
experience, and those using financial report very frequently are the more accepting for 
Q16. 
 
Test for Q17: 
The effects of individual characteristics on the respondents’ opinions with regards to 
whether or not making the auditor responsible for any loss, regardless of who shared in 
the wrongdoing, will increase investments level, as shown in Table (4.40): 
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Table 4.40: The effects of users characteristics for Q17 (Applying joint & several liability rule when suing 
auditors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
Job 
Model: Q17 = β1 J1 + β2 J2 + β3 J3 + β4 J4 + β5 J5 
Investor (J1) 4.33 0.059 72.52 22.542 Yes 
Financial manager (J2) 4.11 0.102 40.17 10.882 Yes 
Creditor (J3) 4.33 0.118 36.65 11.271 Yes 
Financial Analysts (J4) 4.22 0.109 38.63 11.193 Yes 
Others (J5) 4.36 0.102 42.61 13.333 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2304 N=105    
Education 
Model: Q17 = β1 Ed1 + β2 Ed2 + β3 ED3 + β4 Ed4 + β5 Ed5 
Professional (Ed1) 4.26 0.075 56.43 16.800 Yes 
Ph.D. (Ed2) 4.26 0.138 30.91 9.130 Yes 
MSc (Ed3) 4.2 0.156 26.83 7.692 Yes 
BSc (Ed4) 4.27 0.062 68.5 20.484 Yes 
Less than BSc (Ed5) 4.42 0.106 41.4 13.396 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2253 N=105    
Experience 
Model: Q17 = β1 Ex1 + β2 Ex2 + β3 Ex3 
More than 10 yrs (Ex1) 4.34 0.069 62.42 19.420 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & 
more than 5 yrs (Ex2) 
4.2 0.056 74 21.429 Yes 
Less than 5 yrs (Ex3) 4.4 0.09 48.45 15.556 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 3906 N=105    
Using 
financial 
reports 
Model: Q17 = β1 U1 + β2 U2 + β3 U3 + β4 U4 + β5 U5 
Very Frequently (U1) 4.26 0.077 54.68 16.364 Yes 
Frequently (U2) 4.25 0.066 64.34 18.939 Yes 
Occasionally (U3) 4.32 0.076 56.43 17.368 Yes 
Rarely (U4) 4.53 0.168 26.91 9.107 Yes 
Never (U5) 4.2 0.238 17.63 5.042 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2269 N=105    
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Job, Education, Experience, Using 
financial reports) have a converging effect on the users’ views for Q17 (R2 = 99%). The 
Investors & Creditors, those with less than BSc education, those with less than 5 years’ 
experience, and those using financial reports rarely are the more accepting for Q17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Survey for Financial Reports Users 
 135 
4.4.1  Summary of the Users of Financial Statements Characteristics Effect 
Table 4.41: Summary of the Users of financial statements characteristics effect 
Question Job Education Experience Using financial reports 
Q1 Investor BSc More than 10 years Very frequently 
Q2 Investor Less than BSc More than 10 years Very frequently 
Q3 Creditor BSc More than 10 years Very frequently 
Q4 - - - - 
Q5 Investor BSc Less than 5 years Very frequently 
Q6 
Financial manager PhD More than 5 years & 
less than 10 years  
Very frequently 
Q7 Creditor BSc Less than 5 years Very frequently 
Q8 Financial Analysts Less than BSc More than 10 years Very frequently 
Q9 Creditor Less than BSc More than 10 years Very frequently 
Q10 Investor PhD More than 10 years Frequently 
Q11 Creditor BSc Less than 5 years Occasionally 
Q12 
Financial Manager PhD More than 5 years & 
less than 10 years  
Frequently 
Q13 Others MSc Less than 5 years Never 
Q14 Financial Analysts Professional More than 10 years Occasionally 
Q15 Financial manager PhD More than 10 years Frequently 
Q16 
Creditor PhD More than 5 years & 
less than 10 years  
Very frequently 
Q17 Others Less than BSc Less than 5 years Rarely 
 
As is shown from the summary, the effect of users’ experience with more than 10 years 
and those who use financial reports very frequently are the common characteristics 
affecting the answers of the respondents, whilst for the Job and Education 
characteristics, there is no pattern regarding users’ views. 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion: 
The field research performed on the users of the financial statements has taken into 
account four issues, the first of which is the demand for auditing services. The study 
reveals that the existence of a civil legal liability system will increase the demand for 
auditing services, meaning that the users trust the audited financial reports, in the case 
of the existence of civil legal liability system. In turn, it is recognised that this will also 
increase the frequency of using published financial statements by the users. This result 
highlights a relationship between the effectiveness of the auditing services within 
society and the civil legal liability system. 
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The second issue concerns the motivation for auditing quality. The researcher has 
studied the number of factors relating to auditing quality, such as auditing tenure, 
auditor experience, industry specialisation, and auditing firm size, in addition to the 
civil legal liability system. The study reveals that the civil legal liability system is 
considered by users as being the factor most commonly affecting audit quality, with 
exposure to litigation risk the driver for perceived audit quality. 
The third issue in this research concerned studying the effect of increasing the civil 
legal liability of auditors in regard to auditing quality. The research has studied the 
different opposite rules applied by different legal systems in the world. The results 
indicate that users prefer to apply the strict liability rule rather than the negligence rule, 
and also have a preference for increasing the number of parties with the right to litigate 
the auditor, as opposed to limiting the litigation rights to the client only. Also, users 
prefer to increase the compensation amount sought from the auditor rather than 
depending on the deterrence rule, and also have a preference for applying joint and 
several liability rules for unpaid compensation amount by other insolvent defendants. 
The last issue in this research was the effect of increasing auditor liability on the 
investment level within society. With this in mind, users prefer to increase civil legal 
liability on auditors in order to gain protection for their investments. In turn, this will 
promote users’ investment within society. 
The previous result of the study on users show that most users' characteristics effect on 
the answers is the categories of users with more experience and those users more 
commonly using financial reports, whilst the jobs of users and their education have no 
effect on their answers, thus indicating that those users who are wholly engaged and 
more dependent on audited financial reports are those who support the liability system 
for auditing. 
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Chapter Five: Survey for Auditors 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter considered users’ views in regard to the civil legal liability system 
in the auditing profession. Applying a strict liability system on the auditors is known to 
affect auditor performance. With this in mind, in an attempt to study this effect, a 
second questionnaire has been designed to capture the views of auditors regarding their 
performance under different liability rules. The questionnaire includes two parts: the 
first poses joint questions to capture any resemblance or difference between the users’ 
and auditors’ views; the second part questions auditors only. The questionnaire 
includes factors relating to individual data for the respondents concerning their title, 
education level and number of years’ experience in order to study the effects of such 
factors. 
Finally, in order to support the usefulness of the second questionnaire, a statistical 
comparison was carried out in Chapter Six with the objective to compare the results of 
the users’ questionnaire and auditors’ questionnaire. 
 
5.2  Survey Instrument and Sample 
The population of the auditing office, in Kuwait, comprises 50 offices (22 local and 28 
international), as illustrated in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1: Population and sample of auditing firms 
 Population of Auditing firm's  Selected Sample 
No. of Firms No. of Auditors  No. of Firms No. of Auditors 
Local auditing firms 28 288  6 (21%) 39 (13.5%) 
International Auditing firms 22 1317  4 (18%) 145 (11%) 
Total 50 1605  10 (20%) 184 (11.5%) 
 
The questionnaire was distributed randomly to auditors to ensure that the responses 
would not be biased. Indeed, after analysing the responses, it became clear that there 
was no systematic response across the respondents’ categories. Moreover, the results of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirov test show that the responses are subject to normal distribution, 
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thus delivering reliability in regard to the results of the questionnaire; therefore, the 
results can be generalised in regard to all of society. Table (5.2) shows the results of 
this test. 
Table 5.2:  Normality test (Kolmogrov-Smirnov) for auditors’ response 
Variable N Statistic Sig  Variable N Statistic Sig 
Q1.1 96 3.024 0.000  Q7.1 96 2.655 0.000 
Q1.2 96 2.515 0.000  Q7.2 96 3.306 0.000 
Q1.3 96 2.676 0.000  Q7.3 96 2.891 0.000 
Q1.4 96 2.437 0.000  Q7.4 96 3.131 0.000 
Q1.5 96 2.428 0.000  Q7.5 96 2.480 0.000 
Q1 96 2.184 0.000  Q7 96 1.486 0.024 
Q2.1 96 2.799 0.000  Q8.1 96 3.077 0.000 
Q2.2 96 3.334 0.000  Q8.2 96 2.772 0.000 
Q2.3 96 2.649 0.000  Q8.3 96 3.065 0.000 
Q2.4 96 2.690 0.000  Q8.4 96 3.955 0.000 
Q2.5 96 2.736 0.000  Q8.5 96 4.478 0.000 
Q2 96 1.463 0.028  Q8 96 1.765 0.004 
Q3.1 96 2.698 0.000  Q9.1 96 3.252 0.000 
Q3.2 96 2.615 0.000  Q9.2 96 2.806 0.000 
Q3.3 96 2.858 0.000  Q9.3 96 2.750 0.000 
Q3.4 96 2.434 0.000  Q9.4 96 2.388 0.000 
Q3.5 96 2.555 0.000  Q9.5 96 2.601 0.000 
Q3 96 1.298 0.069  Q9 96 1.015 0.254 
Q4.1 96 2.222 0.000  Q10.1 96 3.308 0.000 
Q4.2 96 4.214 0.000  Q10.2 96 4.025 0.000 
Q4.3 96 2.324 0.000  Q10.3 96 3.840 0.000 
Q4.4 96 2.459 0.000  Q10.4 96 4.560 0.000 
Q4.5 96 2.522 0.000  Q10.5 96 3.497 0.000 
Q4 96 1.510 0.021  Q10 96 1.866 0.002 
Q5.1 96 2.897 0.000  Q11.1 96 3.263 0.000 
Q5.2 96 2.791 0.000  Q11.2 96 2.722 0.000 
Q5.3 96 3.114 0.000  Q11.3 96 3.144 0.000 
Q5.4 96 3.728 0.000  Q11.4 96 2.416 0.000 
Q5.5 96 2.248 0.000  Q11.5 96 2.241 0.000 
Q5 96 1.697 0.006  Q11 96 1.787 0.003 
Q6.1 96 3.849 0.000  Q12.1 96 3.628 0.000 
Q6.2 96 3.273 0.000  Q12.2 96 3.347 0.000 
Q6.3 96 2.340 0.000  Q12.3 96 3.899 0.000 
Q6.4 96 2.304 0.000  Q12.4 96 2.938 0.000 
Q6.5 96 2.963 0.000  Q12.5 96 3.295 0.000 
Q6 96 1.124 0.159  Q12 96 1.466 0.027 
 
The 184 questionnaires were distributed during the period February 2011–April 2011, 
with the returned questionnaires amounting to 98 (53%), as illustrated in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Number of distributed and received questionnaires for auditors 
Date Type of the audit firm 
No. of 
Staff 
  Distributed Received Response Rate 
13/02/2011 Local 20   5 4 80% 
15/02/2011 International 100   22 13 59% 
17/02/2011 Local 10   6 5 83% 
24/02/2011 Local 17   8 5 62% 
28/02/2011 International 90   32 16 50% 
12/03/2011 International 350   62 34 54% 
24/03/2011 Local 16   7 3 42% 
29/03/2011 Local 16   8 5 62% 
31/03/2011 Local 11   5 2 40% 
05/04/2011 International 130   29 11 38% 
  Total  760   184 98 53% 
 
 
After reviewing the received questionnaires (98), two questionnaires were found to be 
invalid for analysis. The number of valid questionnaires for analysing therefore 
amounted to 96. The individual characteristics data for this sample is detailed in Table 
5.4. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Auditors’ characteristics data 
Characteristics of Respondents N = 96 % 
Respondents title: 
1. Auditor 
2. Senior Auditor 
3. Partner 
4. Others 
Total 
 
54 
19 
7 
16 
96 
 
56.2% 
19.8% 
7.3% 
16.7% 
Respondents Education: 
1. PhD 
2. MSc 
3. BSc 
4. Less 
Total 
 
4 
9 
69 
14 
96 
 
4.2% 
9.4% 
71.8% 
14.6% 
 
Respondents years of experience: 
1. More than 10 years 
2. More than 5 years & less than 10 years 
3. Less than 5 years 
Total 
 
8 
26 
62 
96 
 
8.3% 
27.1% 
64.6% 
Respondents carrying Professional Certificate 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Total 
 
32 
64 
96 
 
33.3% 
66.6% 
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As can be seen from the table, most respondents are auditors with experience of less 
than 5 years with education levels of BSc. This fact may provide some degree of 
indication concerning those respondents with less knowledge in terms of how to deal 
with liability rules, and how they prefer to work with more due care in order to steer 
away from the consequences of auditing liability. 
 
 
5.3  Results of the Hypotheses Test 
The test of the hypotheses for auditors’ view includes two main hypotheses; these 
hypotheses were divided into secondary hypotheses for performing tests from several 
dimensions. 
 
5.3.1 The Effect of Civil Legal Liability System on the Auditing Profession 
The first hypothesis was designed to test the extent of the effects of the auditor civil 
legal liability system on auditing within society.  
H1: The degree of the civil legal liability system within society has no effects on the 
auditing profession. 
This hypothesis was tested by creating two secondary hypotheses: the first secondary 
hypothesis was used in order to illustrate the effects of civil legal liability on the 
investors demand for the auditing services in society; the second secondary hypothesis 
tested the effect of civil legal liability on the frequency of using the published and 
audited financial statements. 
H1/1: The weaknesses of the civil legal liability system do not affect the demand on 
auditing services. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 1 and five statements in 
Question 2 concerning the demand for auditing services without a civil legal liability 
system, as illustrated in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Tests for hypothesis 1/1 
The weaknesses of the civil legal liability system do not affect the demand on auditing services 
 Statement Chi 
Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q1. The absence of a civil 
legal liability system will: 
       
1 decrease the number of 
clients seeking auditing 
services 
69.833 
(0.00)** 
11 (11.5%) 1.99 1.081 -9.159 
(0.00)** 
1.78 2.20 
2 decrease the auditing fees 61.083 
(0.00)** 
8 (8.3%) 1.94 1.014 -10.269 
(0.00)** 
1.74 2.14 
3 decrease the auditor 
assessment of clients’ 
risk 
61.604 
(0.00)** 
8 (8.3%) 1.98 1.026 -9.751 
(0.00)** 
1.78 2.18 
4 increase the probability 
of audit failure 
67.854 
(0.00)** 
7 (7.3%) 1.88 0.932 -11.828 
(0.00)** 
1.70 2.06 
5 decrease the number of 
certified public 
accountants 
65.667 
(0.00)** 
6 (6.2%) 1.90 0.946 -11.440 
(0.00)** 
1.71 2.08 
 Average score 1.676 
(0.00)** 
11 (11.5%) 1.935 0.949 -10.991 
(0.00)** 
1.75 2.12 
Q2. As an auditor do you 
accept: 
       
6 liability rules will 
increase the cost of 
auditing 
1.108 
(0.00)** 
87 (90.6%) 4.23 0.747 16.130 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.38 
7 that you works with a 
limited number of 
customers and without 
civil legal liability  
99.167 
(0.00)** 
14 (14.6%) 1.98 0.598 -16.729 
(0.00)** 
1.86 2.10 
8 increase your 
assessment of client’s 
risk due to liability rules 
70.000 
(0.00)** 
88 (91.6%) 4.29 0.679 18.631 
(0.00)** 
4.16 4.42 
9 to be liable for any audit 
failure 
 
22.562 
(0.00)** 
85 (88.5%) 4.27 0.657 18.963 
(0.00)** 
4.14 4.40 
10 to be liable for any 
business failure 
 
76.396 
(0.00)** 
6 (7%) 1.93 0.874 -12.034 
(0.00)** 
1.76 2.10 
 Average Score 83.896 
(0.00)** 
74 (77%) 3.340 0.364 9.147 
(0.00)** 
3.27 3.41 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The Chi square test for Q1 indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have a preference from the five given responses detailed in the 
questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the 
respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and the t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
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From the above-mentioned responses for Q1, it appears that 11.5% of the respondents 
see that the lack of civil legal liability system affects the demand for auditing 
professions within society (response mean 1.935), since 11.5% consider that this lack 
will reduce the number of clients seeking auditing services. Moreover, 8.3% of them 
consider that this will reduce the auditing fees owing to reduced demand for auditing. 
Furthermore, 8.3% believe that this will make auditors decrease the assessment of 
clients’ risk in order to increase the number of auditing processes carried out. In 
addition, 7.3% state that this will increase the probability of auditing failure, with 6.2% 
seeing that this will reduce the number of certified public accountants in society. 
Finally, these results for Q1 indicate that auditors do not believe that the lack of civil 
legal liability has an effect on the demand for auditing services. 
For Q2, the Chi square test indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have a preference of the five given responses in the questionnaire. 
However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the respondents 
have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ responses and t-
test, we can determine their preferred answer. 
From the above-mentioned responses for Q2, it appears that 77% of the respondents 
consider the civil legal liability system as affecting the demand for auditing services 
(response mean 3.34) since 90.6% believe that a civil legal liability system causes the 
increase in audit cost. On the other hand, 14.6% prefer to work with a limited number 
of customers and thus not bear a civil legal liability, with a 91.6% stating that a civil 
legal liability system will cause them to increase their assessment of clients’ risk. 
Markedly, 88.5% of auditors agree to be liable for any auditing failure, with 7% of 
auditors agreeing to be held liable for business failure. Importantly, the results for Q2 
indicate that the auditors agree that the civil legal liability system has an effect on the 
demand for auditing services. Dopuch & King (1992) suggest that the presence of a 
legal liability system and a credible audit process encourages firms (i.e. clients) to 
demand auditing services voluntarily. 
From the researcher’s point of view, the contradictions between Q1 and Q2 indicate 
that auditors do not think that the demand for auditing services (and the number of 
clients) will be affected by the absence of civil legal liability system. Essentially, there 
is a significant role for the auditor in the development of a certain business, who is 
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responsible for the analysis of the financial statements of a certain business (Craswell, 
Francis & Taylor, 1995). Still, this impacts the auditing profession, which is a result in 
support of other studies, such as those of Shibano (2000) and Yu (2001), which indicate 
that imposing high levels of legal responsibility on the auditor makes the auditor more 
conservative in his report, subsequently leading to a higher possibility of refusing 
auditors for clients’ financial reports. 
The second secondary hypothesis was designed to test the effect of the civil legal 
liability on the frequency of using financial statements. 
H1/2: The weakness of the civil legal liability system has no effect on the 
frequency of using published financial statements. 
 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 3 and five statements in 
Question 4 concerning whether or not the existence of the auditor's civil legal liability 
system will increase the use of financial statements and thus increase the overall 
dependence on them, as illustrated in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Tests for hypothesis 1/2 
The weakness of the civil legal liability system has no effect on the frequency of using published financial 
statements. 
 Statement Chi 
Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q3. Do you think the 
existence of a civil legal 
liability system will: 
       
11 increase the investors’ 
dependence on audited 
financial reports 
64.417 
(0.00)** 
87 (90.6%) 4.34 0.792 16.615 
(0.00)** 
4.18 4.50 
12 increase the publishing 
of interim financial 
reports 
95.667 
(0.00)** 
83 (86.5%) 4.19 0.758 15.344 
(0.00)** 
4.04 4.34 
13 increase the need for 
high-quality 
accounting standards 
43.500 
(0.00)** 
76 (79%) 4.00 0.846 11.581 
(0.00)** 
3.83 4.17 
14 enhance the publishing 
of financial reports on 
a timely basis 
46.833 
(0.00)** 
80 (83.3%) 4.17 0.777 14.714 
(0.00)** 
4.02 4.32 
15 enhance management 
in terms of voluntary 
disclosure 
60.146 
(0.00)** 
70 (72.9%) 3.93 0.920 9.868 
(0.00)** 
3.75 4.11 
 Average score 70.562 
(0.00)** 
91 (94.8%) 4.125 0.500 22.031 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.22 
Q4. As an auditor do you 
accept: 
       
16 that there is a 
difference in the effort 
excreted in auditing 
financial statements in 
case of existence of 
civil legal liability 
system 
26.833 
(0.00)** 
7 (7.3%) 2.31 0.850 -7.926 
(0.00)** 
2.14 2.48 
17 increase auditor effort 
beyond the auditing 
standards 
1.343 
(0.00)** 
4 (4.2%) 2.81 0.529 -3.470 
(0.00)** 
2.71 2.91 
18 increase supervision 
and co-ordination of 
audit team 
38.083 
(0.00)** 
77 (80.2%) 4.14 0.829 13.424 
(0.00)** 
3.98 4.30 
19 to audit interim 
financial reports 
 
45.750 
(0.00)** 
80 (83.3%) 4.22 0.771 15.497 
(0.00)** 
4.07 4.37 
20 Issue your report on a 
timely basis 
 
72.021 
(0.00)** 
76 (79.2%) 4.07 0.849 12.381 
(0.00)** 
3.90 4.24 
 Average score 85.500 
(0.00)** 
80 (83.3%) 3.510 0.413 12.10 
(0.00)** 
3.43 3.59 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The Chi square test for Q3 indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as a 
result of the respondents not having any preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the 
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respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
From the above-mentioned responses for Q3, it appears from the answers that 94.8% of 
those respondents consider that the existence of a civil legal liability system will 
increase the usage of financial statements and thus increase the dependence on them 
(response mean 4.125) since 90.6% believe that this will lead to an increase in the 
dependence on audited financial reports. Moreover, 86.5% consider that this will 
increase the publishing of interim financial reports. Furthermore, 79% state that this 
will lead to an increase in the need for high-quality accounting standards, with 83.3% 
maintaining that this will enhance the publication of financial reports on a timely basis. 
As a final result, 72.9% consider that this will enhance management in terms of 
voluntary disclosure in the financial statements. 
For Q4, the Chi square test indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis 
considering that the respondents do not have any preference from the five given 
responses in the questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, 
which shows that the respondents do not have a preferred answer. Depending on the 
means for the participants’ responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred 
answer. 
From the above-mentioned responses for Q4, 83.3% agree that the existence of a civil 
legal liability system will affect the frequency of using financial statements (response 
mean 3.51) since 92.7% (7.3% agree) refused to accept that existence of civil legal 
liability system as having an effect on their auditing efforts. In addition, 95.8% (4.2% 
agree) refused to increase their efforts beyond the auditing standards owing to the 
existence of civil legal liability. 
Notably, 80.2% agree to increase their supervision, with 83.3% agreeing to audit 
interim financial reports. Finally, 79.2% agree to issue their reports on a timely basis 
owing to the existence of a civil legal liability system. 
The results of the first main hypothesis is not conclusive for Q1 as the auditors do not 
support the belief that the civil legal liability system will affect the demand for the 
auditing services, whilst for Q2, the results support that the existence of a liability 
system will increase the use of financial reports. The studies of Narayanan (1994) and 
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Patterson & Wright (2003) suggest that heightening the legal responsibility of external 
auditors would not be able to strengthen the auditing profession, which is owing to the 
fact that certain legal rules may reduce or even demise the auditing process as a whole.  
 
5.3.2 The Effect of Increasing the Civil Legal Liability of Auditors on Auditing 
Quality 
The second main hypothesis was designed to test the effect of auditor’ civil legal 
liability system on auditing quality. 
H2: Increasing the civil legal liability of auditors will not increase audit quality. 
This hypothesis was tested through putting forward four secondary hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis was used to test whether or not increasing parties litigating the auditor 
owing to auditing failure will increase quality. 
The second secondary hypothesis tested the effect of the auditor’s civil legal liability 
nature on auditing quality, considering whether or not the auditor should have full 
rather than limited responsibility for any faults in financial statements when performing 
the auditing so as to increase auditing quality. 
The third secondary hypothesis tested whether or not an increase in compensation 
amount imposed upon the auditor would increase auditing quality. 
The fourth secondary hypothesis sought to establish whether or not the auditor should 
bear any obligations towards defendants in the case of their insolvency and thus pay 
compensations, and whether this would increase auditing quality.                                                            
H2/1: Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may 
cause due to auditing failure, will not increase audit quality. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 5 and five statements in 
Question 6 concerning whether or not increasing the number of parties able to litigate 
the auditor for any damage incurred as a result of auditing failure would increase 
auditing quality, as illustrated in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7: Tests for hypothesis 2/1 
Increasing the numbers of parties litigating auditor for any damages he may cause due to auditing failure, will not 
increase audit quality 
 Statement Chi Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q5.Allowing more than one 
party to sue the auditor for 
judgment errors will: 
       
21 increase legal consultants 
by auditor 
 
77.417 
(0.00)** 
91 (94.8%) 4.42 0.675 20.552 
(0.00)** 
4.29 4.55 
22 reduce acceptance of 
risky business clients 
69.083 
(0.00)** 
85 (88.5%) 4.19 0.685 16.976 
(0.00)** 
4.06 4.32 
23 make auditors more 
documentation of audit 
process 
59.583 
(0.00)** 
78 (81.2%) 3.99 0.788 12.304 
(0.00)** 
3.84 4.14 
24 increase advanced 
education of financial 
information users 
1.044 
(0.00)** 
15 (15.6%) 3.06 0.678 0.904 
(0.368) 
2.93 3.19 
25 improve definition of 
legal rules 
 
32.083 
(0.00)** 
71 (74%) 4.02 0.821 12.19 
(0.00)** 
3.86 4.18 
 Average score 106.583 
(0.00)** 
91 (94.8%) 3.935 0.437 20.94 
(0.00)** 
3.85 4.02 
Q6. As an auditor do you 
think: 
       
26 audit quality will increase 
when you liable towards 
other parties rather than 
the parties participate in 
the audit contract 
94.417 
(0.00)** 
1 (1%) 2.59 0.642 -6.20 
(0.00)** 
2.46 2.72 
27 only the client have the 
right to litigate the auditor 
for audit failure 
82.583 
(0.00)** 
85 (88.5%) 4.09 0.727 14.749 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.23 
28 you should make your 
best efforts to serve the 
expected users, as the 
financial reports is a 
public goods 
39.000 
(0.00)** 
74 (77%) 4.06 0.779 13.367 
(0.00)** 
3.91 4.21 
29 there is a need to define 
the primary users of 
financial statements 
38.083 
(0.00)** 
76 (79.2%) 4.11 0.806 13.547 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.27 
30 you only liable towards 
the auditing standards 
setters 
1.007 
(0.00)** 
3 (3.1%) 1.90 0.801 -13.506 
(0.00)** 
1.74 2.06 
 Average score 43.375 
(0.00)** 
73 (76%) 3.352 0.407 8.475 
(0.00)** 
3.27 3.43 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The Chi square test for Q5 indicates that we cannot accept null hypothesis owing to the 
fact that the respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in 
the questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that 
the respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
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From the responses to Q5, it appears that 94.8% of auditors support increasing the 
number of parties litigating the auditor in the case of auditing failure as the response 
mean was 3.935; with 94.8% therefore considering that this would increase legal 
consultants by the auditor with regard to his work. Moreover, 88.5% see that this would 
cause the auditor to limit his acceptance of clients with high-risk activities. Markedly, 
81.2% consider that this would cause auditors to provide more documentation of the 
auditing process, with 15.6% believing that this would increase the advanced education 
of financial information users. Finally, 74% state that this would improve the definition 
of legal rules. 
For Q6, the Chi square test indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis owing to 
the respondents not having any preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the 
respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
The response for Q6 shows that 76% of auditors agree that an increase in the number of 
parties having the right to litigate auditors will increase auditing quality (response mean 
3.352). Notably, 99% disagreed (1% agree) the view that auditing quality depends on 
the number of parties having the right to litigate the auditors. Moreover, 88.5% agree 
that only the client (one party) should have the right to litigate the auditor, whilst 77% 
agree with the view that the auditor should serve the expected users of financial reports. 
Furthermore, 79.2% hold the view that there is the need to define the primary users of 
financial statements, with 96.9% of auditors refusing (3.1% agree) to be liable only to 
auditing standard-setters. 
Finally, the answers for Q5 and Q6 are not conclusive in regard to the auditors’ views 
concerning the effect of number of parties having the right to litigate the auditors, 
whilst the auditors’ answers for Q6 agree that increasing the number of parties having 
the rights to litigate the auditors for auditing failure will increase auditing quality. With 
this in mind, there is the indication that auditors prefer to be liable only to one party 
(the client), which is in agreement with the work of Chan & Wong (2002), who tested 
the effects of the expansion of third-party scope, drawing the conclusion that, as the 
scope of auditor liability towards non-clients is limited, there is a clear improvement in 
efficiency. Moreover, in regard to the direction adopted in the USA during the 1980s, 
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calling for restricting the zone of auditors’ legal responsibility as a result of negative 
effects exposed by the auditing profession and business environment due to an 
increased number of parties having the right to litigate auditors, it is supported that 
exposure to litigation risk increases. 
The researcher’s view concerning this issue is that expanding the number of parties 
with the right to litigate the auditor will increase the burden on auditors towards the 
procedures to avoid litigation over the consideration to increase auditing efficiency. 
H2/2: Applying a strict liability rule improves audit quality, whilst applying 
negligence rule has a lesser effect on audit quality. 
 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 7 and five statements in 
Question 8 concerning whether or not the auditor should bear civil legal liability for 
any fault in financial statements, shows that more protection will be delivered to 
investors, thus encouraging investment, as illustrated in Table 5.8.  
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Table 5.8: Tests for hypothesis 2/1 
Applying a strict liability rule improves audit quality, whilst applying negligence rule has a lesser effect on audit 
quality. 
 Statement Chi 
Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q7.Requiring auditors to 
have full rather limited 
responsibility is likely to: 
       
31 increase auditor’s effort 
beyond the auditing 
standards 
88.479 
(0.00)** 
81 (84.4%) 4.15 0.794 14.132 
(0.00)** 
3.99 4.31 
32 increase the 
conservatives in 
auditor’s opinions 
88.917 
(0.00)** 
85 (88.5%) 4.08 0.691 15.366 
(0.00)** 
3.94 4.22 
33 decrease the rate of 
accepted clients' risk 
73.375 
(0.00)** 
75 (78%) 3.97 0.900 10.549 
(0.00)** 
3.79 4.15 
34 increase the quality 
assessment of audit 
evidences 
20.438 
(0.00)** 
83 (86.5%) 4.38 0.715 18.855 
(0.00)** 
4.24 4.52 
35 increase the 
effectiveness of the 
audit committee 
40.167 
(0.00)** 
78 (81.2%) 4.12 0.837 13.175 
(0.00)** 
3.96 4.28 
 Average score 70.542 
(0.00)** 
89 (92.7%) 4.140 0.560 19.919 
(0.00)** 
4.03 4.25 
Q8. As an auditor do you 
think that full responsibility 
rule rather than negligence 
rule will: 
       
36 affect your performance 
and opinion 
89.625 
(0.00)** 
7 (7.3%) 1.91 0.930 -11.524 
(0.00)** 
1.73 209 
37 increase the number of 
evidence collected by 
you 
1.298 
(0.00)** 
92 (95.8%) 4.33 0.675 19.343 
(0.00)** 
4.20 4.46 
38 increase the time of 
auditing 
 
99.938 
(0.00)** 
81 (84.4%) 4.06 0.805 12.926 
(0.00)** 
3.90 4.22 
39 increase auditor due care 
 
1.462 
(0.00)** 
10 (10.4%) 3.01 0.533 0.191 
(0.849) 
2.91 3.11 
40 have no effect on audit 
programme and risk 
estimates 
1.954 
(0.00)** 
3 (3.1%) 2.94 0.406 -1.510 
(0.134) 
2.86 302 
 Average score 56.667 
(0.00)** 
67 (69.8%) 3.25 0.301 8.122 
(0.00)** 
3.19 3.31 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
                                                
 
The Chi square test for Q7 indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have a preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the 
respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can subsequently determine their preferred answer.  
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From the above-mentioned responses, it is clear that 92.7% of the respondents support 
the fact that the auditor bearing civil legal liability for any fault in financial statements 
will increase auditing quality (responses mean 4.14). Notably, 84.4% support that this 
civil legal liability will increase auditors’ efforts beyond normal auditing standards, 
whereas 88.5% consider that the auditor bearing the civil legal liability for any fault in 
financial statements will increase conservatives, in auditors’ opinions. Furthermore, 
78% believe that the auditor will be forced to reduce the rate of accepted client risk. 
Moreover, 86.5% state that this will increase the quality assessment of auditing 
evidences, with 81.2% further noting that it would increase the overall effectiveness of 
auditing committees.                                 
For Q8, the Chi square test indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted owing 
to the fact that the respondents do not have any preference from the five given 
responses in the questionnaire. However, the alternative hypothesis can be accepted, 
which shows that the respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for 
the participants’ responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
The auditors’ views regarding applying the full responsibility rule show that 69.8% 
agree that it would increase auditing quality. Notably, the answers demonstrate that 
92.7% disagreed (7.3% agree) that applying full responsibility will affect their 
performance and opinions, whilst 95.8% agree that it will increase the volume of 
auditing evidence, and 84.4% agreeing that it will increase the time of auditing. 
Furthermore, 89.6% of the respondents refused (10.4% agree) that applying the full 
responsibility rule would affect their due care, with 96.9% also refusing that it would 
affect the auditing programme and risk estimates. 
Although the answers to Q7 support the notion that applying full responsibility rules 
will affect auditing quality, the answers to Q8 do not show full support from the 
auditors in terms of applying the full responsibility rules. This result agrees with many 
empirical researches, such as the studies of Narayanan (1994) and Patterson & Wright 
(2003), which emphasise that imposing an increase in auditors’ civil responsibility does 
not, in itself, guarantee a corresponding increase in effort level (auditing quality), as 
some particular legal rules increase the auditing quality or reduce the possibility of 
auditing failure, despite imposing little responsibility on the auditor, compared with 
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other alternative rules that are more strict on auditors. In addition, the study of Pacini, 
Martin & Hamilton (2000) shows that the full responsibility rules will lead to a 
diminished flow of information. 
The study of Dopuch & King did not find any evidence to suggest that imposing a strict 
liability system on auditing services will achieve higher net benefits than a negligent 
liability system. On the contrary, results seem to indicate that markets operating a 
negligent liability system reflect higher levels of economic efficiency than those 
adopting other systems (e.g. strict liability). Notably, the use of auditors in strict 
liability markets was lower than predicted as auditors demanded higher fees for their 
services, resulting in lower investment by companies. 
H2/3: Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for the 
plaintiff against the auditor who is charged due to his negligence) will not 
increase auditing quality. 
 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 9 and five statements in 
Question 10 concerning whether or not increasing the compensation amount to be paid 
by the auditor as a result of auditing failure would increase auditing quality, as shown 
in the following table (5.9). 
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Table 5.9: Tests for hypothesis 2/3 
Increasing the compensation amount (which is determined by the court for the plaintiff against the auditor who is 
charged due to his negligence) will not increase auditing quality. 
 Statement Chi 
Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q9.Increasing 
compensation amount 
sought from the auditor 
due to audit judgment 
errors will: 
       
41 increase audit fees 
 
33.250 
(0.00)** 
90 (93.7%) 4.46 0.614 23.265 
(0.00)** 
4.34 4.58 
42 improve auditing 
programmes 
 
55.771 
(0.00)** 
22 (22.9%) 2.75 1.086 -2.256 
(0.026)*** 
2.54 2.96 
43 increase tests of 
internal control 
accuracy 
50.833 
(0.00)** 
76 (79.2%) 4.02 0.754 13.272 
(0.00)** 
3.87 4.17 
44 increase the size of 
audit sample 
 
49.917 
(0.00)** 
81 (84.4%) 4.22 0.728 16.393 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.36 
45 decrease acceptable 
audit risk 
 
63.583 
(0.00)** 
86 (89.6%) 4.28 0.676 18.572 
(0.00)** 
4.15 4.41 
 Average score 52.042 
(0.00)** 
94 (97.9%) 3.946 0.418 22.171 
(0.00)** 
3.86 4.03 
Q10. As an auditor do you 
think a full compensation 
of investment loss rather 
than an independent 
measure of loss will: 
       
46 affect the supply of 
auditing profession 
85.583 
(0.00)** 
81 (84.4%) 4.01 0.673 14.717 
(0.00)** 
3.88 4.14 
47 prompt the rising of 
auditors competence 
2.044 
(0.00)** 
6 (6.2%) 2.89 0.679 -1.655 
(0.101) 
2.76 3.02 
48 improve auditing 
programmes  
 
1.926 
(0.00)** 
8 (8.3%) 2.93 .0603 -1.186 
(0.239) 
2.92 2.94 
49 increase understanding 
of the client’s business 
2.908 
(0.00)** 
6 (6.2%) 3.03 0.446 0.686 
(0.494) 
2.94 3.12 
50 decrease the acceptance 
of risky business clients 
1.473 
(0.00)** 
84 (87.5%) 4.03 0.688 14.696 
(0.00)** 
3.90 4.16 
 Average score 76.50 
(0.00)** 
82 (85.4%) 3.377 0.267 13.820 
(0.00)** 
3.32 3.43 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The Chi square test for Q9 indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, the alternative hypothesis can be accepted as this shows that 
the respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
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The results of the answers of Q9 indicate that 97.9% of the respondents support 
increasing the compensation amount to be paid by the auditor following auditing failure 
as the response mean was 3.946. With this in mind, 93.7% of the respondents consider 
that, owing to the increase in compensation amount that the auditor has to pay in the 
case of auditing failure, the auditor will increase auditing fees. However, 22.9% see 
that the auditor will improve auditing so as to reduce the probability of auditing failure. 
Furthermore, 79.2% consider that the auditor will increase the tests of internal control 
accuracy so as to reduce auditing failure probabilities. Furthermore, 84.4% believe that 
the auditor will increase the size of the auditing sample so as to achieve the same goal. 
Finally, 89.6% suggest that the auditor will decrease the acceptable audit risks so that 
auditing failure will be avoided, reducing the possibility of litigating the auditor, 
consequently inducing greater compensation for injured persons resulting from auditing 
failure.        
                                 
The Chi square test for Q10 suggests that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in questionnaire. 
However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis, which shows that the respondents 
have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ responses and t-
test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
 
The results of the answers to Q10 emphasise that 85.4% of the respondents agree that 
full compensation for investment loss owing to auditing failure will increase audit 
quality (mean response 3.377), with 84.4% of the auditors agreeing that applying full 
compensation will affect their supply of audit services, whilst 93.8% disagreed (6.25% 
agree) that it would prompt rising their competence. Moreover, 91.7% disagreed (8.3% 
agree) that it would improve the auditing programme, with 93.8% refusing (6.2% 
agreed) that it would increase overall understanding of clients’ businesses. Finally, 
87.5% of the auditors state that applying full compensation would decrease their 
acceptance of risky clients. 
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The answers to Q9 support the belief that increasing the compensation amount would 
affect auditing quality, which agrees with the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & 
Thoman (1990) and Elitzur & Falk (1996). Moreover, the study of Laux & Newman 
(2010) states that auditing quality increases with the auditor’s expected litigation losses 
resulting from auditing failures. The answers to Q10 do not show full support from 
auditors in terms of applying the full compensation rule, as this will affect their 
acceptance of risky clients. 
 
The full compensation rule may be easier in terms of application, ensuring less conflict 
between the auditor and plaintiff; however, this rule may also create unjustified 
investment decisions by users creating unaffordable litigation, thus potentially affecting 
auditing services. 
 
H2/4: Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by other 
insolvent defendants will not increase audit quality. 
Testing this hypothesis included five statements in Question 11 and five statements in 
Question 12 concerning whether or not making the auditor responsible for any loss, 
regardless of who shared in the wrongdoing, would increase auditing quality, as 
illustrated in Table 5.10. 
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Table 5.10: Tests for hypothesis 2/4 
Increasing the auditor’s liability for paying the unpaid compensation by other insolvent defendants, will not 
increase audit quality. 
 Statement Chi 
Sq. 
Test 
Respondents 
Agreeing* 
Number 
(%) 
Answers 
Mean 
Answers 
SD 
t- test † 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Q11.Applying joint & 
several liability rule 
when suing auditors 
will: 
       
51 increase control 
over acts of 
management 
1.182 
(0.00)** 
84 (87.5%) 4.08 0.790 13.431 
(0.00)** 
3.93 4.23 
52 achieve effective co-
ordination between 
different parties 
54.833 
(0.00)** 
80 (83.3%) 4.10 0.747 14.490 
(0.00)** 
3.95 4.25 
53 increase 
understanding of the 
client’s business 
89.312 
(0.00)** 
77 (80.2%) 3.96 0.882 10.651 
(0.00)** 
3.79 4.13 
54 increase size of 
disclosure about 
errors and illegal 
acts 
55.250 
(0.00)** 
83 (86.5%) 4.22 0.728 16.393 
(0.00)** 
4.08 4.36 
55 promote multiplicity 
of auditors in 
client’s firms 
54.208 
(0.00)** 
70 (72.9%) 4.04 0.951 10.737 
(0.00)** 
3.85 4.23 
 Average score 92.125 
(0.00)** 
89 (92.7%) 4.081 0.530 19.988 
(0.00)** 
3.98 4.18 
Q12. Do you think the 
auditor should pay 
compensation: 
       
56 in case of business 
failure 
 
1.605 
(0.00)** 
4 (4.2%) 1.94 0.693 -15.022 
(0.00)** 
1.80 2.08 
57 in case of audit 
failure 
 
92.917 
(0.00)** 
87 (90.6%) 4.16 0.604 18.757 
(0.00)** 
4.04 4.28 
58 according to his 
proportion in the 
wrongdoing 
2.034 
(0.00)** 
11 (11.5%) 3.02 0.665 0.307 
(0.759) 
2.89 3.15 
59 in full, in case of 
other parties 
bankruptcy 
  
77.229 
(0.00)** 
9 (9.4%) 1.92 0.991 -10.709 
(0.00)** 
1.73 2.11 
60 in limited amount of 
the damage 
 
97.75 
(0.00)** 
82 (85.4%) 4.04 0.928 10.997 
(0.00)** 
3.86 4.22 
 Average score 84.625 
(0.00)** 
36 (37.5%) 3.015 0.345 0.414 
(0.680) 
2.95 3.08 
* The total number of agree & strongly agree observations. 
** Significant level at 1% 
† t-test for the difference of answers from 3 on the Likert scale (no opinion) 
 
The Chi square test for Q11 indicate that we cannot accept null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in the 
questionnaire. However, the alternative hypothesis can be accepted, which shows that 
the respondents have a preferred answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ 
responses and t-test, we can determine their preferred answer.  
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The results indicate that 92.7% of the respondents support the auditor paying 
compensations, regardless of the extent to which other parties shared in the wrongdoing 
in financial statements (joint and several liability). As 87.5% see that this will increase 
control over various acts of management. Markedly, 83.3% consider that this will help 
in achieving effective co-ordination between different parties concerned with preparing 
and reviewing financial reports. Furthermore, 80.2% state that the auditor will increase 
understanding of the client’s business, with 86.5% believing that this will increase the 
degree of disclosure concerning errors and illegal actions. Finally, 72.9% consider that 
it will promote multiplicity of auditors in clients’ firms.                                                  
The Chi square test for Q12 indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis as the 
respondents do not have any preference from the five given responses in questionnaire. 
However, we can accept the alternative hypothesis as the respondents have a preferred 
answer. Depending on the means for the participants’ responses and t-test, we can 
determine their preferred answer.  
The results of the answers for Q12 indicate that most of the auditors refused (62.5%) 
that applying joint and several liability rule will increase audit quality (37.5% agree). It 
was found that 95.8% disagreed (4.2% agree) with the statement that the auditor should 
bear the compensation for business failure, 90.6% agreed that compensation should be 
paid in the case of audit failure. Moreover, 88.5% disagreed (11.5% agree) with paying 
compensation in proportion to the wrongdoing, whilst 90.6% disagreed (9.4% agree) to 
pay compensation in the case of other parties’ bankruptcy. Finally, 85.4% agreed with 
paying compensation to a limited amount of the damage. 
The answers of Q11 support applying the joint and several liability rule when suing 
auditors, which is believed to prompt auditing quality. This result agrees with the study 
of Khurana & Raman (2004), who state that the exposure to litigation risk is the driver 
for perceived audit quality. Moreover, this finding is also in accordance with the papers 
of Simunic & Stein (1996) and Venkataraman, Weber & Willenborg (2008). 
Importantly, the answers of Q12 do not show full support from the auditors in regard to 
applying the full compensation rule. 
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As a result of the H2 test, we can accept that increasing the civil legal liability of 
auditors will increase auditing quality, although auditors do not support increasing their 
liability. 
In addition, increasing the civil legal liability affects auditing quality to a certain 
degree, and may cause unjustified investment process. Therefore, there is the need to 
balance the auditor liability to an optimum level, thus ensuring that users trust the 
auditing process. 
 
5.4  Test of Auditors’ characteristics Effect 
The questionnaire distributed to the auditors include information relating to auditors’ 
characteristics, such as their titles, education, professional qualification, and experience  
in order to study whether these characteristics have an effect on auditors’ responses.  
In order to test the effect of respondents’ characteristics on auditors’ views concerning 
the civil legal liability system, a multi linear regression analysis has been performed 
through quantifying the characteristics of respondents in order to perform the 
regression to test the effect of such characteristics on the answers of each question. This 
was done after converting individual data into a quantitative measure for use in the 
regression analysis, using dummy variables to express the respondent’s characteristics. 
The dummy variables for each respondent’s characteristic are illustrated by the number 
of variables equal to the number of classes of each character taking the value of “0” or 
“1” creating 13 variables as follow: 
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Table (5.11): Dummy variables used in tests for Auditors’ Characteristics effect 
Title: Title1 Title2 Title3 Title4 
Auditor 1 0 0 0 
Senior Auditor 0 1 0 0 
Partner 0 0 1 0 
Others 0 0 0 1 
Education: Edu1 Edu2 Edu3 Edu4 
Ph.D. 1 0 0 0 
MSc 0 1 0 0 
BSc 0 0 1 0 
Less than BSc 0 0 0 1 
Professional Qualification: Prof.C1 Prof.C2   
Professional certificate 1 0   
Non-Professional certificate 0 1   
Experience: Exper1 Exper2 Exper3  
More than 10 years 1 0 0  
Less than 10 yrs & more than 5 yrs 0 1 0  
Less than 5 years 0 0 1  
 
The average answers for the twelfth main questions are regressed against each one of 
the four characteristics in a separate model, in order to capture the effect of each 
character on their responses, creating 48 models. 
By regressing all the 13 dummy variables representing the four characteristics in one 
model will cancel the effect of some characteristics in the output results. Accordingly, 
the researcher avoided it through processing the 48 models, 4 models for each one of 
the twelfth main questions. The regression model applied as follow: 
Qi = ƒ { Characteristic i } 
Where:  
       Qi = Q1, Q2, …., Q12 
        Characteristic:    Title: Title1, Title2, Title3, Title4 
                                   Education: Edu1, Edu2, Edu3, Edu4 
                                   Professional Certificate: Prof.C1, Prof.C2 
                                   Experience: Exper1, Exper2, Exper3 
 
The test’s results relating to the four characteristics using linear regression, demonstrate 
β coefficient for each class of characteristic, this coefficient represents the average 
opinion for each class regarding the dependent variable, measured on Likert scale used 
in the questionnaire (from score of 5 representing to strongly agree to score of 1 
representing to strongly disagree). An adjusted one-side t-test applied to measure the 
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significance answers that agree with the dependent variable (with a score more than 3 
“neutral”). The results of the tests are discussed below. 
 
Test for Q1: 
Table 5.12: The effects of auditors’ characteristics for Q1 (lack of the legal liability system affects the 
demand for auditing professions in the society) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q1 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 2.1 0.128 16.406 -7.031 No 
Senior Auditor (title2) 1.68 0.217 7.76 -6.083 No 
Partner (title3) 1.68 0.357 4.71 -3.697 No 
Others (title4) 1.82 0.244 7.48 -4.836 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.81 F-test =101 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q1 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
2.05 0.475 4.3158 -2.000 No 
MSc (Edu2) 
1.57 0.316 4.9684 -4.525 No 
BSc (Edu3) 
2.02 0.114 17.719 -8.596 No 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
1.714 0.254 6.748 -5.063 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.81 F-test = 100 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q1 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 1.71 0.166 10.301 -7.771 No 
Non-Professional certificate 2.04 0.117 17.436 -8.205 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.81 F-test = 204 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q1 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
More than 10 years 1.7 0.336 5.0595 -3.869 No 
Less than 10 yrs & more 
than 5 yrs 
1.8 0.186 9.6774 -6.452 No 
Less than 5 years 2.022 0.12 16.85 -8.150 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.81 F-test = 132 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, there is no effect concerning the four characteristics (Title, 
Education, Professional certificate, Years’ expertise) on the auditor views for Q1. 
Importantly, only 11% of the auditors agree that the absence of a civil legal liability 
system will affect the demand on auditing services. 
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Test for Q2: 
Table 5.13: The effects of auditors’ characteristics for Q2 (legal liability system affects the demand for auditing 
services) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q2 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.32 0.064 51.875 5.000 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.49 0.109 32.018 4.495 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.2 0.179 17.877 1.117 No 
Others (title4) 3.29 0.122 26.967 2.377 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1174 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q2 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3 0.179 16.76 0.000 No 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.51 0.119 29.496 4.286 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.34 0.043 77.674 7.907 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.31 0.095 34.842 3.263 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2082 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q2 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.31 0.064 51.719 4.844 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.35 0.045 74.444 7.778 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 4014 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q2 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
More than 10 years 3.22 0.127 25.354 1.732 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.43 0.07 49 6.143 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.31 0.045 73.556 6.889 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2729 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q2 (R2 = 98-
99%). The senior auditors, MSc educated, those with non-professional certificates, and 
those with between 5 and 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q2. 
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Test for Q3: 
Table 5.14: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q3 (Existence of legal liability system will increase the 
usage of financial statements) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q3 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 4.14 0.089 46.517 12.809 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 4.2 0.15 28 8.000 Yes 
Partner (title3) 4.08 0.247 16.518 4.372 Yes 
Others (title4) 4 0.168 23.81 5.952 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 944 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q3 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
4.1 0.252 16.27 4.365 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
4.15 0.168 24.702 6.845 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
4.15 0.06 69.167 19.167 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.98 0.134 29.701 7.313 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1602 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q3 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 4.1 0.088 46.591 12.500 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 4.13 0.062 66.613 18.226 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 3230 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q3 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
More than 10 years 4.05 0.177 22.881 5.932 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
4.2 0.098 42.857 12.245 Yes 
Less than 5 years 4.1 0.063 65.079 17.460 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2149 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q3 (R2 = 97-
98%). The senior auditors, the MSc educated, those with non-professional certificates, 
and those with between 5 and 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q3. 
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Test for Q4: 
Table 5.15: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q4 (the existence of legal liability system will affect the 
frequency of using financial statements) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q4 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.57 0.073 48.904 7.808 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.45 0.124 27.823 3.629 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.34 0.205 16.293 1.659 Yes 
Others (title4) 3.42 0.14 24.429 3.000 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0. 97 F-test = 992 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q4 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.1 0.204 15.196 0.490 No 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.57 0.136 26.25 4.191 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.54 0.049 72.245 11.020 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.42 0.109 31.376 3.853 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0. 98 F-test = 1773 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q4 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.58 0.072 49.722 8.056 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.47 0.051 68.039 9.216 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 3488 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q4 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.4 
 
0.146 
 
23.288 
 
2.740 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.47 0.081 42.84 5.802 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.53 0.052 67.885 10.192 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2284 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q4 (R2 = 97-
98%). The auditors, the MSc educated, those with professional certificates, and those 
with an average of less than 5 years’ experience are more accepting for Q4. 
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Test for Q5: 
Table 5.16: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q5 (Increase number of parties litigating auditor in the 
case of auditing failure) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q5 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.92 0.075 52.267 12.267 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.88 0.127 30.551 6.929 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.8 0.21 18.095 3.810 Yes 
Others (title4) 4.14 0.144 28.75 7.917 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1186 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q5 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.75 0.218 17.202 3.440 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.8 0.145 26.207 5.517 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.93 0.052 75.577 17.885 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
4.1 0.116 35.345 9.483 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1953 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q5 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.85 0.077 50 11.039 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.97 0.054 73.519 17.963 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 =0. 98 F-test = 3904 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q5 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.85 
 
0.156 
 
24.679 
 
5.449 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.96 0.086 46.047 11.163 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.93 0.056 70.179 16.607 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2545 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q5 (R2 = 98). The 
others, the lesser educated, those with non-professional certificates, and those with 
between 5 and 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q5. 
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Test for Q6: 
Table 5.17: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q6 (increase number of parties have the right to litigate 
auditors will increase the auditing quality) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q6 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.4 0.075 45.333 5.333 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.21 0.126 25.476 1.667 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.28 0.208 15.769 1.346 No 
Others (title4) 3.37 0.142 23.732 2.606 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test =872 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q6 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.15 0.202 15.594 0.743 No 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.13 0.134 23.358 0.970 No 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.39 0.048 70.625 8.125 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.34 0.107 31.215 3.178 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1652 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q6 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.3 0.072 45.833 4.167 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.37 0.05 67.4 7.400 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 3242 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q6 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
More than 10 years 3.27 0.144 22.708 1.875 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.29 0.08 41.125 3.625 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.38 0.051 66.275 7.451 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2154 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q6 (R2 = 97 -
98%). The auditors, the BSc educated, those with non-professional certificates, and 
those with less than 5 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q6. 
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Test for Q7: 
Table 5.18: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q7 (Requiring auditors to have full rather limited 
responsibility) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q7 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 4.12 0.097 42.474 11.546 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 4.06 0.164 24.756 6.463 Yes 
Partner (title3) 4.14 0.27 15.333 4.222 Yes 
Others (title4) 4.26 0.184 23.152 6.848 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 794 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q7 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
4 0.282 14.184 3.546 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
4 0.188 21.277 5.319 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
4.13 0.067 61.642 16.866 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
4.28 0.15 28.533 8.533 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1291 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q7 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 4.01 0.098 40.918 10.306 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 4.2 0.069 60.87 17.391 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2660 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q7 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
4.1 
 
0.2 
 
20.5 
 
5.500 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
4.1 0.11 37.273 10.000 Yes 
Less than 5 years 4.16 0.071 58.592 16.338 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1713 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q7 (R2 = 97-
98%). The others, the less educated, those with non-professional certificates, and those 
with less than 5 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q7. 
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Test for Q8: 
Table 5.19: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q8 (applying full responsibility rule rather than 
negligence rule) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q8 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.24 0.061 53.115 3.934 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.28 0.103 31.845 2.718 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.31 0.17 19.471 1.824 Yes 
Others (title4) 3.21 0.116 27.672 1.810 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1228 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q8 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.3 0.152 21.711 1.974 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.31 0.101 32.772 3.069 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.25 0.036 90.278 6.944 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.18 0.081 39.259 2.222 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 2731 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q8 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.25 0.053 61.321 4.717 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.25 0.037 87.838 6.757 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 5515 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q8 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.3 
 
0.107 
 
30.841 
 
2.804 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.25 0.059 55.085 4.237 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.24 0.038 85.263 6.316 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 3648  N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q8 (R2 = 98-
99%). The partners, the MSc educated, and those with more than 10 years’ experience 
are the more accepting for Q8. In regard to professional certificates, both those with 
and without professional certificates gave the same answers.  
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Test for Q9: 
Table 5.20: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q9 (Increasing compensation amount sought from the 
auditor due to audit judgment errors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q9 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.98 0.086 46.279 11.395 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.81 0.145 26.276 5.586 Yes 
Partner (title3) 4.02 0.239 16.82 4.268 Yes 
Others (title4) 3.9 0.163 23.926 5.521 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 920 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q9 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
4.15 0.208 19.952 5.529 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.75 0.139 26.978 5.396 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.96 0.05 79.2 19.200 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.91 0.111 35.225 8.198 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2140 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q9 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 
4.03 0.073 55.205 14.110 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.9 0.051 76.471 17.647 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 4338 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q9 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
More than 10 years 4.05 0.146 27.74 7.192 Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.81 0.081 47.037 10.000 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.98 0.052 76.538 18.846 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2903 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q9 (R2 = 97-
98%). The partners, the PhD educated, those with professional certificates, and those 
with more than 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q9. 
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Test for Q10: 
Table 5.21: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q10 (full compensation for investment loss due audit 
failure will increase audit quality) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q10 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 3.37 0.055 61.273 6.727 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.46 0.093 37.204 4.946 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.28 0.154 21.299 1.818 Yes 
Others (title4) 3.34 0.105 31.81 3.238 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1618 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q10 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.3 0.131 25.191 2.290 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.51 0.087 40.345 5.862 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
3.38 0.031 109.03 12.258 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.25 0.07 46.429 3.571 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 3939 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q10 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 3.43 0.047 72.979 9.149 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 3.35 0.033 101.52 10.606 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 7740 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q10 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.3 
 
0.094 
 
35.106 
 
3.191 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
3.41 0.052 65.577 7.885 Yes 
Less than 5 years 3.37 0.034 99.118 10.882 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.99 F-test = 5064 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q10 (R2 = 98-
99%). The senior auditors, the MSc educated, those with professional certificate, and 
those with between 5 and 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q10. 
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Test for Q11: 
Table 5.22: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q11 (Applying joint & several liability rule when suing 
auditors) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
Title 
Model: Q11 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 4.12 0.093 44.301 12.043 Yes 
Senior Auditor (title2) 4.15 0.157 26.433 7.325 Yes 
Partner (title3) 3.82 0.259 14.749 3.166 Yes 
Others (title4) 3.94 0.177 22.26 5.311 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 838 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q11 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3.9 0.267 14.607 3.371 Yes 
MSc (Edu2) 
4.22 0.178 23.708 6.854 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
4.09 0.064 63.906 17.031 Yes 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.98 0.142 28.028 6.901 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1402 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q11 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 4.11 0.094 43.723 11.809 Yes 
Non-Professional certificate 4.06 0.066 61.515 16.061 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2821 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q11 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.9 
 
0.188 
 
20.745 
 
4.787 
 
Yes 
Less than 10 yrs & more than 
5 yrs 
4.1 0.104 39.423 10.577 Yes 
Less than 5 years 4.09 0.067 61.045 16.269 Yes 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1878 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, all four characteristics (Title, Education, Professional certificate, 
Years’ expertise) have a converging effect on the auditors’ views for Q11 (R2 = 97-
98%). The senior auditors, the MSc educated, those with professional certificates, and 
those with between 5 and 10 years’ experience are the more accepting for Q11. 
 
 
Chapter Five: Survey for Auditors 
 171 
 
Test for Q12: 
Table 5.23: The effects of Auditors’ characteristics for Q12 (applying joint and several liability rule will 
increase audit quality) 
Effect Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient β 
Standard 
 Error 
t-test Adj. 
t-test 
Significance 
 at 95% 
 
 
Title 
Model: Q12 = β1 title1 + β2 title2 + β3 title3 + β4 title4 
Auditor (title1) 2.98 0.063 47.302 -0.317 No 
Senior Auditor (title2) 3.09 0.107 28.879 0.841 No 
Partner (title3) 3.08 0.176 17.5 0.455 No 
Others (title4) 2.98 0.12 24.833 -0.167 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.97 F-test = 989 N=96 
   
Education 
Model: Q12 = β1 Edu1 + β2 Edu2 + β3 Edu3 + β4 Edu4 
Ph.D. (Edu1) 
3 0.17 17.647 0.000 No 
MSc (Edu2) 
3.2 0.113 28.319 1.770 Yes 
BSc (Edu3) 
2.97 0.041 72.439 -0.732 No 
Less than BSc (Edu4) 
3.11 0.091 34.176 1.209 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 1873 N=96 
   
 
Professional 
Qualification 
Model: Q12 = β1 prof.c1 + β2 prof.c2 
Professional certificate 2.98 0.061 48.852 -0.328 No 
Non-Professional 
certificate 
3.02 0.043 70.233 0.465 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 3640 N=96 
   
 
Experience 
Model: Q12 = β1 exper1 + β2 exper2 + β3 exper3 
 
More than 10 years 
 
3.07 
 
0.123 
 
24.959 
 
0.569 
 
 
No 
 
Less than 10 yrs & more 
than 5 yrs 
3.02 0.068 44.412 0.294 No 
Less than 5 years 3 0.044 68.182 0.000 No 
Reg. Statistic R2 = 0.98 F-test = 2401 N=96   
 
 
As the results show, only those educated to MSc level have an effect on auditors’ 
views, whilst all others characteristics have no effect. 
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5.4.1  Summary of Auditors’ Characteristics Effect 
Table 5.24: Summary of the auditors’ characteristics effect 
Question Title Education 
Professional 
Certificate 
Years of experience 
Q1 - - - - 
Q2 Senior Auditor MSc Non professional More than 5 & less than 10 
Q3 Senior Auditor MSc Non professional More than 5 & less than 10 
Q4 Auditor MSc Professional Less than 5 
Q5 Others Less Non professional More than 5 & less than 10 
Q6 Auditor BSc Non professional Less than 5 
Q7 Others Less Non professional Less than 5 
Q8 Partner MSc Both More than 10 
Q9 Partner PhD Professional More than 10 
Q10 Senior Auditor MSc Professional More than 5 & less than 10 
Q11 Senior Auditor MSc Professional More than 5 & less than 10 
Q12 - MSc - - 
 
As can be seen from the summary, there is no apparent effect of the characteristics for 
the refused questions from the auditors’ view (Q1, Q12), whilst for the other question 
there is no pattern towards any characteristics concerning auditors’ views. In general, 
there is agreement in the views between different groups of auditors, regardless of their 
experience or education. Such results reinforce the results of the hypothesis test in 
relation to the auditor’s survey. 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, another field research was performed 
on the auditors, with consideration to two issues, the first of which was concerned with 
the auditors’ views concerning the effect of civil legal liability on the demand of 
auditing services. The study reveals that the auditors do not believe that their 
professional performance will be affected by the existence or non-existence of liability 
rules, although they do think that the existence of liability rules will make financial 
statement users more trustful in the financial information, and thus increase the number 
of users of audited financial reports. The second issue was concerned with the 
motivation for auditing quality. The auditors agree that a high burden liability will 
make them increase their efforts and due care, thus causing a high quality for auditing 
services. Although they don't agree with increasing the liability owing to auditing 
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failure as it will make the auditing services more costly (collecting more evidence, 
increase time of auditing, increase the samples size) and may also potentially cause 
unjustified investment decisions, exposing the auditors to unfair litigation from 
investors and limiting their acceptance for risky clients subsequently decreases the 
supply for auditing services. 
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Chapter Six: Comparison between Users’ and Auditors’ Views 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Two field studies were performed to capture users’ and auditors’ views regarding the 
civil legal liability system, with both agreeing that the increasing the civil legal liability 
system for auditors would increase the number of users of financial statements. 
Furthermore, both groups also agree that it would increase auditing quality.  
Six joint questions were posed between the two studies, two of which concerned the 
effect of civil legal liability system on the auditing profession, whilst the remaining 
four questions considered the effect of increasing civil legal liability on auditing 
quality. For the joint questions, a t-test was performed in order to study the differences 
in answers. 
 
6.2 Comparison of the Effect of the Civil Legal Liability System on the Auditing 
Profession 
Table 6.1: Comparison between Users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of civil legal liability system on the 
demand on auditing services 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Responden
ts agreeing 
Answe
rs 
mean 
Responden
ts agreeing 
Answe
rs 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
t-test Sig. 
The absence of a civil legal 
liability system will: 
       
1 
decrease the number of 
clients seeking auditing 
services 
87% 4.14 11.5% 1.99 -2.153 -14.78 0.00 
2 
decrease the auditing fees 
 
70% 3.70 8.3% 1.94 -1.767 -11.57 0.00 
3 
decrease the auditor 
assessment of clients’ risk 
76% 4.02 8.3% 1.98 -2.04 -13.44 0.00 
4 
increase the probability of 
audit failure 
75% 4.05 7.3% 1.88 -2.173 -14.98 0.00 
5 
decrease the number of 
certified public accountants 
78% 4.12 6.2% 1.90 -2.228 -16.42 0.00 
 Average score 75% 4.008 11.5% 1.935 -2.0722 -15.60 0.00 
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From the above comparison, it can be seen that there is a significant difference between 
auditors and users concerning the effect of the civil legal liability system on the 
demand for auditing services. Whilst the users’ view is that the absence of a civil legal 
liability system will decrease their demand for auditing services, the users in this 
case—more specifically, the investors—look for investment insurance through the 
auditing services. With this in mind, Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) 
indicate that payments of civil responsibility make insurance for investors available 
against investment losses in business firms. 
On the other hand, the auditors’ view is that the absence of a civil legal liability system 
will not affect the demand for their services as users are in need of an auditing service 
and understand the auditor’s role within society in terms of the development of a 
certain business and also the responsibility for the analysis of the financial statements 
of a certain business (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995).  
 
Table 6.2: Comparison between users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of civil legal liability system on 
the frequency of using financial statements 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Difference 
t-
test 
Sig. 
Do you think the 
existence of a civil legal 
liability system will: 
       
1 
increase the 
investors’ dependence 
on audited financial 
reports 
76.2% 4.03 90.6% 4.34 0.315 2.78 0.006 
2 
increase the 
publishing of interim 
financial reports 
77.1% 4.01 86.5% 4.19 0.178 1.55 0.123 
3 
increase the need for 
high-quality 
accounting standards 
85.7% 4.22 79% 4.00 -0.219 -1.78 0.077 
4 
enhance the 
publishing of 
financial reports on a 
timely basis 
86.7% 4.31 83.3% 4.17 -0.148 -1.25 0.211 
5 
enhance management 
in terms of voluntary 
disclosure 
87.6% 4.18 72.9% 3.93 -0.254 -2.1 0.037 
 Average score 76% 4.15 94.8% 4.125 -0.225 -0.35 0.723 
 
From the above comparison, it can be seen that, on average, there is no difference 
between users and auditors concerning the effects of a civil legal liability system on 
frequency of using financial statements. Although users are less accepting that the 
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existence of civil legal liability system will increase their dependence on audited 
financial reports, it is considered that this result may be owing to the fact that the 
auditors make considerations in their auditing for any liability that could affect them, 
whilst users in developing countries are less aware of the auditing process and the 
different legal rules. 
On the other hand, users are more accepting that civil legal liability systems need high-
quality accounting standards and enhanced voluntary disclosure. Despite users’ need 
for a liability system to ensure that the input of their decision-making model is 
trustworthy, they perceive the quality of accounting standards and voluntary disclosure 
needs, which is in agreement with the auditors’ view regarding that users are in need of 
auditing services and understanding of auditors’ role within society. 
 
 
6.3 Comparison for the Effect of Increasing the Civil Legal Liability of Auditors on 
Auditing Quality 
 
Table 6.3: Comparison between Users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of increasing parties litigating 
auditors on audit quality 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Difference 
t-
test 
Sig. 
Allowing more than one 
party to sue the auditor 
for judgment errors will: 
       
1 
increase legal 
consultants by auditor 
86.7% 4.29 94.8% 4.42 0.131 1.33 0.184 
2 
reduce acceptance of 
risky business clients 
85.7% 4.06 88.5% 4.19 0.130 1.16 0.246 
3 
make auditors more 
documentation of audit 
process 
66.7% 3.90 81.2% 3.99 0.094 0.76 0.448 
4 
increase advanced 
education of financial 
information users 
84.8% 4.12 15.6% 3.06 -1.061 -9.9 0.00 
5 
improve definition of 
legal rules 
62.8% 3.67 74% 4.02 0.354 2.79 0.006 
 Average score 69.5% 4.006 94.8% 3.935 -0.0703 -0.87 0.385 
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From the above comparison, it can be seen that, on average, there is no difference 
between users and auditors concerning the notion that increasing parties having the 
right to litigate auditors will increase auditor quality. Although users are more 
accepting that it will increase their advanced education and less accepting that 
increasing the number of parties will improve the definition of legal rules, according to 
this rule, the users will be more aware of their rights in terms of the auditor, whilst the 
auditor, under this rule, requires a strict definition for those legal rules governing their 
duties and their liabilities towards third parties. For the auditor, this means there is the 
need to define, for other parties’ rights, loss from auditing failure and the amount of 
compensation for each party involved in the benefits of the auditing process. 
Table 6.4: Comparison between users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of civil legal liability nature on 
audit quality 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test Sig. 
Requiring auditors to 
have full rather limited 
responsibility is likely to: 
       
1 
increase auditor’s 
effort beyond the 
auditing standards 
86.7% 4.20 84.4% 4.15 -0.54 -0.46 0.643 
2 
increase the 
conservatives in 
auditor’s opinions 
79.0% 3.97 88.5% 4.08 0.112 1.006 0.316 
3 
decrease the rate of 
accepted clients' risk 
68.8% 3.94 78% 3.97 0.026 0.195 0.845 
4 
increase the quality 
assessment of audit 
evidences 
85.7% 4.21 86.5% 4.38 0.165 1.582 0.115 
5 
increase the 
effectiveness of the 
audit committee 
71.4% 3.83 81.2% 4.12 0.296 2.372 0.019 
 Average score 62.8% 4.03 92.7% 4.140 0.1091 1.246 0.214 
 
From the above comparison, it can be seen that, on average, there is no difference 
between users and auditors concerning the notion that the full responsibility rule will 
increase auditing quality, although users are less accepting that the full responsibility 
rule will increase the overall effectiveness of the auditing committee. 
The auditors’ view regarding this point is that the full responsibility rule will cause 
them to increase their auditing evidence and auditing time in order to keep away from 
litigation. On the other hand, they do not show full support for applying full 
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responsibility rules. This result agrees with the studies carried out by Narayanan (1994) 
and Patterson & Wright (2003), which show that imposing an increase in auditors’ civil 
responsibility does not, in itself, guarantee a corresponding increase in effort level 
(auditing quality). 
Table 6.5: Comparison between users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of increasing compensation amount 
on audit quality 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test Sig. 
Increasing compensation 
amount sought from the 
auditor due to audit 
judgment errors will: 
       
1 
increase audit fees 
 
76.2% 3.90 93.7% 4.46 0.563 5.591 0.00 
2 
improve auditing 
programmes 
 
83.8% 4.19 22.9% 2.75 -1.440 -10.74 0.00 
3 
increase tests of internal 
control accuracy 
75.2% 3.90 79.2% 4.02 0.126 1.1 0.273 
4 
increase the size of 
audit sample 
78.1% 4.10 84.4% 4.22 0.114 1.036 0.301 
5 
decrease acceptable 
audit risk 
 
86.6% 4.24 89.6% 4.28 0.043 0.41 0.682 
 Average score 73.3% 4.06 97.9% 3.946 -0.1189 -1.83 0.069 
 
From the above comparison, it can be seen that, on average, there is no difference 
between users and auditors concerning the belief increasing the compensation amount 
sought from the auditor will increase auditing quality, although the auditors are more 
accepting than users that increasing the compensation amount will cause them to raise 
their fees to meet any future compensations resulting from errors. On the other hand, 
auditors are less accepting that it will improve auditing programmes as they believe that 
they are doing their duty, regardless of the liability rule applied. 
The final result of the comparison shows that auditing quality will increase when the 
auditor expects litigation losses from auditing failures, although it is clear that auditors 
do not show full support for applying the full compensation rule, as this will affect their 
acceptance of risky clients. 
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Table 6.6: Comparison between users’ and auditors’ answers for the effect of applying joint & several 
liability rule on audit quality 
 Statements 
Users Auditors Comparisons 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Respondents 
agreeing 
Answers 
mean 
Answers 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test Sig. 
Applying joint & 
several liability rule 
when suing auditors 
will: 
       
1 
increase control 
over acts of 
management 
74.3% 4.14 87.5% 4.08 -0.060 -0.47 0.638 
2 
achieve effective co-
ordination between 
different parties 
68.6% 3.75 83.3% 4.10 0.352 2.78 0.006 
3 
increase 
understanding of the 
client’s business 
60.0% 3.60 80.2% 3.96 0.358 2.75 0.007 
4 
increase size of 
disclosure about 
errors and illegal 
acts 
77.1% 4.11 86.5% 4.22 0.104 0.926 0.356 
5 
promote multiplicity 
of auditors in 
clients’ firms 
73.3% 3.85 72.9% 4.04 0.194 1.247 0.214 
 Average score 64.8% 3.89 92.7% 4.081 0.1898 1.906 0.058 
 
From the above comparison, it can be seen that, on average, there is no difference 
between users and auditors concerning the belief that applying joint and several 
liability rules will increase auditing quality. Markedly, the exposure to litigation risk is 
the driver for perceived audit quality (Khurana & Raman, 2004), although the users are 
less accepting of the belief that applying this rule will make auditors achieve effective 
co-ordination between different parties. Moreover, they are also less accepting that it 
will make auditors increase their overall understanding of the client's business. The 
auditors perceive that applying the joint and several liability rule requires effective co-
ordination between different parties involved in the auditing process, as well as a high 
degree of understanding in terms of the risks in the audited business. 
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6.4 Conclusion: 
As a result of this test, both groups (users and auditors) agree that increasing the civil 
legal liability for auditors will subsequently increase auditing quality within society, as 
the risk threatening auditors to be exposed to litigation gives them a strong incentive to 
maintain their independence and interest in auditing quality (DeFond, Raghunandan & 
Subramanyam, 2002).  
The comparison between both group views concerning the different rules for civil legal 
liability applied and its effects on auditing quality include a number of parties having 
the right to litigate the auditor, which emphasises that auditors need a strict definition 
for legal liability. The rule of full responsibility will cause them to increase their 
auditing evidence and auditing time in order to stay away from litigation, and is 
therefore not a factor in auditing processing efficiency. Furthermore, the rule of full 
compensation will affect the auditor accepting risky clients, which in turn has a 
negative impact on investment processes within society. In this regard, joint and several 
liability rules will prompt coordination between different parties involved in the 
auditing process, from the auditor’s perspective. 
On the other hand, there are different views concerning the effect of civil legal liability 
on the demand for auditing within society. The auditors’ views are that the absence of a 
civil legal liability system will not affect the demand for their services as users are in 
need of auditing services and understand the auditor's role within society. In this regard, 
auditors do not belief that the existence of civil legal liability is the major factor in the 
demand of auditing services. Moreover, in their view, increasing liability will only 
increase their costs of doing business and the costs of procedures done to avoid 
litigation. 
For users, especially investors, investment insurance is needed when utilising auditing 
services. Michas (2011) indicates in his study that auditing quality is lower in emerging 
market countries, with Chen et al. (2011) also pointing out that private firms have 
lower quality financial reporting owing to reduced market demand in the emerging 
markets. This provides an indication as to why users view auditing as a tool for 
ensuring their investments in less developed countries. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion, Recommendations, Limitations and 
Future Research 
 
7.1  Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1.1 Conclusion 
The researcher presents the development of civil legal liability rules for the auditing 
profession, comparing the situations in the USA and in the UK with regard to common 
laws and legislative laws. Moreover, the situation in the state of Kuwait is equally 
presented, where the civil legal liability for auditors is considerably weak. Furthermore, 
in the literature review, the researcher demonstrates the different liability rules 
governing the auditor in his work. In addition, a field study has been performed 
concerning the civil legal liability system for the auditing profession within society. 
The study has been performed in two distinct stages: the first stage was designed with 
the objective to study the views of different categories of users of financial reports, as 
they represent the demand on the auditing profession within society; the second stage 
was designed in order to study the views of auditors, as they represent the supply of the 
auditing profession within society. The second stage was carried out in order to draw 
out the features of a civil legal liability system that can be implemented within society 
and in the emerged market like Kuwait state, in particular.  
The contributions of this research are: 
 This research will enrich the literature by working to incorporate legal and 
accounting knowledge, in order to understand how the legal rules impact 
liability of external auditors and decisions of users of financial statements 
related to their investments level.  
 The study also will determine various effects of alternative legal rules, thus 
enabling the legislator to control any of these effects, while formulating the 
rules governing legal liability of the auditor; it is then possible to suggest an 
appropriate system for auditor legal responsibility (ALR).             
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The summary for the result of the first stage of the study show that the users (especially 
the users with more experience and frequent users of financial statements) view that: 
Users’ responses: 
 The demand for auditing services depends on the existence of a civil legal 
liability system controlling the auditing profession. As without the existence of 
civil legal liability rules there will be fewer clients seeking auditing services, 
there will also be an increase in cases of auditing failure. 
 The existence of a civil legal liability system will increase reliance on published 
financial statements. This will induce more confidence in audited financial 
reports, and further prompt auditors to increase disclosures in the financial 
reports. 
These results shows that users in need of the auditing service understand the auditor’s 
role in society, acknowledging that they play a significant role in the development of a 
certain business and are also responsible for the analysis of the financial statements of a 
certain business (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995). Notably, users hold the view that, 
in order to achieve the optimal result of the auditing services, there is a need for a civil 
legal liability framework. 
 
 The factors most commonly affecting auditing quality, in the users’ view, is the 
existence of a civil legal liability system, more so than other factors, such as the 
size of the auditing firm, auditor experience, auditor specialisation, and auditing 
tenure, as this will prompt auditors to increase their due care and reduce biases 
in their opinions.  
 
This result agrees with the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & Thoman (1990) and 
Elitzur & Falk (1996), which state that there is in general, positive correlation between 
the level of compensation expected by the plaintiff as a result of auditors’ liability 
towards them and auditing quality. Moreover, the study of Khurana & Raman (2004), 
shows that the exposure to litigation risk is the driver for perceived auditing quality 
more so than brand name protection.  
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 Users consider that auditing quality will increase with the application of a strict 
liability rule rather than limited liability for the auditor in case of any fault in 
the audited financial reports. Notably, users seek full protection when using 
financial reports. 
This result is not in agreement with the studies of Schwartz (1997) and Radahakrishnan 
(1999), who argue that the inability of auditors to predicate the due care criterion (there 
is no strict rule to judge the auditors due care) to be used in evaluating their 
performance may be an incentive for them to increase their auditing effort or otherwise 
to present greater conservative opinions in auditing reports to reduce the possibility of 
their exposure to litigation risk or to negligence. 
 Increasing the number of parties with the right to litigate the auditor will make 
the auditor care about legal consultation and thus will encourage additional 
documentation when conducting the auditing process, subsequently leading to 
improved audit quality. 
 
This means that the quality of the auditor’s performance is scrutinised by more than 
one party, which could benefit society as a whole—not only the client of the auditing 
profession. In contrast, in the USA, by the 1980s, there was a big trend calling for 
limiting the zone of the auditor’s legal liability due to the passive impacts displayed by 
the auditing profession and business environment; this is recognised as being due to an 
increased number of parties having the right to litigate auditors, this meaning increased 
exposure to litigation risk. 
 
 Increasing the compensation amount for any auditing failure will encourage 
auditors to increase their test for controls and auditing sample. This will 
improve auditing quality in the users’ view. 
 
The result supports the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & Thoman (1990), Dye 
(1995), Schwartz (1997), King & Schwartz (2000) and Zhang & Thoman (1999), which 
suggest that an increase in auditor commitment with regard to paying compensation for 
injuries resulting from auditing failure will increase auditing quality. In this regard, 
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future payment for compensation resulting from audit failure will drive auditors to 
improve their audit planning and ensure greater levels of due care and attention.  
 
 Applying joint and several liability rules will encourage auditors to achieve 
effective co-ordination between different parties in the auditing process and 
accordingly increase their understanding of the client’s business, subsequently 
resulting in improved auditing quality. 
 
These results confirm that the users support increasing civil legal liability system 
within the community as it has a direct impact on the quality of audit. This result 
should be considered carefully as Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) 
indicate that the legal system for civil responsibility achieves the highest level of effort 
(auditing quality), but does not necessarily produce the greatest efficiency for society. 
Moreover, Narayanan (1994) and Patterson & Wright (2003) conclude that imposing an 
increase in the auditor’s civil responsibility does not, in itself, guarantee a 
corresponding increase in effort level (auditing quality). 
 
 The users consider that applying the previously mentioned rules will increase 
the level of investment within society. 
The results confirm that the users of financial statements support increasing the civil 
legal liability system within the community, as it has a direct positive impact on the 
investment level within the community. This result further supports the study of 
Newman, Patterson & Smith (2005), which states that an increase in auditor penalties 
for undiscovered expropriation leads to a total investment increase. On the other hand, 
some (Schibano, 2000, in Yu, 2000) argue that greater levels of legal responsibility 
may force the auditor to show discretion when issuing reports, a development that 
would notably result in the potential rejection of financial statements issued by the 
auditor, subsequently causing business firms to experience difficulties in obtaining 
funds needed for conducting investment activities, despite being beneficial to society. 
Also, Schwartz (1997) and King & Schwartz (2000) indicate that the legal system that 
might attain auditing quality is not necessarily the most efficient for society as legal 
responsibility enforces more accurate auditing besides protecting users of financial 
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statements against potential losses. As a result, greater levels of legal accountability for 
auditors may prompt investors (amongst users of financial statements) to exaggerate 
investment compared with ideal levels for society. 
Auditors’ responses: 
The summary for the results of the second stage of the study show that the auditors’ 
believe the following: 
 The demand for auditing services will not be affected by the existence or non-
existence of the civil legal liability system, and that due care is ensured 
regardless of the liability rules. 
 
This result indicates that auditors do not think that the demand for auditing services 
(and the number of clients) will be affected by the absence of civil legal liability 
system. Essentially, there is a significant role for the auditor in the development of a 
certain business, who is responsible for the analysis of the financial statements of a 
certain business (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995).  
 
 The existence of a civil legal liability system will affect the auditing profession 
through increasing costs (owing to collecting more evidence, increase time of 
auditing, and increase the samples size), with lesser acceptance of risky 
auditors. This, in turn, may cause a decrease in the auditing services supplied 
within society. 
 
 The existence of a civil legal liability system will increase both the number of 
users of financial statements and the frequency of using financial statements due 
to increasing confidence in the auditing profession and decreases in the risk of 
investment for the investors. 
 Auditors do not prefer to apply the full responsibility rule in the case of auditing 
failure as this will cause an increase in the time of auditing and the evidence 
collected by auditors to protect themselves, accordingly increasing the cost of 
audit. Importantly, their due care and audit programmes will not be affected. 
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 Increasing the compensation amount will cause auditors to decrease their 
acceptance of risky clients, which will subsequently affect the investment level 
in some economic sectors. 
 
This result supports the belief that increasing the compensation amount would affect 
auditing quality, which agrees with the studies of Palmrose (1988), Melumad & 
Thoman (1990) and Elitzur & Falk (1996). Moreover, the study of Laux & Newman 
(2010) states that auditing quality increases with the auditor’s expected litigation losses 
resulting from auditing failures. This result not show full support from auditors in terms 
of applying the full compensation rule, as this will affect their acceptance of risky 
clients. 
 
 There is not a preference for the application of the joint and several liability 
rules in the case of auditing failure. Moreover, they prefer to pay compensation 
in limited amounts in the case of auditing failure, and not in the case of business 
failure. This rule would cause auditors to increase their control over the act of 
management; this, in turn, will complicate the auditor’s mission.  
 Auditors agree that the existence of the previous mentioned rules will increase 
auditing quality. 
Finally, a comparison has been carried out in order to compare the answers of the two 
groups (users and auditors), with both groups found to agree that increasing the civil 
legal liability for auditors will increase auditing quality within society. The comparison 
between both group views concerning the different rules for civil legal liability applied 
and its effect on audit quality include the number of parties having the right to litigate 
the auditor, which shows that auditors need a strict definition for legal liability. The 
rule of full responsibility will cause auditors to increase the volume of auditing 
evidence, as well as their auditing time, in order to ensure litigation is avoided, but is 
notably not a factor in terms of auditing process efficiency. Moreover, the rule of full 
compensation will affect the auditor’s acceptance of risk clients, which in turn will 
have a negative effect on investment process within society. Furthermore, the joint and 
several liability rules will prompt coordination between different parties involved in the 
auditing process, from the auditor’s view. 
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On the other hand, there are differences in views concerning the effect of the civil legal 
liability on the demand for auditing within society. The auditors’ views are that the 
absence of a civil legal liability system will not affect the demand on their services, as 
users are in need of auditing services and understand auditors’ roles within society. 
Accordingly, auditors do not believe that the existence of civil legal liability is the 
major factor in terms of the demand on auditing services. Furthermore, in their view, 
increasing their liability will only increase their costs of doing business and the costs of 
procedures implemented in order to avoid litigation, and to meet any future 
compensations resulting from errors in the audited financial statements.  
This research differs from the other literature in several important ways: first, it studies 
the effects of the civil legal liability system from two views at the same time—those of 
the users and auditors; second, the study has been performed in an environment of 
weak governance, with the main findings showing that the users, besides their needs for 
auditing services, require auditors to provide collateral for their investment process in 
order to increase their investment level. Furthermore, auditors have been found to be 
reluctant to increase their liability in such an environment where increasing their 
liability may cause them to decrease their services within society, although the auditors 
nevertheless acknowledge that increasing liability will increase auditing quality. 
According to the various effects of alternative legal rules, this study enabling the 
legislator to control any of these effects, while formulating the rules governing legal 
liability of the auditor; it is then possible to suggest an appropriate system for auditor 
legal responsibility (ALR).             
7.1.2  Recommendations for Kuwaiti Legislation 
In the Kuwaiti legal system, there is only one direct article concerning the auditor’s 
responsibility (Article 165, Law no. 15, 1960) regarding the accuracy of financial 
information detailed within his report. Moreover, other articles in the Kuwaiti laws are 
general articles not specified for auditing profession; they govern the compensation for 
third party damages. In light of the previous findings, the researcher can recommend 
the following in regard to Kuwaiti legislation: 
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 the adoption of a complete civil legal liability system for the auditing 
profession: this will promote auditing quality and in turn promote investment in 
the state of Kuwait; 
 auditor liability to clients (the firms under auditing), according to the agreement 
between the two parties; 
 the auditor’s liability for any auditing failure: the client should be compensated 
for any wrongdoing; 
 the implementation of a strict definition of other parties that may benefit from 
the audited financial report: the auditor should be liable, according to the 
negligence rule, which will give the auditor protection against unfair lawsuits of 
irrational investors. 
Also the researcher suggests: 
 Adding a new legislative text to the law of the regulation of securities and the 
establishment of investment funds No.31 for the year 1990 includes civil 
liability of company management and its external auditors in the case of 
condemning them with committing fraud, deception and gross negligence, 
resulting in issuing misleading financial information in the front of users of 
financial statements whom dealing with the securities market in its financial 
stocks, and whom depend on this information in making their decisions relating 
to the company. Furthermore, adding a new text to the same law, including the 
rule on which the judge can depend when evaluating the sum of damage for the 
plaintiff in the case of financial stocks, thus reducing the degree of personal 
estimation.  
 Adding a new legislative text to the law of the regulation of securities and the 
establishment of investment funds no. 31 for 1990 includes the necessity of 
appointing a judge share of all defendants whom have civil liability towards the 
plaintiff (users dealing in the financial stocks of the audited company) in the 
compensation judged by the court for the sake of the plaintiff. This civil liability 
should be limited to the external auditor’s liability (solvent defendant) for his 
share determined in compensation. Furthermore, an additional sum (represent a 
determined ratio of his share) should be incurred in the case of insolvency of 
one (or some) of the defendants. 
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 Maintaining joint liability between defendants, in the case of condemning them 
with committing fraud or gross negligence, as well as applying joint liability 
amongst members of the auditing firm. 
 Legal reformations must be formulated in a way that guarantees eliminating 
vagueness and obscurity, in terms of explaining the dimensions by different 
parties, as they could determine their legal position in the claim, soundly. 
A framework for the civil legal liability can be suggested as follows: 
Figure (4): Characteristics of a suggested civil legal liability for external auditors, 
in the State of Kuwait 
Legislations regulating the auditor's civil liability 
 
 
 
Suggested Legal Rules for Regulating the Auditor's Civil Liability 
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7.2  Limitations and Future Research 
7.2.1  Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is that it was performed on the auditors and users in 
the state of Kuwait, only. Notably, there are many factors affecting the auditing 
environment, such as social, economic, and political factors, all of which differ from 
one country to another and may affect the views and results of the study. 
The present study was limited in terms of testing the relationship between the civil 
legal liability of external auditors to the client (business firm subject to auditing) and 
the third party (users of financial statements); on the one hand, the quality of auditing 
process, and the decisions made by investors, on the other. 
The present study’s interests concerned testing the impact of civil legal liability on 
decisions made by users of financial statements, with emphasis placed on the analysis 
of decisions made by the different parties (investors in stocks market, investment 
management staff, credit service in banks operating in Kuwait, etc.), along with other 
users of financial statements.  
This research did not consider the views of the government and legislators concerning 
the effects of the legal responsibility of external auditors on the auditing professions 
and investment level. 
Quality determinants relating to psychological and behavioural factors are beyond the 
scope of the present study.  
 
7.2.2 Future Research 
Future research in civil legal liability rules should focus on the auditing standards 
regulating the auditing profession, and their effects on the auditing quality, and should 
also study whether users consider auditing standards as sufficient, in terms of judging 
auditor liability. 
Also, additional research can be carried out in regard to the methods implemented by 
auditors striving to avoid liabilities towards their clients and third parties. The auditor 
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can resort to some methods to avoid liability without losing clients; such methods can 
affect auditing quality and financial information, thus having grave effects on the 
investment level. 
Future research should also focus on the comparative studies between different 
countries concerning legal rules and auditing quality, which may help to develop 
acceptable worldwide liability rules that can be harmonised with international 
investments across the world. 
References 
 192 
References: 
 
Abbott, L. J, Parker, S. & Peters, G. F. (2006). Earnings Management, litigation risks 
and asymmetric audit fee response. Auditing J Practice and Theory, Vol. 25(1), 
pp. 85–98. 
Abu Zeid, H. (2000). Studies in Auditing-PartII. Alesra press, Cairo, Egypt. 
Allegaer, C. & Tinkelman, D. (2000). Holding auditors accountable for negligence. 
Commercial lending review 15 (spring), pp.61–65. 
Anderson, J. C, Jennings, M. M., Lowe, D. J. & Reckers, P. M. J. (1997). The 
mitigation of hindsight bias in judges evaluation of auditor decision. Auditing J 
Practice and Theory. Vol. 16 (2), pp. 20–37. 
Andersen, A., Coopers, Co., Lybrand, D., Touche, E., Young, K. P. M. G. & Price, W. 
(1992). Statement of position: The liability crisis in the United States-Impact on 
the accounting profession. Joint letter signed by authors. Reprinted in Journal of 
accountancy.Vol.174 (5), pp. 19–23. 
Arrunada B. (2000). Audit Quality: Attributes, Private Safeguards and the Role of 
Regulation. The European Accounting Review. Vol. 9 (2), pp. 205-224. 
Avison E., Lau F., Myers D. & Nielsen A. (1999) Action research. Communications of 
the ACM. Vol. 42 (1), pp. 94-97. 
Ball, R. & Shivakumar, L. (2008). How much new information is there in earnings? 
Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 46 (5), pp. 975–1016. 
Ball R., Robin A. & Wu J. (2003), Incentives Versus Standards: Properties of 
Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries, Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 36, pp.235 – 270.      
Balsam S., Krishnan J. &Yang J. (2003). Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings 
Quality. Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory. Vol. 22 (2), pp.71-97.                                                                     
Balvers, R., McDonald, B. & Miller, R. (1988). Under pricing of new issues and choice 
of auditor as a signal of investment banker reputation. The Accounting Review. 
Vol.63 (4), pp. 605–621.  
Bedard, J. C., Deis, D. R., Curtis, M. B. & Jenkins, J. G. (2008). Risk monitoring and 
control of audit firms: A research synthesis. Auditing: A journal of Practice 
&Theory. Vol. 27 (1), pp. 187–218. 
Becker, C., DeFond, J., Jiambalvo & Subramanyan, K. (1998). The effect of audit 
quality on earning management. Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol. 15 
(1), pp.1–24.  
Behn, B. K, Jong-Hang, C. & Kang, T. (2008). Audit quality and properties of analyst 
earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review. Vol. 83 (2), pp. 327–349.  
 
References 
 193 
Bobek D. , Daugherty B. &, Radtke  R. (2012). Resolving Audit Engagement 
Challenges through Communication. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
Vol. 31 (4) pp. 21–45. 
Bonner, S. E., Palmrose, Z. & Young, S. M. (1998). Fraud type and auditor litigation: 
An analysis of SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases. The 
Accounting Review.Vol. 73 (4), pp. 503–532.  
Boynton, W. & Kell, W. (1999). Modern auditing. New York:John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 Braiotta, L.,  Gazzaway, T.,  Colson, R. &  Ramamoorti, S. (2010). The Audit 
Committee Handbook, 5th Edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Son, Inc. 
Breton, G. & Taffler, R. J. (2001). Accounting information and analyst stock 
recommendation decisions: a content analysis approach. Accounting and 
Business Research. Vol. 31 (2). 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E. (2007) Business research methods. 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press. 
Butler, M., Leone A., & Willenborg M. (2003).An empirical analysis of auditor 
reporting and its association with abnormal accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. Vol.  37, pp. 139–165 
Carcello JV& Palmrose Z. (1994). Auditor litigation and modified reporting on 
bankrupt clients. Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 32(3), pp.1–30. 
Carey P & Simnett R. (2006). Audit partner tenure and audit quality, The Accounting 
Review. Vol. 81 (3), pp. 653–676. 
Chen F., Li Q. & Wang X. (2011). Financial Reporting quality and investment 
efficiency of private firms in emerging markets. The Accounting Review. Vol. 
81 (4), pp.1255–1288. 
Christensen H., Lee E. &Walker M. (2008). Incentives or Standards: What Determines 
Accounting Quality Change Around IFRS Adoption?, working paper, 
University of Manchester. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013054. 
Clarkson M. & Simunic A. (1994).The association between audit quality, retained 
ownership, and firm-specific risk in U.S. vs. Canadian IPO markets. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. Vol. 17 (1-2), pp. 207-228.  
Colbert G & Murray D. (1998) The association between audit quality and audit size: 
An analysis of small CPA firms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and 
Finance.Vol.13 (2), pp.135–150.  
Collis J. & Hussey R. (2003) Business research: a practical guide for undergraduate 
and postgraduate students. 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Corbetta P. (2003). Social Research, Theory, Methods and Techniques. Oxford: The 
Alden Press.  
References 
 194 
Craswell AT, Francis JR. & Taylor SL. (1995). Auditor brand name reputations and 
industry specialisations. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 20. 
Darbyshire D. (1992). Cutting auditors: Nose off to spite clients' face. Accountancy 
Vol.110 (Dec), pp.101–102. 
Daske H., Hail L., Leuz C., & Verdi R. (2009), Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the 
Economic Consequences of IFRS Adoptions. Working paper. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=979650.  
DeAngelo L. (1981a). Auditor independence, Low balling, and Disclosure regulation. 
In: Becker C, DeFond J, Jiambalvo J & Subramanyan K 1998, The effect of 
audit quality on earning management. Contemporary Accounting Research.Vol. 
15 (spring), pp.1–24. 
DeAngelo L. (1981b). Auditor Size and Audit Quality. In: Lennox G. (1999a). Audit 
quality and audit size: An evaluation of reputation and deep pockets hypotheses. 
Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting.Vol.26 (7/8), pp. 779–805. 
DeFond M. (1992). The Association between Changes in Clients firm Agency costs 
and Auditor Switching. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory. Vol. 11 
(1), pp. 16-31. 
DeFond M, Raghunandan L. & Subramanyam K. (2002). Do non-audit service fees 
impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions. 
Journal of Accounting Research.Vol.40 (4), pp.1247–1274. 
DeFond M & Jiambalvo J. (1991). Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors. 
The Accounting Review. Vol. 66(3), pp. 643–655. 
DeFond M & Jiambalvo J. (1993). Factors related to auditor-client disagreements over 
income-increasing accounting methods. Contemporary Accounting Reseach. 
Vol. 9(2), pp.415–431. 
Deis D & Giroux G. (1992). Determinants of audit quality in the public sector. The 
Accounting Review. Vol.67 (3), pp.462–479. 
Dennis DM, Engle TJ & Stephens WL. (1996). The effect of litigation on public 
accounting as a career choice. Accounting Horizons.Vol.10 (2), pp.1–13. 
Dopuch N & King RR. (1992). Negligence versus strict liability regimes in auditing: 
An experimental investigation. The Accounting Review. Vol.67(1), pp.97–120. 
Dopuch N, Ingberman DE & King RR. (1997). An experimental investigation of multi-
defendant bargaining in 'joint and several' and proportionate liability regimes. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 23. 
Dunbar C. & Juneja V. (1993). Recent Trends II: What Explains Settlements in 
Shareholder Class Action? White Plains, N.Y: National Economic Research 
Associates, Inc. USA. 
References 
 195 
Dye RA & Sunders S. (2001). Why not allow FASB & IASB standards to compete in 
USA? Accounting Horizons. Vol.15 (3). 
Dye RA. (1995). Incorporation and the audit market, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. Vol. 19. 
Eichenseher J, Hagigi M & Shields D. (1989). Market reaction to auditor changes by 
OTC companies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory.Vol.9, pp.29–40. 
Elitzur R & Falk H. (1996). Planned audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy.Vol. 15 (3), pp. 247–269. 
Fatwa & Legislation Dep., 2004. Civil Law & its' Complementary legislation. 7
th
 ed. 
Kuwait: Council of ministers. 
Fatwa & Legislation Dep., 2005. Group Kuwaiti legislation part V111, Commercial 
Companies law. 7
th
 ed. Kuwait: Council of ministers. 
Flory, S. M., Phillips Jr, T. J., Reidenbach, R. E., & Robin, D. P. (1992). A 
multidimensional analysis of selected ethical issues in accounting. Accounting 
Review. Vol.67 (2), pp.284-302. 
Francis JR. (2004). What do we know about auditing quality?. The British Accounting 
Review. Vol. 36 (4), pp 345-368. 
Francis JR & Yu MD. (2009). Big 4 office size and audit quality. Accounting review. 
Vol. 84 (5), pp.1521–1552. 
Franz F, Crawford RD & Johnson EN. (1998). The impact of litigation against an audit 
firm on the market value of non- litigation clients. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance.Vol.13 (2), pp.117–134.  
Geiger MA & Raghunandan K. (2002). Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures. 
Auditing: A journal of Practice &Theory. Vol. 21 (1). 
Goldman A & Barlvo B. (1974). The auditor- firm conflict of interests: Its implications 
for independence. The Accounting Review.Vol. 49, pp.707–718. 
Gormely R. (1988). Developments in accountant's liability to non clients for 
negligence. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and finance.Vol.3 (summer), 
pp.185–212. 
Gramling AA, Schatzberg JW, Bailey AD & Zhang H. (1998). The impact of legal 
liability regimes and differential client risk on client acceptance, audit pricing, 
and audit effort decisions. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance.Vol.13 
(4), pp.437–460. 
Guy D, Alderman C & Winters A. (1999). Auditing.USA: The Dryden Press. 
Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2006). International differences in the cost of equity capital: Do 
legal institutions and securities regulation matter?. Journal of Accounting 
Research. Vol. 44(3), pp. 485-531.  
References 
 196 
Heninger G. (2001). The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal 
Accruals. The Accounting Review. Vol. 76 (1), pp.114. 
Hillegeist SA. (1999). Financial reporting and auditing under alternative damage 
apportionment rules. The Accounting Review.Vol.74 (3), pp. 347–369. 
Hogan CE & Jeter DC. (1999). Industry Specialisation by Auditors. Auditing: A journal 
of Practice &Theory. Vol. 18(1). 
Hooghiemstra R & Manen JV. (2004). Non-executive directors in Netherlands: another 
expectations gap? Accounting and Business Research. Vol. 34 (1). 
Jensen KL & Payne JL. (2005). Audit procurement : Managing audit quality and 
quality fees in response agency costs. Auditing J Practice & Theory, Vol. 24(2), 
pp. 27–48. 
Jensen MC & Meckling WH. (1976).Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 3(4), 
pp303–431.  
Kachelmeier, S. J., & Towry, K. L. (2002). Negotiated transfer pricing: Is fairness 
easier said than done?. The Accounting Review. Vol. 77 (3), pp. 571-593. 
Kadous K. (2000). The effect of audit quality and consequence severity on juror 
evaluations of auditor responsibility for plaintiff losses. The accounting 
review.Vol.75 (3), pp. 327–341. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2008). Governance matters VII: Aggregate 
and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007. Policy Research Working 
Paper, World Bank 
Kealey BT, Lee HY & Stein MT. (2007). The association between audit-firms tenture 
and audit fees paid to successor auditors: Evidence from Arthur Andersen. 
Auditing: Journal of  Practice and Theory. Vol. 26 (2), pp. 95–116.  
Khurana IK & Raman KK. (2004). Litigation risks and financial reporting credibility of 
Big4 versus non Big 4 audits: Evidence from Anglo-American countries. The 
Accounting review. Vol. 79 (2), pp. 473–495. 
King R & Schwartz R. (1999). Legal penalties and audit quality: An experimental 
investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research. Vol.16 (4), pp.685–710. 
King R & Schwartz R. (2000). An experimental investigation of auditors' liability: 
Implications for social welfare and exploration of deviations from theoretical 
predictions. The Accounting Review. Vol.75 (4), pp.429–452. 
Kinney W & Nelson M. (1996). Outcomes information and the expectation gap. The 
journal of Accounting Research. Vol.34 (autumn), pp.281–299. 
Krishnan J & Krishnan J. (1997). Litigation risk and auditor resignations. The 
Accounting Review.Vol.72.,pp539–560. 
References 
 197 
Krishnan J. & Schauer C. (2000). The differentiation of quality among auditors: 
Evidence from the not-for-profit sector. Auditing: Journal of Practice and 
Theory. Vol. 19 (2), pp.9-25. 
Krishnan J. & Zhang Y. (1999). Auditors litigation risks and corporate disclosure of 
quarterly review report. A journal of Practice &Theory. Vol. 24 (sup), pp. 115–
138. 
Kwon S., Lim C & Tan P. (2007). Legal systems and Earnings quality: the role of 
auditor industry specialisation. Auditing: A journal of Practice & Theory. Vol. 
26 (2), pp. 25–55. 
Lennox G. (1999a). Audit quality and audit size: An evaluation of reputation and deep 
pockets hypotheses. Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting.Vol.26 (7/8), 
pp. 779–805. 
Lennox G. (1999b). Non-audit fees,disclosure, and audit quality. The European 
Accounting Review. Vol.8 (2), pp.239–253. 
Li S. (2010), Does Mandatory Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
in the European Union Reduce the Cost of Equity Capital?, The Accounting 
Review. Vol. 85(2), pp. 607–636.                                                                 
Low K. (2004). The effects of industry specialisation on audit risk assessments and 
audit planning decision. The Accounting review. Vol. 79 (1), pp. 201–214. 
Lys T & Watts R. (1994). Lawsuits against auditors. Journal of Accounting 
Reseach.Vol.32 (3), pp.65–93. 
Malone CF & Roberts RW. (1996). The title: Factors Associated with Incidence of 
Reduced Auditing, Quality Behaviors. Auditing: A journal of Practice 
&Theory. Vol. 15 (2). 
Mayhew B. & Pike J. (2004). Does investor selection of auditors enhance auditor 
independence? The Accounting review. Vol. 79 (3), pp. 797–822. 
Melumad N & Thoman L. (1990). On auditors and the courts in an adverse selection 
setting. Journal of Accounting Research.Vol.28 (1), pp.77–120. 
Michas Paul N. (2011), “The importance of audit profession development in emerging 
market countries”, The Accounting Review, Vol.81 (5), pp.1731–1764. 
Napier C. (1998). Intersections of law and accountancy: Unlimited auditor liability in 
the UK. Accounting Organization and Society. Vol. 23, pp.105–128.  
Narayanan VG. (1994). An analysis of auditor liability rules. Journal of Accounting 
Research.Vol.32 (3), pp.39–64. 
Nelson, M. W., Elliott, J. A., & Tarpley, R. L. (2002). Evidence from auditors about 
managers' and auditors' earnings management decisions. The accounting review. 
Vol. 77, pp. 175-202. 
References 
 198 
Newman P, Patterson ER & Smith JR. (2005). The role of auditing in investor 
protection, The Accounting review. Vol. 80(1), pp. 289–313. 
Ng, T. B. P. (2007). Auditors' decisions on audit differences that affect significant 
earnings thresholds. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. Vol. 26(1), 
pp.71-89. 
Nichols DR & Smith DB. (1983). Auditor credibility and auditor changes. In: Lennox 
G. (1999a). Audit quality and audit size: An evaluation of reputation and deep 
pockets hypotheses. Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting.Vol.26 (7), 
pp.779–805. 
Pacini C & Sinason D (1998). Gaining a new balance in accountants' liability to non 
clients for negligence: Recent developments and emerging trends. Commercial 
Law Journal.Vol.103(spring),pp.15–66. 
Pacini C , Martin M & Hamilton I. (2000). At the interface of law and accounting: An 
examination of a trend toward a reduction in the scope of auditor liability to 
third parties in the common law countries. American Business Law Journal. 
Vol.37 (winter),pp.171–235.  
Pae S. & Yoo S. (2001). Strategic Interaction in Auditing: An Analysis of Auditors' 
Legal liability, Internal Control System Quality, and Audit Effort. The 
Accounting Review. Vol. 76, (3). 
Palmrose Z. (1986). Audit fees and auditor size: Further evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research.Vol.24 (1), pp.333–356. 
Palmrose Z. (1988). An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The 
Accounting Review. Vol.63 (1), pp.55–73. 
Pany K & Whittington R. (1997). Auditing. McGraw-Hill Irwin.USA. 
Patterson E & Wright D. (2003). Evidence of fraud, audit risk and audit liability 
regimes. Review of accounting studies. Vol. 8 (1), pp.105–131. 
Pierre K. & Anderson J. (1984). An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits 
against auditors. The Accounting Review.Vol.59 (2), pp.242–263. 
Pratt J & Stice J. (1994). The effects of client characteristics on auditor litigation risk 
judgments, required audit evidence, and recommended audit fees. The 
Accounting review. Vol.69, pp639–656. 
Preiato  J, Brown P & Tarca A. (2010), Mandatory Adoption of IFRS and Analysts’’ 
Forecasts: How Much Does Enforcement Matter?, UNSW Australian School of 
Business Research Paper No. 2009 ACCT 01. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499625 
Radhakrishnan S. (1999). Investors' recovery friction and auditor liability rules. The 
Accounting Review. Vol.74 (2), pp.225–240.  
References 
 199 
Raghunandan K & Rama DV. (1999). Auditor Resignations and the Market for Audit 
Services. Auditing: A journal of Practice &Theory. Vol. 18 (1). 
Rudolph, H. R., & Welker, R. B. (1998). The effects of organizational structure on 
communication within audit teams. Auditing: A journal of Practice & Theory. 
Vol. 17(2), pp.1-14. 
Sarath B. &  Wolfson M. (1993). Auditing Litigation and the Volume of Trade in 
Market Framework. In: Schwartz R. (1997). Legal Regimes, Audit Quality and 
Investment. The Accounting Review. Vol. 72 (3), pp385-406. 
Saunders M., Lewis P. & Thornhill A. (2009). Research methods for business students, 
5
th
 ed. Prentice Hall, England. 
Saunders M., Lewis P. &  Thornhill, A.(2006). Research methods for business students, 
.4
th
 ed. Prentice Hall. England. 
Schauer C. (2001). Differences in Audit Quality among Audit Firms: An Examination 
Using Bid-Ask Spreads. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Vol. 1 (4), pp.170-186. 
 
Schwartz R. (1997). Legal Regimes, Audit Quality and Investment. The Accounting 
Review. Vol. 72 (3), pp385-406. 
Schwartz R. (1998). Auditors’ liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing standards. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. Vol. 11 (2), pp.183-207 
Shibano T. (2000). Overguarding the guardians: Increasing auditor liability decrease 
new investments. In: Chao Yu H. (2001). Experimental evidence of impact of 
increasing auditors' legal liability on firms' new investments. Contemporary 
Accounting Research.Vol.18 (Fall), pp.495–528. 
Shockley R. (1981). Perceptions of auditors' independence: An empirical analysis. The 
Accounting Review. Vol.56 (4), pp.785–800. 
Simunic DA & Stein MT. (1996). The impact of litigation risk on audit pricing: A 
review of the economics and the evidence. Auditing: A journal of Practice & 
Theory. Vol. 15, supplement. 
Stice JD. (1991). Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement 
factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review.Vol.66 
(3), pp.516–533. 
Sullivan, D. (1992). Litigation risk broadly considered. In Auditing Symposium XI: 
Proceedings of the 1992 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on 
Auditing Problems. University of Kansas, KS: School of Business, pp. 49-59.  
Titman S & Trueman B. (1986). Information quality and the valuation of new issues, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (June). 
Thomas W, Ward B & Henke E. (1991). Auditing: Theory and Practice. USA: PWS 
Pub Co. 
References 
 200 
Tucker J & Zurich J. (1993). Auditors' liability to third parties under common law: 
Traditional approaches and recent trends. Ohio CPA Journal. Vol.52 (August), 
pp.25–30. 
Turner L & Godwin J. (1999). Auditing, earning management and international 
accounting issues at Securities and Exchange Commission. Accounting 
Horizons. Vol.13 (3), pp.281–297. 
Venkataraman R, Weber JP & Willenborg M. (2008). Litigation risks, audit quality and 
audit fees: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings (IPO). The Accounting 
Review. Vol.83 (5), pp.1315–1345.  
Watts R. & Zimmerman J.(1981). The Markets for Independence and Independent 
Auditor. Working Paper, University of Rochester.  
Weber J, Henry D & Lavelle L. (2001). How bad will it get?. Business Week. pp.30–32. 
Wikipedia website, accessed in 10 October 2009, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedley_Byrne_%26_Co_Ltd_v_Heller_%26_Part
ners_Ltd >. 
Wooten TC. (2003). Research about audit quality. The CPA Journal.Vol.73 (1), pp.48–
50. 
Yin, R. (2009) Case study research: Design and methods, 4th Edition. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Zhang P & Thman L. (1999). Pre-Trial settlement and the value of audits. The 
Accounting Review.Vol.74 (4), pp.473–491. 
 
Appendix 
 201 
Appendix 
 
